

# The impact of narratives on policy- making at the national level

## The case of France

**Marie Moncada**

November 2023

*BRIDGES Working Papers 20*

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101004564



---

## Authors

**Marie Moncada** is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Sciences Po's Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics (CEE). She obtained her PhD on Political Science by the University of Paris-Saclay in 2019. Her thesis deals with undocumented migrants' access to healthcare in France and the United States. The core of her research activities lies in public policy and the concerns about how to identify and test the parameters that influence its establishment and implementation. She is also interested in exploring the advantages and disadvantages of grounded theory and the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software. At BRIDGES, she carries out media and social media analysis, and participates in the study of the impact of migration narratives on French and EU policymaking.

## Reviewers

Christina Boswell and Saskia Smellie

# Contents

Abstract.....	5
1. Introduction.....	6
2. Background and national context .....	7
2.1 Key narratives on migration .....	7
2.2 Policy developments since 2012 .....	10
2.3 Public attitudes and media salience .....	11
2.4 The three case studies selected .....	12
2.5 Data .....	13
2.6 Variables.....	14
2.7 Breakdown of data by support or opposition to immigration .....	15
3. Case study 1: The European migration crisis in 2015 and the EU relocation scheme .....	17
3.1 Context .....	17
3.2 Narratives in the written press .....	18
3.3 Narratives in Parliament .....	22
3.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives .....	25
3.5 Narratives in administrative circulars .....	28
3.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres .....	30
3.7 Conclusion .....	32
4. Case study 2: The Ukrainian refugee crisis .....	33
4.1 Context .....	33
4.2 Narratives in the written press .....	33
4.3 Narratives in Parliament .....	36
4.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives .....	40
4.5 Narratives in administrative circulars .....	42
4.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres .....	44
4.7 Conclusion .....	45
5. Case study 3: the Aquarius vessel .....	46
5.1 Context .....	46
5.2 Narratives in the written press .....	46
5.3 Narratives in Parliament .....	49
5.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives .....	53
5.5 Narratives in a presidential statement .....	54
5.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres .....	55
5.7 Conclusion .....	56
6. What do the interviews say?.....	58

---

6.1 Staying informed through traditional media .....	58
6.2 Disseminating information through traditional media .....	61
7. Conclusions across the three case studies .....	62
7.1 Key narratives on the three case studies.....	62
7.2 Circulation of narratives .....	63
7.3 Lay and technocratic narratives .....	64
7.4 The government's narrative straddles lay and technocratic styles .....	66
7.5 Confirmed and refuted hypotheses.....	67
References .....	69
Annex: Sampling details of the media, political and policy analysis .....	73

---

## Abstract

This report examines the way in which narratives on migration circulate in France across communicative and coordinative spheres (Schmidt 2008). It focuses on three events: the relocation of migrants in 2015, the temporary protection triggered for the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the allocation of a port for the Aquarius in 2018. It explores whether narratives are embraced, adapted, ignored, or rejected between the media, Parliament, and administrations. The first result shows that these narratives are generally positive towards migrants because they are detached from two sensitive issues in France: the integration of immigrants and the violence they might commit. A second finding is that, overall, within the communicative sphere, parliamentarians tend to reproduce the media narrative, whereas the media tend to favour the narrative of French and European governments. As well, for the relocation and the temporary protection, the coordinative sphere (consisting of administrative circulars) has a slightly different narrative because, unlike the media and Parliament, it enforces policy solutions and does not propose any. But, for the Aquarius event, the coordinative sphere (corresponding to a presidential speech) embraces the narratives of parliamentarians and the media to counter the arguments attacking the French government. A third result proposes to distinguish between 'lay' and 'technocratic' narratives based on their content and the way in which they use the notion of 'the people'. The fourth result establishes a link between the use of 'lay' or 'technocratic' narratives by the government depending on the context in which it is situated.

**Keywords:** migration; narratives; policy-making; relocation; temporary protection; aquarius.

# 1. Introduction

BRIDGES is a H2020 research project funded by the European Commission. It focuses on **migration narratives**, i.e., written and oral discourses on migration and migrants. The narratives are ‘causal stories’ (Stone 1989) with a beginning, a middle and an end. They generally present a plot, characters (heroes, good guys, bad guys, experts, etc.), a setting and a final moral.

The drafting of this report is carried out in **Work Package 7 (WP7)** which analyses how different narratives shape, and are deployed in, the political debate and policy-making. This work package conducts comparative analysis of six European countries: **France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom**. This report is an interim report focusing on the French case only.

We distinguish two types of documents: those belonging to the **communicative sphere** (press articles and parliamentary speeches) and those belonging to the **coordinative sphere** (administrative circulars and presidential speech) (Schmidt 2008). We will observe, within the communicative sphere, how media narratives are taken up in political debate by identifying correlation or alignment across the two datasets (media narratives and narratives in parliamentary debates). We will then compare narratives between the communicative and the coordinative venues.

We will identify the level of alignment by comparing our data with the following typology (Boswell and Smellie 2023):

1. **Embracing**. Does a narrative mirror another one? Are they similar across all five dimensions (characters, settings, moral, plot, and causal mechanisms)?
2. **Adapting**. Does a narrative reflect a modified version of another one?
3. **Rejection**. Does a narrative argue against another one?
4. **Ignoring**. Is a narrative not mirrored or omitted from another one?

We will also distinguish between two styles of narrative: ‘lay’ and ‘technocratic’ (Boswell and Smellie 2023). **Lay narratives** are easily accessible and spread: ‘Lay narratives are simple, intuitive, and often highly emotive stories designed to be accessible and compelling to a broad public audience’. Conversely, **technocratic narratives** are harder to disseminate because of their complexity: they are ‘more detailed, sober, or explicitly “evidence-based”’ (Boswell and Smellie 2023, 7). We hypothesise that the communicative sphere adopts more of a lay style, whereas the coordinative sphere uses more of a technocratic style (Boswell and Smellie 2023, 9).

Finally, we are going to reason on the basis of the following **five hypotheses**:

1. Increased political salience of immigration engenders more lay (including populist) narratives, which governments will be under pressure to respond to/embrace.

2. Predominance of populist narratives leads to diversification/polarisation of different narratives across actors and venues, especially where the latter are more technocratic or 'evidence-based'.
3. Where governments are more buffered from political pressure, they are more likely to embrace technocratic narratives.
4. Where immigration is politically salient and governments are under pressure to deliver tangible outcomes, they are likely to decouple rhetorical commitment to populist narratives from more evidence-based practice.
5. Where policymakers base policy interventions on populist narratives, they may be exposed to a 'cognitive constraint' whereby expert or lay (experiential) knowledge exposes inconsistencies or inaccuracies in narratives.

We will first look at the contexts of the three events we are studying (2). We will then discuss these three events: the EU relocation scheme in 2015 (3), the reception of Ukrainians in 2022 (4) and the Aquarius affair in 2018 (5). The interviews will then give us a better understanding of how the narratives circulate (6) before concluding (7).

## 2. Background and national context

### 2.1 Key narratives on migration

The French narrative on immigration, mostly cultural, is centred on French identity, integration of immigrants and secularism (Bertossi 2012, 443). To a lesser extent, it is also concerned with security (terrorism and violence in low-income neighbourhoods). The regularisation of migrants or the economic arguments relating to social assistance (push/pull factors) or discrimination no longer dominate the French narrative. The same applies to European policies which are not generally questioned in France.

#### *a) Legalisation and Discrimination*

From the 1970s to the 1990s, France was marked by strong mobilisation of irregular migrants demanding **regularisation**. These took the form of sit-ins and hunger strikes in public places and churches (Siméant 1993). One of the most famous mobilisations is probably the one in the church of Saint Bernard in 1996, which was supported by many political and cultural figures. This also preceded the mass regularisation of illegal aliens in 1981–1982, when about 130,000 aliens were regularised (Viprey 2010).

The term '**sans-papiers**' (undocumented) took root in the debate at this time (Mouchard 2002). Subsequently, the closure of the **Sangatte** camp in 2002, the 2011 **Arab Spring**, the **migratory crisis** of 2015, the closure of the **Calais Jungle** in 2016, and the **Aquarius** in 2018 relaunched, from time to time, the debate on illegal immigrants and the control of 'migratory flows'. The dismantling of the Calais Jungle in 2016 also intensified discussions on **unaccompanied minors** in France. But the regularisation of undocumented migrants has not been a dominant theme in French public debate since the late 1990s.

The 1983 'Beurs marches' for equality and against racism denounced the **discrimination** suffered by second and third generation immigrants (Hajjat 2013; Brücker, Veron, and Lou Vertongen 2019). The term '**beur**' (or '**beurette**' for women) was then used to designate this young generation, born on French territory, and having one or both parents as immigrants from North Africa (Laronde 1988). Discrimination against people of immigrant origin is less a focus today.

### *b) Republican Integration*

From the 1980s onwards, many public debates were held on the **Republican integration** of immigrants and their descendants (Noiriel 1988; Lessana 1998; Martigny 2016:269–304). This notion of integration has become a permanent fixture in the French political landscape since the creation of the **High Council for Integration** in 1989. This concept of integration, developed by the High Council, is at the root of a transformation in the scope of secularism which, particularly since 2002, has been extended to include the fight against Muslim religious symbols in private companies and the development of the '**Muslim problem**' in politics and the media (Beaugé and Hajjat 2014).

According to the High Council, 'a policy of integration implies the adherence of all to a minimum of common values (...) the French conception of integration must obey a logic of equality and not a logic of minorities (...) [and should exclude] the institutional recognition of minorities' (High Council for Integration 1991, 18–19). To present it differently, 'the French republican model of integration (...) emphasises a common, national, civic culture instead of pluralism, an abstract concept of citizenship, **colour blindness**, and the effort that immigrants must make to integrate into the nation rather than the duty of the host society to integrate immigrants' (Lépinard 2015, 617). However, the notion of integration has been interpreted in various ways and cannot be defined as a coherent ideology (Bertossi 2012). This model is often presented in opposition to the '**Anglo-Saxon**' model by politicians and civil servants (Hargreaves 2000, 83; see also Alba 2005; Alba and Foner 2014; Martigny 2016:205–226).

A main integration-related scheme was controversial in France: the 2006 '**Reception and Integration Contract**'. The signature of this text was compulsory for all foreigners newly regularised or renewing their residence permit. It imposed compulsory civic training on institutions, the 'values of the Republic', secularism, gender equality, and optional language training (Lochak 2006). A '**Reception and Integration Contract for the Family**' was also created the following year for those whose children had benefited from family reunification (Hachimi-Alaoui 2016). These contracts were replaced in 2016 by the '**Republican Integration Contract**' with similar content. The latter is formalised by a compulsory four-day training course on 'the principles and values of French society and the Republic'.

Recurrent debates on, for example, the construction of new mosques, the presence of halal meat in canteens, the difficulty to accommodate Arabic-speaking pupils (Varro 2013) and the instruction of the Arabic language in schools also suggest that this country would be in the process of **Islamisation** (Choy 2022). This discourse would more accurately link French identity to a certain 'whiteness' of the nation (Escafré-Dublet 2019). French identity is also linked to the **Catholic religion** in some French right-wing and far-right-wing imaginations (Peker 2022) and the notion of the '**great replacement**' was gaining momentum in 2018.



### c) *Secularism*

In the early 2000s, questions were raised about the concept of secularism and the tolerance of religious symbols (Caponio and Testore 2012). Since then, a '**new secularism**', less political and more cultural, has been championed by the right and far-right mostly. It has become a feature of national identity in the face of 'the Muslim world' and 'some immigrants' who would be opposed to it. Finally, it is also opposed to Anglo-Saxon **communitarianism**, which is considered to be too lax with regard to religions (Baubérot 2021:102–121). The **Muslim women**, starting with the young '*beurette*', were, and still are often presented in France as the symbol of successful integration (Raissiguier 1999, 451; Guénif Souilamas 2000). They are said to represent the emancipation of traditions that run counter to the French Republic.

The wearing of the **veil** in places of education (school, university, etc.) and in companies is thus the subject of frequent controversy. In 2004, the wearing of the headscarf in schools was banned and the question of whether it is allowed on school trips or at school meetings (for mothers) is still being debated (Gökariksel and Mitchell 2005; Lorcerie 2008). The wearing of the **full veil** in the public space was also banned in 2010. As well, a frequent controversy since 2016 concerns the banning of the **burkini**. In 2022–2023, the government has also announced its intention to abolish the **abaya** in schools – a long women's garment that covers the entire body, except for the face and hands. The issue of the veil and the abaya has the particularity of dividing the right and the left internally, as well as the French feminist movement (Delphy 2006; Lettinga and Saharso 2014).

The State's desire to control the Muslim community is also contested (Jouanneau 2017). This control has materialised through two main mechanisms. The first is the creation of a '**French Council of the Muslim Faith**' in 2003 (de Galembert 2009). This association, placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, has the role of representing Muslims in France to the State. The second mechanism is the establishment, in 2000, of '**Principles and legal foundations governing relations between the public authorities and the Muslim faith in France**' (Koenig 2005). This text, signed by several Muslim religious associations, invited these associations to adhere to the principle of secularism. In exchange, the State committed itself to providing them with material and financial support.

### d) *Terrorism*

In the period from 1979 to 2019, France was the third most affected country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development by Islamist terrorism, based on the number of attacks (not victims), and the first most affected in the European Union (EU) (Reynié 2019). In this context, President Emmanuel Macron (2017–2027) enacted, in 2021, a **law against separatism** wishing to fight against radical Islam and the will to 'secede' from the French Republic. This law notably restricts home schooling, intensifies the monitoring of religious practices and organisations, and prohibits public service providers from wearing religious symbols (Choy 2022). It also strengthens the control of foreign funding for certain religious associations and provides a stricter framework for 'political' meetings within these associations.

## e) Council Estates

The religious dimension of integration is reflected, more generally, in the rhetoric on **violence against women** in the 2000s. Polygamy, the veil, female circumcision, forced marriages and sexist and sexual violence (like gang rapes [Mucchielli 2005]) by 'young people from council estates' are thus debated and specifically targeted at North African immigration (Hachimi-Alaoui 2016). From the 1990s, debates on council estates ('*banlieues*' or '*cités*', i.e., low-income neighbourhoods) are linked to '**ethnic alterity**, deviance and disadvantage': 'Ethnic minorities tend to appear as the causes, rather than the victims, of urban problems [in the French press]' (Hargreaves 1996, 607).

Since the 1990s, debates on **police brutality** have also been highlighted. Police officers, regularly accused of killing young men of foreign origin, are the cause of many **riots** in France (Gauthier and Jobard 2018). The best-known riots are undoubtedly those of 2005 because of their long duration (21 days) (Mauger 2006; Mucchielli and Le Goaziou 2007). The riots of 2023 were also significant because of the financial cost of their damage.

## 2.2 Policy developments since 2012

Since 1980, France has passed around **30 laws** on immigration, asylum, and nationality. On average, that's one law every year and a half (Harzoune 2023).

The 2011 reform (Law of **16 June 2011**, see references) reduces the opportunities to come and live in France. This reform relaxed the crime of solidarity and encourages highly qualified immigration. It facilitates the detention and deportation of irregular foreigners and introduces a two- to five-year ban on returning to France. It also fights more strongly against undeclared work and restricts the possibilities of naturalisation.

The 2012–2014 reforms (Laws of **31 December 2012** and **22 July 2013**, Order of **7 May 2014**, and Decree of **23 May 2014**) abolished the offence of illegal residence to comply with a ruling of the European Court of Justice. They also facilitate student immigration and the retention of young graduates.

The 2015 asylum reform (Law of **29 July 2015**) improved the material reception of asylum seekers subject to the Dublin procedure and slows down the deportation of some rejected persons. On the other hand, asylum applications are processed in an accelerated way and, for the first time, the place of accommodation of asylum seekers is addressed and imposed.

In 2016 (Law of **7 March 2016**), the duration of residence permits was extended and skilled immigration is promoted. Nevertheless, the possibility of challenging an expulsion for an asylum seeker was made more complex. The ban on returning to French territory was extended to other categories of people.

Finally, in 2018 (Laws of **20 March 2018** and **10 September 2018**), material assistance to undocumented migrants is further protected, asylum is extended to certain categories of people and skilled immigration is encouraged. On the other hand, the deportation of asylum seekers and illegal aliens is facilitated, and the naturalisation of children is made more complex, especially in overseas territories. A **new bill** is currently being debated in Parliament.

Regarding **Muslims**, three laws are important: the law banning the wearing of the headscarf in schools (**15 March 2004**), the law banning the wearing of the burqa in public spaces (**11 October 2010**), and finally, the law against separatism (**24 August 2021**) aimed at controlling the Muslim community. These three laws were discussed in the previous section.

## 2.3 Public attitudes and media salience

### *a) Public Attitudes*

In 2021, compared to the European average, the French considered that **immigrants were less well integrated** in France, that the French government was not doing enough to integrate them, and that immigration was more of a problem than an opportunity for the country. The French also tended to **overestimate illegal immigration** (Eurobarometer 2021).


The focus on 'integration' is partly explained by the surveys for Western Europe: 'France has relatively negative attitudes to immigration when compared with other Western European countries. (...) The French see **cultural assimilation** as more important when deciding who should be allowed to immigrate than economic self-sufficiency' (Dennison and Talò 2017).

On the other hand, while immigration was considered by the French to be an important issue in **2015–2018**, at both the French and European levels, this priority has dropped considerably since then (Eurobarometer 2022). Similarly, between 2010 and 2020, the French have increasingly considered that immigrants make France '**a better place to live**' (European Social Survey 2020).

### *b) Media Salience*

There are several peaks in coverage on the 'illegal border crossings' in France: the closure of the **Sangatte** camp in northern France (2002), the controversial debate on an **immigration law** tightening the conditions for entering France (Law of 24 July 2006, see references), the **Arab Spring** (2011), the '**migration crisis**' following the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts (2015), the closure of the **Calais** camp (2016) and the arrival of the **Aquarius** in Europe (2018).

**GRAPH 1. Media salience on illegal immigration**



*HITS: (immigr\* OR migr\*) AND (illegal\* OR clandestine\* OR Mediterranean OR Channel)*

*PERIOD: From 1 January 2000 to 20 July 2023*

*SOURCE: Europresse (Le Figaro, Le Monde, Libération – printed version)*

Two of the events we are going to study (relocation and Aquarius) take place in the context of a peak in media coverage on 'illegal' immigration (2015–2018), but this peak diminishes considerably for our third event (the war in Ukraine in 2022).

## 2.4 The three case studies selected

The first case study is the **EU relocation scheme in 2015**. Relocation refers to the transfer of people in need of international protection from one European Member State to another. Faced with the influx of immigrants landing on the Italian and Greek coasts, the European Commission proposed a relocation plan in September 2015. Each Member State undertook to take in a certain number of asylum seekers over a two-year period.

The second case study concerns the triggering of temporary protection for people fleeing the war in **Ukraine** following the Russian invasion on 24 February **2022**. The EU countries implemented in March 2022 a mechanism that had never been used before: the Council Directive of 20 July 2001 (see references).

Finally, the third case study concerns the **Aquarius in 2018**. The Aquarius was a humanitarian vessel chartered by the NGOs SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders in the Mediterranean. In June 2018, after a rescue operation, the Aquarius found itself with more than 600 migrants on board. Italy and Malta refused to allow it to dock in their ports. After several days of waiting and negotiations, Spain finally offered to receive the migrants on board in Valencia. The Aquarius has been the subject of intense media and political debate in France, not least because of the 'migration crisis'.

## 2.5 Data<sup>1</sup>

The data is gathered from press articles, parliamentary debates (communicative sphere) and administrative documents (coordinative sphere). Five interviews also shed light on the results.

Regarding **press articles**, first, each event has 12 press articles: four from *Le Figaro* (right), *Le Monde* (centre-left) and *Libération* (left) (Ifop 2022). For relocation, the latter have a high number of ‘relocation\*’ hits. The period selected runs from 20 August to 25 September 2015. It is deliberately broad because, except for *Le Monde*, it was very difficult to find articles from *Le Figaro* and *Libération* dealing with the subject. The search hits are as follows: ‘relocat\* AND (europ\* OR eu) AND asylum’.

For the war in Ukraine, I mainly focused on articles containing these occurrences in the title (and not in the whole text as I did for the relocation and the Aquarius): ‘ukrain\* and (migr\* or immigr\* or asylum or refugee\* or exile\*)’. The period selected runs from 26 February to 1 April 2022.

Finally, for Aquarius, I mainly focused on articles with the hit ‘aquarius’ throughout the text. The period selected runs from 12 to 19 June 2018. As a reminder, the Aquarius rescue of migrants took place on 9 and 10 June 2018.

As regards the **parliamentary debates** on relocation, I first collected the debates on the websites of the National Assembly and the Senate using the hits ‘relocalis\* AND migr\*’. I then carried out a hit search on NVivo to select the documents (relocalis\* AND [refugees OR asylum OR migr\* OR immigr\* OR foreigners]). I then quickly read through the debates, searching for certain keywords (relocalis\*, Visegrád, hotspot, 40,000, 160,000, etc.) to select the main statements made in the Chamber. Interjections and short answers have not been included. The testimony of each politician was copied into Excel on a given date. The same Excel cell can therefore contain several oral interventions by the same politician, provided that these interventions were made on the same day. The sample consists of 38 cells containing these testimonials.

For the war in Ukraine, I carried out three separate searches on the National Assembly and Senate websites to collect as many parliamentary debates as possible (ukrain\* AND refugees; ukrain\* AND asylum; ukrain\* AND ‘temporary protection’). I then selected my documents on NVivo (ukrain\* AND [refugees OR asylum OR migr\* OR immigr\* OR foreigners]). Finally, I read the debates using certain keywords (temporary protection, réfug\*, asile, accueil\*, etc.). Interjections and brief responses were not included. The testimonies are divided into 51 cells.

For the Aquarius case, I collected the parliamentary debates on the National Assembly and Senate websites using the keyword ‘aquarius’. I then read the debates to select the testimonies using the same keyword. This time, interjections and short answers were selected to increase the sample, which was in danger of being too small. The testimonies are divided into 61 cells.

---

<sup>1</sup> For further information on the methodology and operationalisation of this research, see Boswell and Smellie (2023).

Finally, **administrative documents** were retrieved from three sites: 'Légifrance' (<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>), 'Government' (<https://www.gouvernement.fr/>) and 'Vie publique' (<https://www.vie-publique.fr/>). A set of circulars (excluding Aquarius), official press releases and interviews were collected in all three cases. The final sample consists of six circulars (relocation), three circulars (Ukraine) and one presidential press release (Aquarius). Administrative circulars are technical documents that must apply the law. They are intended primarily for government departments, but not for anyone outside the government. It is therefore impossible to find circulars referring to the Aquarius, as this event does not refer to any legal text. The only alternative for Aquarius was to use a presidential press release, but this document straddles the communicative and coordinative spheres.

The chronological breakdown of the documents is given at the end of each section.

## 2.6 Variables

The data was coded using **Excel**. Each line corresponds to a document (press article, administrative circular or presidential press release) or a parliamentary testimony (i.e., a speaker speaking one or more times on the same day).

The Narrative Policy Framework defines four variables to describe a narrative (Jones, Shanahan, and McBeth 2014). These variables were divided into columns (characters, settings, moral of the story and plots). **Characters** are the characters in the story. The *hero* solves or promises to solve the policy problem. The *victim* is harmed by the policy problem. The *villain* causes the policy problem.

The **settings** define the issue at stake in terms of time and geography. I am concentrating here on the *geographical* dimension only, listing the countries, individuals and organisations mentioned. The **moral of the story** corresponds to the *policy solution* envisaged.

Finally, the **plots** are made up of seven sub-variables (Stone 2002, 138–145):

- *Decline*: the situation is bad, and no effective solution is envisaged. 'In the beginning, things were pretty good. But they got worse. In fact, right now, they are nearly intolerable. Something must be done' (Stone 2002, 138).
- *Stymied Progress*: the situation will improve if these measures are adopted and implemented quickly. 'In the beginning things were terrible. Then things got better, thanks to a certain someone. But now somebody or something is interfering with our hero, so things are going to get terrible again' (Stone 2002, 139–142).
- *Change is an illusion*: people think the situation is going to get better when in fact it is going to get worse (or vice versa). 'You always thought things were getting worse (or better). But you were wrong. Let me show you some evidence that things are in fact going in the opposite direction. Decline (or improvement) was an illusion' (Stone 2002, 142).

- *Helplessness*: the situation is bad because nothing can be changed. 'The situation is bad. We have always believed that the situation was out of control, something we had to accept but could not influence' (Stone 2002, 142).
- *Control*: the necessary measures have been adopted and are working or should work quickly. 'Now, however, let me show you that in fact we can control things' (Stone 2002, 142).
- *Conspiracy*: fated bad situation is in fact controlled by a selected few. 'Its plot moves us from the realm of fate to the realm of control, but it claims to show that all along control has been in the hands of a few who have used it to their benefit and concealed it from the rest of us' (Stone 2002, 143).
- *Blame the Victim*: the victims must put an end to the situation they are suffering because they alone are responsible for it. '[It] locates control in the very people who suffer the problem' (Stone 2002, 144).

These plots are accompanied by **causal links** to describe a relationship between a policy problem and its potential cause (Stone 1989):

- *Intentional* (purposeful, intended): harm is a known externality (examples: assault, oppression, conspiracies that work, programmes that work).
- *Inadvertent* (purposeful, unintended): harm incurred at someone's hands, but it was not intended (examples: intervening conditions, unforeseen side effects, neglect, carelessness omission).
- *Accidental* (unguided, unintended): harm could not have been avoided (examples: nature, weather, earthquakes, machines that run amok).
- *Mechanical* (unguided, intended): things that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed, or trained by humans to produce certain consequences (examples: intervening agent, machines, trained animals, brainwashed people).

Finally, three sub-variables are used to summarise the narrative ('**meta narrative**'): '*For*' (in favour of immigration), '*Against*' (in opposition to immigration) and '*Ambiguous*' (neither for nor against immigration).

## 2.7 Breakdown of data by support or opposition to immigration

The table below summarises these positions ('For', 'Against', and 'Ambiguous') according to the institution (media, Parliament, or government) and events (media and Parliament combined – government excluded). The total of each box is 100%.

**TABLE 1. Breakdown of data by support or opposition to immigration**

Data	Total (100%)	Event	Total (100%)
<b>Le Figaro (right)</b>	<b>58.3% Ambiguous</b> 41.7% For	<b>Relocation</b>	<b>56% Ambiguous</b> 30% For 8% Against 4% Ambiguous/For 2% Ambiguous/Against
<b>Le Monde (centre-left)</b>	<b>91.7% For</b> 8.3% Ambiguous/For		
<b>Libération (left)</b>	<b>75% For</b> 16.7% Unknown 8.3% Ambiguous		
<b>National Assembly</b>	<b>54.5% For</b> 25% Ambiguous 10.2% Against 4.6% Unknown 3.4% Ambiguous/For 2.3% Ambiguous/Against	<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>77.7% For</b> 12.7% Ambiguous 4.8% Unknown 3.2% Ambiguous/Against 1.6% Against
<b>Senate</b>	<b>47.6% For</b> 39.4% Ambiguous 8.2% Against 1.6% Ambiguous/For 1.6% Ambiguous/Against 1.6% Unknown		
<b>Administrative circulars and presidential press release</b>	<b>100% For</b>	<b>Aquarius</b>	<b>52.8% For</b> 25% Ambiguous 12.5% Against 5.5% Unknown 4.2% For/Ambiguous

SOURCE: own elaboration

First, a comparison between newspapers shows a distinction between stories according to their political position: *Le Figaro* (right) is less in favour of immigration than *Le Monde* (centre-left) and *Libération* (left). However, this result does not hold true for the latter two newspapers: *Le Monde* (centre-left) is more in favour of immigration than *Libération* (left).

Second, the Senate and the National Assembly have a comparable position on immigration. However, their rates (47.6% and 54.5%, respectively) are lower than the whole press. Parliament thus presents a more negative image of migrants than the national press. This result is surprising in the light of a previous report (Moncada 2023). The latter highlighted the negative statements made by the French media (*Le Figaro* mostly) for two events in France: the burkini controversy in 2016 and the attack on the basilica in Nice in 2020. These negative discourses show that the integration of immigrants and the violence they can commit are two sensitive points in the French narrative. In comparison, the three events we are studying here are less controversial. They are unique in that they concern the European level – a level of little interest to the French. As well, illegal border crossings and asylum are relatively insignificant subjects in France compared to the veil and terrorism.



This result is also surprising for a second reason. According to the same report (Moncada 2023), the French media in general, and the written press in particular, give a much higher profile to right-wing and far-right politicians than to left-wing and far-left politicians. It is therefore possible that French parliamentarians deliberately adopt a more populist and less technocratic tone than the French media by putting forward negative rhetoric about immigration.

Lastly, the war in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Aquarius are the two events where opinions are most positive (Parliament and media combined). Relocation is the episode which, in these two spheres, gives rise to the most negative views. The ranking of these three events confirms the major variables in the scientific literature (European Social Survey 2018; Bansak & al. 2016). In the case of Ukraine (which is predominantly Christian), this is in line with studies showing that the feeling of cultural similarity in France encourages a positive attitude towards immigration. Conversely, Muslims (the majority in Syria) are the subject of more negative attitudes (relocation). Similarly, the temporal evolution of attitudes towards these three events (from the most negative to the most positive) is in line with the fact that the French are increasingly positive about immigration. Finally, the overall positive attitude towards the three events also shows that the 'merit' of migration is linked with the moral and physical suffering of migrants (European Social Survey 2018; Bansak & al. 2016).

This interview respondent, working for an administration, also notes the different treatment of Syrians (relocation) and Ukrainians in France:

There was a mobilisation of the population, of local authorities for the Syrians (...) but frankly, compared to the one that was declared for the Ukrainians, it has no comparison. (...) The mobilisation for the Ukrainians was in no way comparable to that for the Syrians. And I'm not even going to mention the Afghans [since 2021], where there was a small mobilisation, and frankly, nothing to do with that. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

## 3. Case study 1: The European migration crisis in 2015 and the EU relocation scheme

### 3.1 Context

Implemented by two decisions of the Council of the EU on 14 and 22 September 2015 (see references), the 'relocation' programme consisted of transferring asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU Member States, which were then responsible for examining their asylum applications. It can therefore be seen as a temporary derogation from the Dublin Regulation. It followed an intensification of the conflict in Syria and an increase in migrant arrivals and shipwrecks at sea. The photograph of little Alan Kurdi, taken in September 2015, became world famous in this context. The expression 'migratory crisis' was also becoming widespread around the world (Cantat, Pécoud, and Thiollat 2023).

Relocation was proposed according to a distribution key based on quantifiable criteria (population size of the State considered for 40%, GDP for 40%, average number of previous asylum applications for 10% and unemployment rate for 10%). France would have to take in 30,750 people over two years.

The plan was to relocate 160,000 migrants across Europe. In 2017, the Member States only achieved around 30% of this target. France achieved 21.7% of its national targets. The countries most in breach were those in the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia mostly) as well as Poland, Austria, Croatia, and Bulgaria (Durand 2017). Since 2017, the programme has been regularly criticised for failing to meet its commitments.

### 3.2 Narratives in the written press

The media's 'heroes' are essentially the EU, which is behind the relocation scheme, and the Member States that accept it. The first victims are the asylum seekers. The main villains are Viktor Orbán (Hungarian Prime Minister) and the Visegrád group, who were against relocation.

This story takes place at the EU level (settings). The main solutions favoured are relocation and hotspots (moral). Finally, the media narrative strongly encourages ('Intentional') the adoption of these two measures ('Stymied Progress') to put an end to a situation deemed problematic.

#### a) Characters

*Le Figaro's* main heroes are the 'Juncker Commission' and the 'European Parliament', which are encouraging the introduction of relocation. By extension, the EU countries that agree to this distribution of migrants are also presented as heroes. To a lesser extent, anyone who helps refugees is praised.

*Le Monde's* heroes focus solely on the Member States accepting relocation (mainly Luxembourg, France, and Germany) and the European institutions promoting it (represented by Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk).

Finally, *Libération's* heroes are diverse and singular. The paper highlights the UN bodies because of the support they give to migrants. The same applies to 'associations' and 'NGOs'. The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons is also praised for the agents it sends to the East to process asylum applications as part of the relocation process. Finally, the European Commission and the countries that agree to receive asylum seekers (Germany in particular) are also seen as heroes.

The victims are the same in all three newspapers, and mainly concern asylum seekers. *Le Figaro* adds a nuance by emphasising 'real' asylum seekers. Greece is also seen by this newspaper as a victim of the 'colossal burden' of migration. *Le Monde's* victims are only asylum seekers. *Libération's* victims are not limited to asylum seekers, but include migrants in general.

Finally, the villains are diverse. For all three newspapers, the most prominent villain is Viktor Orbán and his 'populism'. *Le Figaro's* villains primarily concern the Visegrád group, which

rejects relocation, as well as Spain, which opposes its compulsory nature. *Le Figaro* also refers to illegal immigration and 'bogus' asylum seekers.

The villains of *Le Monde* refer mainly to countries opposed to relocation: the Visegrád group but also Romania. Some of these countries are also singled out for their anti-Islamic narrative (Hungary, Slovakia and the Polish PiS [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość] party) and their use of firearms at their borders (Hungary).

Finally, *Libération's* villains are once again the Visegrád group, but also Romania, Austria, Slovenia, and Spain, which are opposed to the compulsory nature of relocation. The finger is also pointed at illegal immigration and people smugglers. Finally, *Libération* once again adds an international dimension by condemning the countries destabilising the Middle East region (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies) and inviting the stakeholders in the Syrian conflict to hold talks at the UN (Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States).

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The top ten geographical areas used by the media were: 'Greece' (9.2%), 'the Union' (8.9%), 'the EU' (7%), 'France' (5.9%), 'countries' (5.6%), 'member' (5%), 'Brussels' (3.9%), 'states' (3.3%), 'Poland' (3.3%) and 'Balkans' (3.1%). The percentage is based on the results of a search of 350 occurrences relating to a geographical area.

This result shows that the narrative focuses on migrants in Greece and, to a lesser extent, Poland, and on the need to reach an agreement at European level, between Member States. The Balkan route is also mentioned. The European level is highly favoured. Therefore, the narrative is framed as an EU and international issue and not as a domestic issue.

### **People Mentioned**

The persons mentioned (in inverted commas) were collected in a systematic way. The distribution highlights the European dimension of the event in two ways: firstly, the diversity of the European institutions represented, and secondly, the European nationalities of the politicians mentioned. The Franco-German couple (Angela Merkel and François Hollande) are highlighted because of the driving role they played in introducing relocation. The same applies to Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs, who strongly supported the scheme. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, defends the introduction of permanent and binding relocation. Finally, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is mentioned because of his virulent opposition to the scheme. There is no correlation between the political stance of the newspaper and that of the people quoted.

Non-political actors are also a valuable source of information for understanding the differences in narratives between newspapers. The only non-political stakeholders quoted by the written press are in *Libération*. *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* only quote politicians. Unsurprisingly, this left-wing newspaper mostly supports the views of organisations that are positive towards

immigrants (2 people from NGOs [Non-governmental organisations] and one from the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]).

The weak presence of French political figures and the absence of non-political figures in two newspapers show a relative national disinterest in relocation.

### ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The political figures mentioned but not quoted in inverted commas reveal that *Le Figaro* focuses on the Franco-German couple, whereas *Le Monde* and *Libération* place greater emphasis on the European dimension of relocation. The only non-European politician (Barack Obama) is present in *Libération*, which reinforces the international dimension of the newspaper. The European dimension of *Le Monde* and the international dimension of *Libération* are also reflected in the way they use political organisations. Finally, regarding non-politicians, the right-wing newspaper mentions Daesh, while the centre-left and left-wing newspapers mention Aylan Kurdi and NGOs respectively on two occasions.

The three newspapers also highlight the existence of a common European identity using the expressions 'we Europeans' (*Le Figaro*), 'European peoples' (*Le Monde*) and 'our common European civilisation' (*Libération*). They also refer to populism, particularly when referring to Viktor Orbán (*Le Figaro* and *Libération*).

### ***c) Moral of the Story***

Policy solutions are categorised as follows: relocation (24%), hotspots (20%), international (15.2%), safe countries of origin (9%), borders (7.6%), asylum (6%), regularisation (4.6%), smugglers (4.6%), Frontex (3%), Schengen (3%) and Dublin Regulation (3%).

The solutions relating to relocation stress, in part, the urgent need for permanent and compulsory relocation, particularly at *Monde* and *Figaro*. They are not just aimed at Greece and Italy, but also at statutory refugees who have been recognised mainly in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Some newspapers encourage the high estimates targeted for Europe: 160.000 over two years for the European Commission (*Figaro*), or even 200,000 for António Guterres (UNHCR and current Secretary General of the United Nations) (*Libération*).

In addition to Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, hotspots were also being proposed in Serbia and Macedonia. The newspapers insist on a full and thorough examination of individual situations (*Libération*), the importance of fingerprinting and the return of irregular migrants (*Figaro*). Others want to avoid detention (*Libération*) and propose sending teams from European agencies to help the national authorities (*Figaro*).

The international solutions are varied. They propose increasing financial and humanitarian aid from the Middle East in the short and long term (*Libération*). Financial support is also targeted at countries and organisations helping refugees (UNHCR, World Food Programme, Unicef, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Serbia and UN agencies in Africa) (*Libération*). It is also proposed to put pressure on Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States, in particular, to put an end to the Syrian conflict (*Libération*). Other newspapers encourage the Franco-German partnership to assert itself more explicitly as the driving force in resolving this crisis

(*Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*). Greece and Italy are encouraged not to send Syrian refugees back to Macedonia and Germany, respectively (*Libération*). Finally, some newspapers encouraged the proliferation of readmission agreements to facilitate the expulsion of illegal aliens (*Le Figaro* and *Libération*). They also suggest setting up centres to help people return to their countries of origin and prevent them from leaving (*Figaro*).

It is also proposed that a common list of safe countries of origin be drawn up at European level. However, the exact list is controversial: some suggest including Kosovo, Turkey and, more generally, the Balkan countries (the three newspapers). Others suggest excluding the Balkans (*Le Figaro*).

The issue of external borders is also ambivalent: some suggest strengthening them (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*), while others condemn the erection of walls (Spain at Ceuta and Melilla, Bulgaria and its Turkish border, Hungary and its Serbian border, Greece and its Turkish border) (*Libération*). Hungary has also been criticised for the use of firearms on its borders (*Le Monde*).

Solutions on asylum are also varied. They propose establishing a unified European asylum system (*Le Monde*) and consider that refugees should not be able to choose their host country (*Le Figaro*). Some articles encourage regularisations so that economic migrants do not take greater risks (*Figaro* and *Libération*). Finally, the smugglers must be arrested, Frontex must be strengthened, the Schengen area must be maintained, and the Dublin regulation must be suspended or amended (all three newspapers).

#### d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms

Four 'plots' are identified for relocation. Each policy solution is attached to one or more plots depending on whether the measure is adopted or considered. Other phrases can be added to the classification of these solutions. The four plots are as follows: Stymied Progress (77%), Control (15.4%), Decline (6.1%), and Blame the victims (1.5%).

The overall narrative strongly encourages the adoption of targeted measures that are considered to be effective. *Le Figaro* insists on controlling the situation. This newspaper is also the only one to blame the victims by considering that asylum applications should be systematically requested at the borders of Europe and not within it. Conversely, *Libération* and, to a lesser extent, *Le Monde* are the only ones to mention a decline. This decline concerns the return of Syrian refugees by Greece and Italy to Macedonia and Germany, respectively. It also contests the erection of walls on the borders of European countries and the use of firearms by Hungary at its borders.

Most of the causal links are 'intentional' in the sense that the adoption of effective measures would (or do) put an end to the situation. Responsibility therefore rests on the shoulders of the Member States, particularly those opposed to relocation. Only *Libération* also uses an 'accidental' narrative, arguing that the main nationalities of irregular migrants in Europe come from war zones (Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Eritreans). The second type of 'accidental' narrative recalls that '2,350 people have died at sea since the beginning of 2015' (*Libération*). A third type of causal mechanism in *Libération* is 'Inadvertent': countries destabilise the Middle East region without necessarily seeking to do so (the United States, the United Kingdom,

Australia, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies). These causal links, specific to *Libération*, reveal once again the international dimension of the newspaper.

#### *e) Narrative Style*

The media narrative of the relocation is mainly 'lay' for the following reasons. Its characters are clearly defined and their respective responsibilities in the unfolding of the action are shown. The heroes and villains are polarised, and the allocation of blame is clear. Even if these characters sometimes differ from one newspaper to another, they are always given a clear and distinct characterisation. The settings are focused on a specific scene where the main tensions of the story are concentrated. The solutions are gathered in two main devices that are almost unanimously accepted. The plots and causal links strongly encourage the rapid adoption of the proposed solutions.

### **3.3 Narratives in Parliament**

Parliament's essential hero is France. The victims are the asylum seekers. The villains are the Visegrád group, France and other migrants (not asylum seekers or refugees). The story is set at the level of France and the EU (settings). The main solutions envisaged are relocation and hotspots (moral). Finally, the Parliament considers that the most effective measures have already been adopted ('Control') and that they are the most likely to resolve this problematic situation ('Intentional').

#### *a) Characters*

The main hero defined by the Parliament is 'France' (45.4%), including, albeit to a lesser extent, its administrations (including the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons), its ministers, its President of the Republic and one of its parliamentary committees on European affairs. The second most frequently mentioned hero is 'Europe' or the 'European Union' (23.6%), including, to a lesser extent, meetings of European interior ministers, Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office. Germany, German public opinion (9%) and the European Commission (9%) are also seen as heroes. The political colour is relatively homogenous for this distribution.

The three main victims highlighted by MPs are refugees and asylum seekers (46%), 'migrants' (24%) and countries of first entry (Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Hungary, Serbia, Turkey) (20%). The political distinction here is very clear: the right and the centre-right support refugees and asylum seekers, while the left and the far-left focus more on migrants. The centre-left is halfway between these two poles.

Finally, the villains are heterogeneous. Three main villains are identified. The first concerns Member States refusing relocation (Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia) (27.7%). The second relates to 'illegal immigrants', 'other migrants' (some of whom come from safe countries of origin [Albania and Kosovo in particular]), 'illegal economic immigration', 'non-refugees' and even 'foreigners registered in international police files' (23.4%). The third concerns France (19.1%). To a lesser extent, people smugglers (8.5%) and politicians who want to abolish Schengen are also highlighted (6.4%). Member states refusing relocation are attacked across the French political spectrum. By contrast, 'illegal immigrants' and 'non-

refugees' (in particular) are targeted by the right, centre-right and centre-left. 'France' is singled out by the opposition (right and far-left). Finally, smugglers and those who want to abolish Schengen are highlighted by the majority (centre-left).

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The first occurrences of the 350 geographical occurrences are: 'France' (19.6%), 'the Union' (13.2%), 'Greece' (10.2%), 'Schengen' (9.8%), 'states' (6.8%), 'member' (6.4%), 'countries' (5.3%), 'hot' (4.9%), 'spots' (4.9%) and 'of origin' (4.5%).

This result shows that the narrative focuses on France, the EU and the Member States (as actors) and on the Schengen area (as an area to be modified). Migrants in Greece are also a concern for the Parliament. The same applies to the countries of origin of these migrants. Hotspots are also an area of debate.

### **Speakers**

The following table shows that positions 'for or against' immigration are broadly in line with the political colour of the speaker. The colour of the majority (centre-left) is underlined in the table.

**TABLE 2. Relocation: breakdown of speakers in Parliament by support or opposition to immigration**

	<b>For</b>	<b>Ambiguous</b>	<b>Against</b>
<b>Far-right</b>			
<b>Right</b>		6	4
<b>Centre-right</b>		3	
<b>Centre</b>			
<b><u>Centre-left</u></b>	4	15	
<b>Left</b>	1		
<b>Far-left</b>	3	2	

POLITICAL POSITION: Right: Les Républicains; Centre-right: Union des démocrates et indépendants; Centre-left: Europe Écologie Les Verts, Parti radical de gauche, and Parti socialiste; Left: Nouvelle Donne; Far-left: Parti communiste français.

SOURCE: own elaboration

### **Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted**

The organisations and people mentioned by the MPs were public organisations in the EU (40%), French politicians (27.6%), French public organisations (22%), UN bodies (4.7%) and others (5.7%). The French Parliament is mainly concerned about the formal and informal meetings of European interior ministers (14.3%) and the European Commission's proposal on relocation (13.3%). The event is thus seen in its European dimension. The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons is another French body of interest to politicians (9.5%). The resources of this agency have been strengthened because its agents are dispatched to Europe's external borders to help process asylum applications. This agency

also provides statistics on asylum used by the Parliament. Frontex (4.8%) and the top three French figures in charge of immigration (Prime Minister [5.7%], Minister of the Interior [4.8%] and President of the Republic [4.8%]) were the other most frequently cited protagonists. Political colour does not seem to have an impact on this distribution.

The expressions referring to the public are numerous. Regarding the French, MPs referred to 'the French' (right), 'our fellow citizens' (far-left and centre-right), 'our public opinion' (centre-left), 'our people' (centre-left) and 'national representation' (right). They also refer to 'the Europeans' (centre-left) and the 'genuine popular enthusiasm' in Germany for welcoming refugees (centre-left). Finally, the centre-left refers to 'nationalist populism' and populists, targeting the right and the Front National for their opposition to immigrants.

### *c) Moral of the Story*

Most of the solutions proposed relate to relocation (36.5%), hotspots (17.3%) and borders (16.3%). The other solutions are more scattered and relate to international issues (6.7%), safe countries of origin (5.8%), asylum in Europe (3.8%), the Schengen area (3.8%), speeding up the asylum procedure in France (2.8%), legalisation (2%), the Eurodac file (2%), smugglers (1%) and others (2%).

The entire political spectrum is encouraging the relocation of migrants. The centre-left majority also insists on the need to create additional accommodation places and to help willing municipalities to take in people. The centre-left occasionally envisages permanent and compulsory relocation. Similarly, the centre-left and extreme left are encouraging an increase in the number of relocations. The right-wing is equally divided, with a first part hoping for relocation and a second part opposing it or, at the very least, wanting to reduce the number of relocations.

All political colours are equally in favour of the introduction of hotspots, with the notable exception of the far-left which is opposed. Borders are the subject of several recommendations: the creation of a corps of European border guards and coastguards, the strengthening of Europe's external borders and an increase in refoulements at European borders (by Frontex in particular).

The international aspect is also varied. It encourages readmission agreements and partnerships with countries of origin. It also proposes funding for UN organisations with a dual objective: to encourage the economic development of countries of emigration (and thus curb immigration) and to help migrants. The international section also promotes financial support for the Member States 'most affected' by immigration and calls on non-European countries (including the United States) to take in Syrian refugees.

The establishment of a list of safe countries of origin divides the left and centre-left, with some in favour and others opposed. The centre-left is also in favour of establishing a unified European asylum system, maintaining the Schengen area, speeding up the asylum procedure in France (which can take more than a year) and registering migrants' fingerprints in the Eurodac database. Regularisation is also a divisive issue: the far-left wants to welcome more migrants, while the right wants to reduce the length of residence permits granted to refugees



(from 10 to 5 years renewable). Finally, the far-left is proposing a crackdown on people smugglers.

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

Four 'plots' are identified for relocation. Each policy solution is attached to one or more plots depending on whether the measure is adopted or considered. The four plots are as follows: Control (51.9%), Stymied Progress (26.9%), Decline (13.5%), and Blame the victims (7.7%).

The centre-left majority insists, by far and logically, on controlling the situation. The opposition is relatively evenly distributed between 'Control', 'Stymied Progress' and 'Decline'. However, the Right is the opposition colour that places the most emphasis on Decline. It is also the only political tendency to use the term 'Blame the victim', synonymous with a reduction in immigration or even the expulsion of statutory refugees due to the risk of encouraging the arrival of more immigrants. In a minority, 'Stymied Progress' and 'Decline' are also envisaged by the centre-left.

Almost all the causal links are of the 'Intentional' type because they are linked to a political solution. However, there are three 'accidental' links. On the one hand, the centre-left believes that France can absorb new applications because previous asylum applications have been stable or even falling for several years (2 links). On the other hand, the centre-right believes that France is experiencing an increase in asylum applications (third link). A final link, of the 'Inadvertent' type, is used by the right, which believes that the war against the Islamic State will increase the influx of migrants into France and Europe.

#### *e) Narrative Style*

Parliament's narrative is essentially 'lay'. The heroes, villains and victims are clearly defined, even if they may contradict each other due to the conflict between the majority and the opposition ('France' as hero and villain, for example). The settings focus on just two geographical scenes that condense the actions of the story. The solutions put forward are also few in number (only three) and are strongly supported by plots and causal links.

### **3.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives**

Overall, the narratives told by the media and politicians are similar ('embracing'). They both stress the need for Europe-wide relocation and hotspots. The main hero is the EU which is promoting this solution. The villains are the Member States that are opposed. The 'Settings' therefore focus on the EU. Overall, the media and the Parliament show a high level of confidence in these solutions (importance of the 'Stymied Progress', 'Control' and 'Intentional' parameters).

#### *a) Characters*

Most archetypal characters appear in both the media and in Parliament, suggesting that narratives are 'embraced' within the communicative sphere. The heroes of the media and the Parliament refer to Europe (European Commission and European Parliament). The victims are asylum seekers. To a lesser extent, they relate to migrants in general for *Libération*, the left

and the far-left. The villains are essentially the Visegrád group (Viktor Orbán in particular) and illegal immigration (including, by extension, 'bogus asylum' seekers, other migrants, and smugglers).

Some characters are also not to be found in Parliament and in the media ('ignoring'). Some heroes in the media refer to the Member States accepting relocation, UN bodies and associations. Conversely, the Parliament's heroes include France and Germany (French administrations, German public opinion, etc.).

As well, some of the media's victims are the 'real' asylum seekers, while the Parliament's correspond to the countries of the first entry (for different reasons depending on political leanings). Finally, one media outlet accuses foreign countries of destabilising the Middle East, while opposition MPs associate the French government with the villain. France is thus presented as both a hero and a villain by Parliament.

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The geographical 'settings' focus on the EU and its Member States. They also focus on migrants living in Greece ('embracing'). However, the Parliament is also focusing on France, suggesting some adaption in political debate.

### **Persons Quoted and Mentioned**

Two relationships are identified here: that suggests that narratives are both 'embraced' and 'adapted'. The 'embracing' category concerns the European dimension of the event. The people quoted by the media have a European dimension because of the diversity of the European institutions represented and their nationalities. *Le Monde* and *Libération* also emphasise the European dimension of relocation because of the political organisations and personalities they mention (without naming them). The first category of organisations and individuals mentioned by the Parliament also concerns public organisations in the EU.

The second 'embracing' relationship concerns the international dimension of the narrative. In both cases, this dimension is not very pronounced, but it does exist. In the media, this dimension is most prominent in *Libération*, which mentions various elements (UN bodies, Barack Obama, etc.) without citing them. MPs also refer to UN bodies.

The 'adapting' relationship also refers to four phenomena. The first concerns the importance given to French politicians and public organisations. However, this similarity is relative: the Parliament focuses mainly on France, while the media, and in particular *Le Figaro*, highlight the Franco-German couple (Angela Merkel and François Hollande).

The second example that suggests the adaption of narratives refers to the way in which Europeans are named. The media construct a common European identity ('we Europeans', 'European peoples', 'our common European civilisation') while the Parliament refers only to 'Europeans'.

The third 'adaptation' refers to the notion of 'populism': this expression is used to describe the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orbán) in the press, while among the Parliament it refers to the right and extreme right.

The fourth 'adaptation' refers to the way in which the French are described. The press is quick to refer to 'public debate', while MPs take a keen interest in 'our public opinion', 'the French', 'our fellow citizens', 'our people' and 'national representation'.

### *c) Moral of the Story*

Many of the desired solutions are mirrored across media coverage and political debate, suggestion that narrative are 'embraced'. They encourage the relocation of migrants (permanent and compulsory for some) and the creation of hotspots. Drawing up a list of safe countries of origin is also the subject of controversy in the media and in Parliament (list or not, inclusion of Balkan countries or not). The Schengen area is defended on both sides. The media and Parliament are also encouraging the introduction of a unified European asylum system. Finally, the fight against people smugglers was recommended.

Other solutions are 'adapted'. First, the international aspect is not treated in the same way. The media suggest increasing financial and humanitarian aid from the Middle East and UN agencies, putting pressure on certain countries that are destabilising the region, strengthening the Franco-German partnership, banning Greece and Italy from sending refugees back, increasing the number of readmission agreements, and creating centres to help people return and prevent them from leaving their countries. Parliament also wants to encourage readmission agreements and partnerships with countries of origin. It also proposes to fund UN organisations. But it also wants to fund the Member States most affected by immigration and calls on non-European countries (including the United States) to take in Syrian refugees.

References to border controls as a solution are also 'adapted'. The press is divided on this issue, with some suggesting that the borders should be strengthened and others condemning the erection of walls and the use of firearms at internal borders. On the other hand, the Parliament is unanimous on the need to strengthen external borders (notably by creating a corps of European borders and coastguards) and to increase refoulements. However, the media and political spheres both advocate strengthening Frontex in terms of equipment and staff.

Finally, regularisations are also solutions that are 'adapted'. The media are generally in favour, while Parliament is divided.

Other, minor solutions are being 'ignored'. The media suggest suspending or amending the Dublin Regulation. Parliament is encouraging the acceleration of the asylum procedure in France and a greater use of the Eurodac database.

### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

Most causal mechanisms are 'intentional' in the media and in Parliament. They therefore fall into the 'embracing' category.

The 'adapting' relationship refers to the plots, i.e., the solutions which, as we have seen, straddle the line between 'embracing' and 'adapting'. 'Stymied Progress' is in the majority in the media (77%), while it is in the minority in Parliament (26.9%). Conversely, 'Control' is in the minority in the media (15.4%) whereas it is in the majority in Parliament (51.9%). Criticism of public policy is therefore important in the media, while it is minor in Parliament.

Conversely, two plots are adapted. 'Decline' is very low in the media (6.1%) whereas it is twice as high in Parliament (13.5%). The same applies to 'Blame the victims', which is very low in the media (1.5%) but much higher in Parliament (7.7%). The narrative of right-wing MPs thus shows a certain radicalism towards the measures adopted or envisaged.

Finally, two causal mechanisms are 'ignored'. The first 'ignoring' relationship relates to the 'Inadvertent' link, which echoes the countries destabilising the region (media) and the war against the Islamic State, which will increase the influx of migrants (Parliament). The second 'accidental' link refers to migrants coming from war zones or dying at sea (media) and fluctuating asylum applications (stable and falling for some MPs, rising for others).

### **3.5 Narratives in administrative circulars**

The administrative circulars consider that the main heroes are local public or private initiatives aimed at providing a material welcome (moral) for all asylum seekers (victims). The story is therefore essentially set at the French level (settings). It considers that the measures adopted are effective ('Control') and sufficient to put an end to the problem ('Intentional'). No villain is identified.

#### *a) Characters*

As the administrative circulars are technical, the archetypal characters are difficult to identify. No villain is given. The heroes are always the local initiatives (especially the reception provided by local authorities), France (government and administrative bodies), and even the associations that manage the various accommodation facilities. The victims are always all asylum seekers, not just Syrian refugees.

#### *b) Settings*

##### **Geography**

The first geographical references are: 'France' (50.3%), 'the Union' (6.7%), 'Normandie' (5%), 'Alpes' (4.4%), 'countries' (3.9%), 'Greece' (2.8%), 'Jordan' (2.8%), 'East' (2.2%), 'Bretagne' (1.7%), 'of origin' (1.7%), and 'Middle' (1.7%).

This result highlights the strong concentration of the narrative on France. Greece and the EU are also less important than certain French regions ('Normandie', 'Alpes' and 'Bretagne'). The coordinative sphere also mentions the conflicts in the Middle East. It points out that France has signed an agreement with Jordan to receive migrants fleeing these conflicts who have settled in that country. The country of origin of these people is also a concern for the authorities.

## **Speakers**

The main issuers of the circulars are Bernard Cazeneuve (Minister of the Interior), Jean-Philippe Viquant (Director General of Social Cohesion), Pierre-Antoine Molina (Director General of Foreigners in France) and Sylvia Pinel (Minister of Housing). The General Directorate of Social Cohesion reports to 5 ministries and secretariats of state. The General Directorate of Foreigners in France comes under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.

The main recipients of these circulars are, in order, regional prefects, departmental prefects, regional and departmental directors of social cohesion, the police prefect, the director general of the French Office for Immigration and Integration, regional housing directors, the Île-de-France regional and interdepartmental housing director, territory directors, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons and mayors.

## ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The people and organisations mentioned in the circulars are more varied than the media and politicians. In addition to people and organisations, legal texts and programmes are added because of their importance. These texts and programmes were virtually absent from the media and parliamentary spheres. Around 170 different items were collected. These are mainly of a legal nature (legal codes, laws, articles of law, decrees, circulars, ministerial information, jurisdictions, etc.). They also refer to programmes, plans, national schemes, experiments, etc. Both private and public accommodation facilities are targeted, as relocation essentially affects available housing. The various national and local funds and budgets are listed under their different envelopes. The national and local administrative departments and the local authorities (region, department, and municipalities) are mentioned as they are generally responsible for applying the circulars. The same applies to regional and departmental prefects, including Kléber Arhoul, national coordinator for the reception of refugees, and Jean-Jacques Brot, responsible for coordinating the reception of Syrian and Iraqi refugees. Other measures were also discussed, such as assessment tools, contracts signed between public and private bodies, files and software used by government departments and the various forms that individuals must fill in.

Citizens are generally referred to by the following expressions: 'the population', 'private individuals', 'host families', 'in private homes'. These expressions refer to citizens who volunteer to take in refugees.

## ***c) Moral of the Story***

Three types of solutions are envisaged: welcoming new refugees, creating additional accommodation places and encouraging local initiatives. The reception of new refugees is mentioned several times in the circulars as a reminder of the objectives to be achieved. For example, Europe has pledged to relocate 160,000 people over two years, and it is essential to 'meet our relocation targets' in France. Several figures are given: 1,000 refugees from Germany in the Île-de-France region, between 24,000 and 30,700 people in France over two years, including 10,000 from Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

It is proposed that a regional plan for the reception of asylum seekers be drawn up with the aim of creating 11,000 additional places, by reducing emergency accommodation and increasing stable and sustainable housing for refugees.

Regarding local initiatives, it is proposed to appoint a national coordinating prefect (Kléber Arhoul) to organise these initiatives from local authorities, associations, citizens, etc. This coordinating prefect will also be responsible for encouraging the development of these initiatives.

A series of other measures were proposed, such as ‘decongesting’ the Calais and Grande-Synthe sites in the north of France and increasing the financial and human resources of the authorities responsible for asylum seekers (General Directorate of Foreigners in France, French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Office for Immigration and Integration and prefectures).

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

The plot of ‘control’, emphasising the effectiveness of the measures adopted, dominates the narrative of the circulars (79%). On the other hand, it is pointed out that certain objectives have not yet been achieved and certain solutions have not yet been adopted (‘Stymied progress’, 21%).

Most causal links are ‘intentional’, as they refer to actions to be taken. On the other hand, we also find a large proportion of ‘accidental’ type links (6 documents out of 11), focusing on ‘war zones’, ‘conflicts in the Near East, Middle East, or Africa’, and in particular ‘Syria’, ‘Iraq’, and ‘the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Sudan)’. Only one document also refers to ‘the increase in migratory flows in 2015 and 2016’, which appears to be an accidental event.

#### *e) Narrative Style*

The story of the administrative circulars is mainly ‘technocratic’ for the following reasons. The characters in the story are not clearly defined and no villain is mentioned. The settings involve a multitude of people, organisations, programmes and national and local legal texts. The solutions are objectives to be achieved. The plots and causal links are simple and emphasise more ‘accidental’ links – thus avoiding the blame game.

### **3.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres**

The narratives told in the circulars reflect an adaptation of those told by the media and Parliament. Relocation is, of course, an objective to be achieved, as it is for the media and Parliament. But the circulars place much more emphasis on achieving this relocation, by creating additional accommodation places at national and local level. The heroes are French (national and local levels). The settings also focus on France. So, whereas the media and Parliament brought the debate to European level, the circulars anchor it at national and local level.

## *a) Characters*

The first heroes highlighted by the circulars and Parliament have an ‘embracing’ relationship: they concern France and its institutions (administrations, local authorities, ministers, etc.). A second, minority, type of hero is also similar between the media and the circulars: associations and NGOs caring for migrants.

The victims are ‘adapted’ because they affect all asylum seekers in the circulars but also extend to migrants in general in the media and in Parliament.

Two other characters in the circulars are ‘ignored’ by the media and MPs: local initiatives to welcome migrants (heroes) and the refusal to identify a villain in the circulars.

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The geographical settings of administrative circulars are essentially focused on France – which was slightly observed in Parliament (‘adapting’) but hardly ever in the media (‘ignoring’).

### **Persons Quoted and Mentioned**

The ‘adapting’ relationship refers to the way in which the French are described. The press is quick to refer to ‘public debate’, while MPs take a keen interest in ‘our public opinion’, ‘the French’, ‘our fellow citizens’, ‘our people’ and ‘national representation’. The description of the French people in the circulars is very similar to that of the MPs: ‘private individuals’, ‘the population’, ‘host families’, ‘staying with a family’.

Finally, the ‘ignoring’ relationship refers to the way in which the circulars cite technical elements denied by the media and the Parliament: legal references (legal codes, laws, articles of law, decrees, circulars, ministerial information, jurisdictions, etc.), programmes, accommodation and integration structures, budget envelopes, national and local administrative departments, local authorities, etc.

## *c) Moral of the Story*

The ‘embracing’ solutions correspond primarily to the reception of refugees within the framework of relocation (media, Parliament, and circulars). However, the media and Parliament ‘ignored’ the circulars’ solutions, which consisted of creating additional accommodation places and encouraging local initiatives to welcome new migrants. Local experiences are thus not reported in the media or in Parliament.

## *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*


There are two types of causal link in the ‘Embracing’ category. The first is ‘Intentional’, which by far dominates the narratives in the media, in Parliament and in the circulars. The second is ‘accidental’ and relates to the war zones that are behind the arrival of foreigners in France (circulars above all, but also the media).

Two plots are 'adapted'. The first, 'Control', is mainly found in circulars (79%). In descending order, it is also found in Parliament (51.9%) and in the media (15.4%). The circulars are therefore very satisfied with the public policies adopted, compared with Parliament and the media. Conversely, the 'Stymied Progress' plot is slightly lower in circulars than in Parliament (21% vs. 26.9%). The media are, however, the ones who insist most on the need to adopt certain measures.

### 3.7 Conclusion

The graph below shows the chronological distribution of the data (12 press articles, 38 interventions in Parliament and 6 administrative circulars).

**GRAPH 2. Relocation: chronological breakdown of data**



SOURCE: own elaboration

This breakdown shows a slight overlap between media and parliamentary data in September 2015. It also shows the relative independence of administrative circulars, which largely post-date the September 2015 peak. These overlap and independence no doubt partly explain the proximity of the media and parliamentary narrative ('embrace') and the singularity of the coordinative sphere's narrative ('adapt').

The slightly later nature of the parliamentary data, compared with the media data, also suggests that parliamentarians may have adopted the media narrative. Conversely, the very late appearance of administrative circulars cannot, on its own, explain the singularity of the administrative narrative. This singularity can be explained much more by the very nature of the circulars. Whereas the media and members of Parliament must understand the situation and propose solutions, the circulars must, a posteriori, implement the solutions adopted. So, the time variable alone cannot explain the circulation of narratives.



## 4. Case study 2: The Ukrainian refugee crisis in 2022

### 4.1 Context

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, France, as President of the Council of the EU, announced its intention to propose the activation of the European 'temporary protection' directive on 27 February 2022. This protection was finally activated by the EU on 4 March 2022. All beneficiaries of temporary protection are issued with a temporary residence permit for a period of 6 months. This permit is automatically renewable for the duration of the validity of the decision of the Council of the EU (4 March 2023). It has been extended for a maximum of one year (i.e., until 4 March 2024). Temporary protection is granted to Ukrainian nationals, third-country nationals residing in Ukraine and their families. Temporary protection has existed since 2001 (Council Implementing Decision of 4 March 2022, see references), but was only used for the first time on this occasion.

### 4.2 Narratives in the written press

The media's main heroes are France, the Ukrainians and local French initiatives (public or private) welcoming refugees from Ukraine (victims). Vladimir Putin's Russia is the main villain. The story takes place mainly at the French level (settings) and the preferred solution is to take in these refugees (moral). The adoption of this solution is strongly encouraged ('Stymied Progress') and should, according to the media, put an end to this problematic situation ('Intentional').

#### a) Characters

The heroes in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* are mainly French. Those in *Le Figaro* target the French government (Emmanuel Macron and Clément Beaune) and three far-right players (the Front National, Marine Le Pen and Robert Ménard). The latter are set up as heroes because, during the 2022 presidential elections, the two far-right candidates were divided on the issue of welcoming Ukrainian refugees: Marine Le Pen and his party were in favour, while Éric Zemmour, a former journalist at *Le Figaro*, was against it. *Le Figaro's* non-French heroes are the Ukrainian men who have stayed to defend their country, the Polish volunteers who are helping the refugees, the EU because of its humanitarian support and temporary protection and, finally, the NGOs.

*Le Monde's* heroes also include the French government (including Emmanuel Macron) and the housing actors (associative or not). The local authorities and the French welcoming refugees are also highlighted. The last French stakeholders in *Le Monde* to be heroes are the candidates in the 2022 presidential elections (covering the whole political spectrum) and the French companies helping refugees (railway company, bank, hotel group, etc.). Other heroes include the EU and European governments with a positive attitude towards refugees.

Finally, *Libération's* heroes had a slight international dimension but ignored the French government and the European level. The first heroes highlighted by the newspaper are Ukrainians, i.e., Ukrainians living abroad but returning home to defend their country, Ukrainian civilians supporting the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian children also wishing to fight despite the

ban. NGOs are also praised (including Doctors Without Borders and France terre d'asile) alongside the UN agencies (including the UNHCR) and the city of Paris.

*Le Figaro's* victims are limited to Ukrainian refugees. *Le Monde's* victims also include Ukrainian refugees but go much further. They include the people of African, Asian, or Caribbean origin living in Ukraine, the Indian students living in Poland, the other refugees (in particular Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis), and indeed all migrants (economic or otherwise, of all nationalities). Finally, *Libération's* victims are like those in *Le Figaro*, and include Ukrainians, refugees from Ukraine (including Africans), Ukrainian children and other refugees around the world.

The villains are mainly Vladimir Putin's Russia (three newspapers) and the countries bordering Ukraine which are not taking in enough refugees from Ukraine or other countries (Poland and Hungary, even Romania and Austria) (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* in particular).

Other European villains targeted by *Le Monde* include Spain's far-right party (Vox), Denmark's Prime Minister (Mette Frederiksen) and the United Kingdom because they are relatively hostile towards Ukrainian refugees. *Libération* also criticises the EU for not showing as much solidarity with Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis at the time. A far-right candidate in the French presidential election (Éric Zemmour) has also been criticised for his hostility towards Ukrainian refugees (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*).

## b) Settings

### **Geography**

The first geographical occurrences are: 'France' (20%), 'Poland' (6.2%), 'the Union' (5.8%), 'Kyiv' (4.2%), 'the EU' (2.7%), 'Mariupol' (2.7%), 'Kiev' (2.3%), 'the West' (2.3%), 'bordering' (1.9%), 'Lviv' (1.9%), 'countries' (1.9%), 'Romania' (1.9%), and 'Russia' (1.9%).

This result indicates a strong interest in France, Ukraine (Kiev/Kyiv, Mariupol, Lviv) and its bordering countries, which receive large numbers of migrants (Poland and Romania). The EU is also a key player for the French media. The narrative is also built around a confrontation between the West and Russia.

### **People Mentioned**

The European Commission (especially Ursula von der Leyen) and foreign politicians (especially immigration ministers) are given a lot of say.

There seems to be a positive correlation between the political orientation of the newspaper and the politicians quoted, especially if we compare *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. For example, the politicians quoted in *Le Figaro* are mainly on the right and the extreme right. In contrast, *Le Monde's* politicians are evenly spread across the political spectrum.

Non-political actors are also a valuable source of information for understanding the differences in narratives between newspapers. *Le Figaro* quotes few people (political or not). *Le Monde* emphasises the words of NGOs, in favour of welcoming migrants from Ukraine (Ukrainian or not). Finally, *Libération* largely favours the words migrants and neglects those of politicians.

### ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The people and organisations mentioned but not quoted were the least numerous of the three events. The political figures are varied and relatively evenly distributed across the newspapers. The first nationality is French and includes the Minister of the Interior (Gérald Darmanin) and candidates for the 2022 presidential election. The second nationality is British and includes the British Home Secretary (Priti Patel) and British embassies and consulates. These are mentioned because the UK refused to grant visas automatically to all refugees from Ukraine.

Political organisations once again highlight the European dimension of *Le Monde* and the international dimension of *Libération*. *Le Figaro* also has a European dimension. Non-politicians are few and far between.

The only three texts cited by the newspapers are the 1949 Geneva Convention, the 2001 directive on relocation and the Dublin Regulation (which no longer applies to Ukrainians).

References to the public include 'opinion polls', 'opinion surveys' and 'opinion and national sentiment' (*Le Figaro*). The 'French' are also mentioned a few times (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*).

#### ***c) Moral of the Story***

Most solutions concern the reception of refugees (56%). The other solutions mainly concern humanitarian aid to Ukraine (12.5%), support for neighbouring countries (12.5%), sanctions against Moscow (6.5%) and Ukraine's accession to the EU (3%).

The reception of Ukrainian refugees is mainly aimed at Ukrainians and Ukrainian residents. Some newspapers suggested extending the benefits of the 2001 directive to nationals of other countries (*Le Monde*) or regretted that the directive had not been applied earlier to Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis (*Libération*). A single proposal not to accept Ukrainian refugees was made in *Le Figaro*.

Humanitarian aid is mainly present and described in *Le Figaro*: clothing, food, medicines, donations, accommodation, tents, generators, blankets, hygiene products, etc. Support for neighbouring countries is mentioned in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*, and mainly concerns Poland, Hungary and Romania. Only *Le Figaro* proposes sanctions against Moscow and Ukraine's membership of the EU.

The latest solutions suggest protecting Ukrainian children from war (*Libération*), establishing a zone of air neutrality, and granting refugee status to Marina Ovsyannikova, a Russian journalist opposed to the Moscow regime (*Figaro*).

#### ***d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms***

There are four types of plots: Stymied Progress (48.4%), Control (38.7%), Decline (9.7%), and Change is an illusion (3.2%).

The 'Stymied Progress' category essentially concerns the desire to extend temporary protection to nationals of other countries now or in the past. The 'Control' category essentially

concerns humanitarian aid and the triggering of temporary protection, two instruments that have already been implemented. The 'Decline' category refers to the refusal to accept Ukrainian refugees (*Figaro*) and the refusal to fence the border between Belarus and Poland (*Libération*). Finally, the 'Change is an illusion' category echoes the proposal by a Ukrainian civilian to establish a zone of air neutrality because, according to her, 'one day of talks [with Vladimir Putin] costs hundreds of lives' (*Figaro*).

All the causal links are 'intentional' for two reasons. Firstly, they refer to the measures to be adopted, listed in the previous section. Secondly, they place equal emphasis on the 'invasion' and 'Russian offensive', which they describe in detail: 'Russian planes', 'Russian missiles', 'Kremlin guns', 'Putin's bombs', 'Vladimir Putin's soldiers', etc. Russia's responsibility is thus put forward.

#### e) *Narrative Style*

The media narrative is essentially 'lay' for the following reasons. The heroes, victims and villains are clearly defined and are relatively similar in all three newspapers. The polarisation between the heroes and the villains is emphasised and responsibility for the problem rests squarely on the shoulders of the villain (reinforced by the 'Intentional' link). The settings are in France: the story has an obvious dramatic scene. A majority solution is put forward and is strongly encouraged ('Stymied Progress' and 'Intentional').

### 4.3 Narratives in Parliament

The parliamentarians' main hero is France, which they feel has a duty to come to the aid of refugees from Ukraine (victims) following Russia's action (villain). The story takes place at the level of the EU and France (settings). The main solution favoured is temporary protection to welcome these refugees in France and Europe (moral). The parliamentarians want this solution to be adopted quickly ('Stymied Progress') or are delighted that it has been adopted ('Control'). They show great confidence in it ('Intentional').

#### a) *Characters*

MPs' heroes mainly concern France (41.9%, excluding local authorities and French citizens) and Europe (33.3%, excluding Frontex and Ukraine). This result is accentuated if we add French local authorities (7.6%), French citizens (5.4%) and Frontex (4.3%). The other heroes are associations (3.2%) and others (4.3%).

The 'French' heroes mainly include the hit 'France', as well as the Interministerial delegation for the reception and integration of refugees, the French ambassador to Ukraine (Étienne de Poncins), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the prefects. 'France' was highlighted by the entire political spectrum, apart from the far-right.

The hero 'Europe' includes the hits 'Europe' and 'European Union', as well as the border countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania), the Member States and the European Commission. This category is defended by all political tendencies. Only the far-right singles out Poland and Hungary for their refusal to accept refugees. Conversely, other political currents praise these two countries for welcoming refugees.

Only the two extremes (right and left) deny local and regional authorities. Conversely, the right and extreme right are the only ones to mention Frontex. French citizens (centre-left and right) and associations (centre and right) are relatively evenly split. The last category ('Other') is defended by the centre-left ('Ukrainian fighters', 'President Zelensky' and 'international community') and the right (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation).

Most victims are the refugees from Ukraine (63.6%). Only the far-right consider that these refugees are not victims, and place 'borders', 'Europeans', 'French' living in France and sanctioned 'Russia' in this category. French citizens welcoming refugees from Ukraine are in second place (9%). These are supported by the centre-left, centre and right. Refugees from other countries and other migrants (7.6%) are defended mainly by the far-left, but also by the centre-left and the right. The French people living in Ukraine (6%) are put forward by the majority (centre) and its Prime Minister (Jean Castex, right). The 'neighbouring countries' are also defended by the Prime Minister (4.6%). Ukraine and its 'resistance fighters' are highlighted by the centre-left, centre and right (4.6%). Finally, the 'Other' category mainly includes 'Europeans' and 'Russia' on the far-right (4.6%).

Finally, the villains are Vladimir Putin's Russia (25.7%). Only the far-left and far-right ignore this actor. The French government is also targeted (20.5%) by the entire opposition (far-left, centre-left, centre-right, right, far-right). Illegal immigration (12.8%) is singled out by the right and far-right. Eastern European countries (12.8%) are targeted for several reasons: the far-left and centre-left criticise the sorting of migrants carried out by Poland and Hungary at their borders, while the far-right is opposed to the integration of the Balkan countries into the EU. For the far-right, the integration of Ukraine is a provocation to Russia. Similarly, the integration of Kosovo and Albania is problematic because of their high levels of corruption and their culture, which runs counter to 'our Judeo-Christian civilisation'.

The EU is also targeted by both extremes (10.3%). The far-left criticises Europe for closing its external borders (as part of the global pact on migration) and for its 'complicity' in the Hungarian and Polish 'ethnic cleansing'. Conversely, the far-right is contesting the forced resignation of the director of Frontex (Fabrice Leggeri), the sanctions against Russia and the pressure exerted on Hungary and Poland to accept more migrants ('sieve Europe').

A far-right candidate (Éric Zemmour, 5.1%) was also contested by the centre-left and the right for his refusal to accept refugees. NGOs (5.1%) are attacked by the right and far-right. The 'Other' category (7.7%) includes the left (right and far-right) and smugglers (far-right).

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The first geographical references are: 'the Union' (29.4%), 'France' (16.5%), 'Schengen' (8.2%), 'member' (6.5%), 'states' (5.9%), 'Russia' (3.5%), 'bordering' (2.9%), 'Poland' (2.9%), 'Kiev' (2.4%), and 'countries' (2.4%).

The EU, its member states (as actors) and the Schengen area (as an area in need of reform) are at the heart of the narrative. France is also invited to act. The conflict between Kiev and

Russia is frequently mentioned. The same applies to migrants living in countries bordering Ukraine, particularly Poland.

### **Speakers**

The following table shows that, unlike relocation, positions ‘for or against’ immigration are less dependent on the political colour of the speaker. People speaking in the Chamber are more in favour of immigration. The colour of the majority (centre) is underlined in the table.

**TABLE 3. Ukraine: breakdown of speakers in Parliament by support or opposition to immigration**

	<b>For</b>	<b>Ambiguous</b>	<b>Against</b>	<b>Unknown</b>
<b>Far-right</b>		1	1	
<b>Right</b>	10	3		1
<b>Centre-right</b>	4	1		
<b><u>Centre</u></b>	10	3		
<b>Centre-left</b>	11			
<b>Left</b>				
<b>Far-left</b>	4			
<b>Unknown</b>	1	1		

POLITICAL POSITION: Far-right: Rassemblement national; Right: Horizons, and Les Républicains; Centre-right: Agir, and Union des démocrates et indépendants; Centre : Renaissance; Centre-left: Europe Écologie Les Verts, Nouveaux démocrates, Parti radical de gauche, and Parti socialiste; Far-left: Parti communiste français.

SOURCE: own elaboration

### **Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted**

The items mentioned but not cited are France (71.3%), Europe (24.1%), Ukraine (2.3%) and others (2.3%).

‘France’ mainly affects French families and local authorities hosting Ukrainian refugees. Accommodation and social support associations are also targeted. The Parliament also refers to the French Presidency of the Council of the EU and the consular and diplomatic teams. This French focus is essentially carried by the majority.

The European dimension refers essentially to Frontex, the European Commission and the Council of the EU. It also relates to a project by Emmanuel Macron: a ‘Schengen Council’, i.e., a steering committee for the Schengen area with an armed arm for the EU’s external borders. This European dimension is strongly emphasised by the far-right.

Citizens are called by a variety of names. The most recurrent is the term ‘people’, which is mainly used by the far-right and the right-wing, and includes the following variants: ‘Ukrainian people’, ‘persecuted peoples’ (right-wing), ‘sovereign people’, ‘peoples of Europe’ and ‘aversion to peoples’ (far-right). On only one occasion does the far-left refer to a ‘people’s Europe’. The second most common term used was ‘French people’ and ‘French nationals’, who should be repatriated (mainly from the centre, but also from the right and far-right). The

other two most used terms are 'our compatriots' (centre and right) and 'our fellow citizens' (centre-left, centre and right). Finally, 'citizens' refers to the French, Europeans and 'citizens of the world' (centre-left and far-right).

### *c) Moral of the Story*

The measures mainly concern the temporary protection and reception of refugees from Ukraine in France and Europe (29.3%). The notion of 'distribution' is frequently mentioned, to 'relieve the burden on the countries bordering Ukraine' (right). The far-left would like to welcome more migrants, not just refugees. It also regrets that temporary protection was not triggered earlier for other nationalities (Syrians, Iraqis, etc.).

The second type of measure defended concerns the Schengen area, the EU's external borders and Frontex (12%). The left is absent from this section. Only one centre-left MP is proposing no further controls on people at the EU's borders. The other measures, ranging from the centre to the far-right, seek to strengthen the external borders. This is generally synonymous with a strengthening of the Schengen area through the creation of a 'Schengen Council', i.e., a steering committee with an armed arm to monitor these borders. The right and far-right regret the resignation of the director of Frontex (Fabrice Leggeri) and encourage an increase in Frontex's budget.

The third solution put forward is the reception of refugees by local authorities, associations, and private individuals in France (11.3%), particularly in terms of accommodation. Prefects have been asked to identify the reception capacity of local authorities so that the State can coordinate and subsidise them. Financial aid has also been created for individuals taking in refugees. Some right-wing MPs are also proposing a tax deduction for these households. All these solutions are essentially supported by the majority (centre).

Except for the far-right, there is a consensus across the political spectrum on humanitarian and military support for Ukraine (9.7%). On the military front, one MP proposed activating the European Peace Facility, a financial instrument designed to provide military aid to partner countries. This facility has been used to send arms to Ukraine in 2022.

Border countries (6%) are mainly highlighted for two reasons. On the one hand, the Parliament encourages their financial and material support so that they can take in more refugees (centre-left and right). On the other hand, they are criticised for 'sorting' migrants according to 'the colour of their skin or their religion' (centre-left and far-left). The far-right is the only group not to want to force Hungary and Poland to take in refugees.

Behaviour towards Russia (6%) essentially favours sanctions, except for the extreme right, which wishes to avoid them. The sovereignty of France and Europe vis-à-vis Russia (4.5%) touches on food (Food and Agricultural Resilience Mission), energy and digital issues. The integration of Ukraine into the EU (4.5%), and even Moldova, is proposed by various political currents. Only the far-right sees Ukraine's integration as a provocation to Russia. The last solutions propose repatriating French nationals based mainly in Ukraine, but also in Russia and Belarus (centre and right) (3%). The social assistance granted to Ukrainians (2.2%) mainly concerns families and not isolated individuals. Finally, the 'Other' category (11.3%) proposes economic support for Ukraine (centre), reducing immigration to France and taking a firm stance

on third countries that refuse to readmit some of their nationals (right), easing sanctions on migrants rescued at sea (centre-left), integrating Sweden and Finland into NATO (right) and triggering other European mechanisms (Integrated political crisis response and European Defence Fund) (right). Similarly, some MPs are encouraging the government to be transparent with Parliament (centre-left).

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

Four 'plots' are identified for relocation. Each policy solution is attached to one or more plots depending on whether the measure is adopted or considered. The four plots are as follows: Stymied Progress (47.4%), Control (46.7%), Decline (4.4%), and Blame the victims (1.5%).

The 'Stymied Progress' narrative is supported by all the opposition currents, including the right and the centre-left. The majority in the centre is virtually absent from this plot.

The 'Control' narrative is essentially driven by the majority, which seeks to justify its choices. This plot is also supported by part of the right, including the Prime Minister (Jean Castex). Part of the centre-left is also represented by this type of plot. Only the two extremes (left and right) ignore it.

Finally, the 'Decline' and 'Blame the victim' plots are only supported by the right and extreme right. They aim to reduce immigration to France, reject the integration of certain Balkan countries into the EU for cultural reasons ('Blame the victim') and oppose several measures, such as the resignation of the director of Frontex (Fabrice Leggeri), the integration of Ukraine into the EU (which would be a provocation to Russia), sanctions against Russia and forcing Hungary and Poland to take in refugees.

Virtually all the causal links are of the 'Intentional' type because they refer to a solution that has been adopted or is due to be adopted. Only one 'Inadvertent' link is made by the far-right: it considers that integrating Ukraine into the EU would be a provocation to Russia.

#### *e) Narrative Style*

The style of the parliamentary narrative is 'lay'. Indeed, the characters are highly polarised and few. The villain's responsibility is also emphasised, even though it may vary from one MP to another due to the conflict between the opposition and the majority (France is presented as both a hero and a villain). The settings focus on just two geographical locations. One solution stands out from the others. Finally, the plots are split evenly between the opposition, which wants part of this measure to be implemented ('Stymied Progress') and the majority, which is satisfied with the implementation of another part of this solution ('Control').

### **4.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives**

The main narratives conveyed by the media and Parliament are 'embracing' each other. They insist on the need to welcome migrants from Ukraine. Their settings are thus focused on France, the EU and Ukraine. The main hero is France, and the main villain is Vladimir Putin. The media and Parliament show great confidence in the temporary protection (importance of the 'Stymied Progress', 'Control', and 'Intentional' parameters).



## *a) Characters*

Regarding the characters, the 'embracing' relationship is important. The French government, the EU, local and regional authorities, French citizens, and associations are all portrayed as heroes by the media and Parliament. The victims are also similar and include refugees from Ukraine and refugees from other countries. Finally, the villains include Vladimir Putin's Russia, the countries bordering Ukraine, the EU, and the candidate Éric Zemmour.

Other characters, however, are not to be found in either sphere ('ignoring'). The heroes of the media extend to other actors: far-right politicians, Ukrainians, UN agencies, French companies, other presidential candidates, other Member States, and so on. A Parliament hero denied by the media also refers to Frontex. The victims may also differ: migrants (media), French citizens, countries bordering Ukraine and Ukrainian fighters (Parliament). The same applies to villains, where the Parliament highlights the French government (opposition), illegal immigration and NGOs. The French government is thus presented as a hero (by the majority) and a villain (by the opposition) within the Parliament.

## *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The geographical settings are broadly 'adapted': the media focus on France, while Parliament gives priority to the European level. However, they 'embrace' each other when they point out the existence of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine (and its neighbouring countries).

### **Persons Quoted and Mentioned**

The people and organisations quoted, or simply mentioned, give the event a similar French dimension between the media and politicians. To a lesser extent, the European and Ukrainian dimensions are also present ('embracing').

On the other hand, the way in which the public is described is 'adapted'. The newspapers are brief on this point and quickly refer to 'opinion polls', 'opinion surveys', 'opinion and the prevailing national feeling', or even 'the French'. Conversely, MPs use a wide repertoire of terms to describe citizens: mainly 'the people' (right and far-right), 'the French', 'our compatriots', 'our fellow citizens' and 'the citizens'.

Finally, the international and British dimensions are found only in the media ('ignoring').

## *c) Moral of the Story*

Some of the solutions are shared by the media and Parliament ('embracing'): reception of refugees and triggering of temporary protection, humanitarian support for Ukraine, Ukraine's accession to the EU, sanctions against Russia and support for border countries so that they are better able to receive asylum seekers.

However, the Parliament is proposing numerous other measures, which are being 'ignored' by the media: strengthening of external borders, creation of a 'Schengen Council', reception of

refugees by local authorities, associations and individuals, sovereignty of France and Europe vis-à-vis Russia, repatriation of French nationals based in Ukraine, social aid for Ukrainians and military support for Ukraine.

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

Most of the plots were 'embraced'. They insist on 'controlling' the situation (46.7% for the parliamentary majority mostly, 38.7% in the media) while hoping to see new measures adopted ('stymied progress', 47.4% for the parliamentary opposition mostly, 48.4% in the media). The rate of 'Decline' is also comparable (4.4% for the right and extreme right mostly, 9.7% in the media).

The 'Intentional' causal mechanisms are 'adapted': they certainly refer to the measures to be adopted, but they also emphasise, in the media only, the 'Russian invasion' (and other related expressions).

Finally, three causal mechanisms are ignored in one sphere or another. The first is 'Blame the victims'. The second is 'Inadvertent' and considers that integrating Ukraine into the EU would be a provocation to Russia. These first two causal links are supported by the right and extreme right in Parliament. The third causal mechanism ('Change is an illusion') is carried by a Ukrainian civilian who wants to establish a zone of air neutrality in *Le Figaro*.

## **4.5 Narratives in administrative circulars**

The main heroes of the circulars are the local public and private initiatives to take in refugees from Ukraine (victims) as a result of Russia's action (villain). The story takes place at the French level (settings). The preferred solution is the material reception and integration of these refugees (moral). The circulars welcome the temporary protection ('Control') and consider that this solution will put an end to the problem ('Intentional').

#### *a) Characters*

Stereotypical characters are rarely mentioned in the circulars. The heroes include all private and public stakeholders involved in the reception of foreign nationals (administrations, associations, individuals, etc.). To a lesser extent, heroes also include the United Nations and the Council of the EU. The victims are mainly refugees from Ukraine, but they can also be linked to all new arrivals in France. Finally, Russia is presented as a villain in a single document.

#### *b) Settings*

##### **Geography**

The first geographical occurrences are: 'France' (27.4%), 'the Union' (10.5%), 'companies' (7.3%), 'countries' (6.5%), 'non-EU' (*tiers* in French) (4.8%), 'Lyon' (3.2%), 'airports' (1.6%), 'of origin' (1.6%), 'state' (1.6%), 'stations' (1.6%), 'member' (1.6%), 'Nice' (1.6%), 'Normandie' (1.6%), 'Reims' (1.6%), and 'Strasbourg' (1.6%).

The emphasis is on France and its capacity to welcome visitors at airports and stations, particularly in certain French cities (Lyon, Nice, Normandy, Reims, Strasbourg). Several companies are contributing to this. To a lesser extent, the EU and its member states are also mentioned. Non-EU nationals living in Ukraine are also considered, particularly in terms of their country of origin.

### **Speakers**

The main issuers of the circulars and their appendices are, in order, the Minister of the Interior (Gérald Darmanin), the Minister of Housing (Emmanuelle Wargon), the Minister Delegate to the Minister of the Interior (Marlène Schiappa), the Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior (Sonia Backès) and the Minister of Solidarity and Health (Olivier Véran).

The main recipients are regional prefects, departmental prefects, regional health agencies, the French Office for Immigration and Integration and the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons.

### **Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted**

The people and organisations mentioned in the circulars are once again very varied compared to the media and the Parliament. Legal texts and various public programmes are added to these mentions. Around 160 different items are collected. These mainly concern local and national administrations (directorates, delegations, etc.), public budgets, local authorities (departments, regions, prefectures, etc.) and various programmes (experiments, plans, etc.). To a lesser extent, these elements also affect associations welcoming foreign nationals, public and private landlords (including associations) allocating inexpensive accommodation, financial aid given to foreign nationals and the various online platforms used to coordinate reception in France. The main objectives of these schemes are training and professional integration, housing, minors (school education, unaccompanied minors, etc.), learning French and, to a lesser extent, equality between territories and the health of foreign nationals.

Citizens are generally referred to as 'individuals', or even as 'civil society actors'. They are known for their 'citizen hosting offers'.

### ***c) Moral of the Story***

Two main solutions are put forward. On the one hand, the circulars insist on reception, accommodation, and social support for beneficiaries of temporary protection. Emphasis is placed on stable accommodation, ideally for more than three months. The circulars also state that new arrivals, including refugees, need to be better integrated. This includes learning French, access to healthcare and employment, opening a bank account, obtaining a residence permit, social rights, mobility, sport, and culture and, finally, acceptance of the values of the Republic.

### ***d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms***

The plots are all the 'Control' type, as they relate to the solutions to be applied. Most of the causal links are 'Intentional' because they refer to a policy solution. Only one causal link is

'Accidental': it refers to the 'massive displacement of populations' and the 'very large numbers of people arriving'. It is always stated that these people are 'fleeing the war in Ukraine', without identifying who is responsible for this war. As well, one document, 'Intentional' as well, refers to the 'war launched by Russia in February 2022'.

#### *e) Narrative Style*

The circulars' narrative is 'technocratic'. Heroes, victims and villains are rarely mentioned. Heroes are the most prominent characters, and mainly concern administrations, associations and individuals. The settings, on the other hand, are numerous and varied: they focus on France, and include a range of national and local administrations, public programs, national budgets, legal texts, etc. Only two solutions are highlighted, but they are described in all the complexity of their implementation and have objectives to achieve. Finally, the plots and causal links are simple, as in the 'lay' narrative, but they emphasize the accidental nature of the situation, thus avoiding pointing the finger at a villain.

### **4.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres**

The media and parliamentary narratives are reflected in an 'adapted' form in the circulars. The main solution put forward is the reception of immigrants from Ukraine, but this is set out more precisely in the circulars. The settings in the circulars focus mainly on France and, to a lesser extent, on the EU, but they neglect Ukraine. The heroes of the circulars are essentially French private and public players, but they do not refer to France and its government. Russia is only mentioned once as a villain. Lastly, the circulars never call into question the decisions taken, thus demonstrating great confidence in them (importance of the 'Control' and 'Intentional' parameters).

#### *a) Characters*

The 'embracing' characters concern the main victims, i.e., the refugees from Ukraine. They are present in the media, in Parliament and in circulars.

The other characters, however, are 'adapted' depending on the venue. The heroes in the media and in Parliament are local authorities, French citizens, and associations. The heroes in the circulars are all the private and public stakeholders who welcome foreigners. Similarly, the victims of the media and Parliament are other refugees, not just refugees from Ukraine. By contrast, the circulars focus mainly on new arrivals. Finally, the main villain of the media and Parliament is Vladimir Putin's Russia. The circulars never refer to Vladimir Putin, but they do occasionally mention Russia.

#### *b) Settings*

#### **Geography**

The geographical settings are slightly adapted to those of the media and Parliament: the focus is on France and the EU, but not Ukraine.

### Persons Quoted and Mentioned

The only relationship relating to the persons and organisations cited or simply mentioned is 'ignored'. It refers to the singular way in which citizens are referred to in the circulars ('individuals', 'civil society stakeholders', 'offers of citizen accommodation'). It also refers to all the elements mentioned in the circulars that are not found in the media or in Parliament: local and national administrations, public budgets, local authorities, various public programmes, etc.

#### c) Moral of the Story

There is only one 'embracing' solution, because it is found in Parliament and in the circulars: that of welcoming refugees from Ukraine by local authorities, associations, and individuals in France.

There is only one ignoring solution, proposed only in the circulars: the integration of new arrivals (learning the language, access to healthcare, etc.).


#### d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms

The plots in the media, Parliament and circulars are largely of the 'Control' type ('embracing'). The 'Intentional' causal mechanism is shared only by the media and the circulars: it refers to the Russian invasion. Finally, the last causal mechanism, 'Accidental', refers to the displacement of populations, which is only mentioned in the circulars ('ignoring').

## 4.7 Conclusion

The graph below shows the chronological distribution of the data (12 press articles, 51 parliamentary interventions and 3 circulars).

**GRAPH 3. Ukraine: chronological breakdown of data**



SOURCE: own elaboration

---

These data show that media and government data are superimposed, and that parliamentary data, which is considerably later, is out of sync. However, the media and parliamentary narratives are similar ('embrace'), whereas that of the administrative circulars is more singular ('adapt'). This may be in line with what was observed for the relocation of migrants: parliamentarians may take up elements of the media narrative.

The alignment in time of press articles and administrative circulars could explain, in theory, the difference in their narratives ('adapt') because they wouldn't have time to copy each other. However, it would seem, once again, that the singular nature of administrative circulars, which are tasked with applying solutions rather than understanding a situation, are more responsible for the peculiarity of their narrative.

## 5. Case study 3: the Aquarius vessel

### 5.1 Context

The Aquarius was a vessel chartered between February 2016 and December 2018 by the association SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders. It rescued 30,000 migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, before being detained for political and legal reasons, and replaced in July 2019 by a new vessel, the Ocean Viking.

After rescuing 629 migrants in distress off the coast of Libya on 9 and 10 June 2018, the ship remained stranded at sea for several days without being able to dock, as Italy and Malta refused to take in the survivors. On 10 June, Italy and Malta, the two countries closest to the ship, refused to accept it. On 11 June, Spain agreed to receive it. From 11 June to 17 June, the Aquarius made its way to Valencia, passing between Sardinia and Corsica due to poor weather conditions. It then made a stopover in Marseille to welcome 78 refugees.

Pedro Sánchez had been president of Spain since 2 June 2018 following a motion of censure overthrowing Mariano Rajoy. Welcoming the Aquarius was thus one of the new Spanish president's first major decisions.

In August 2018, Gibraltar withdrew its flag from the Aquarius. The ship left Marseille on 15 September 2018 with a Panamanian flag. Under pressure from Italy, which criticised the Aquarius for not returning refugees to their countries of origin, Panama withdrew its flag from the ship a few days later. Since then, the ship has found no other country to support it and stopped its activity (Miron and Taxil 2019).

### 5.2 Narratives in the written press

The main hero highlighted by the media was Spain, which agreed to receive the migrants from the Aquarius (victims). France is the main villain of the story because of its silence. The narrative takes place at the Spanish and French levels (settings). The preferred solution was to receive these migrants in a port closer than Valencia, in France, in Italy or in Malta for

instance (moral). The media strongly encouraged this solution ('Stymied Progress') and show great confidence in its ability to solve the problem ('Intentional').

### a) Characters

The heroes are relatively evenly distributed between the three newspapers. The main heroes are the Spanish government, the Spanish political parties in favour of welcoming the Aquarius (including Ciudadanos and Partido Popular), and the two hundred towns and seventeen Spanish regions that say they are ready to receive the boat (35.6%). The second most popular heroes were the NGOs (23.7%) (SOS Méditerranée, Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross in particular). Then come the Italian cities that are in favour of welcoming the Aquarius (Palermo, Messina, etc.) (11.8%) and the politicians in the majority and opposition who are also in favour of welcoming the ship (especially the MPs in the majority) (7.9%). The final heroes are the people welcoming migrants to Valencia (translators, police officers, etc.) (5.3%), Germany (4%) and a range of other countries and individuals (Finland, Greece, migrants involved in life on the boat, etc.) (11.8%).

The victims were few. For all three newspapers, they relate to migrants (62.5%). *Le Figaro* also has a special feature, focusing on political refugees (12.5%). The same applies to *Libération*, which highlights Italy and Greece for their large numbers of immigrants (25%).

French villains are only mentioned in *Le Monde* and *Libération*, with *Le Figaro* once again affirming its relative support for France. The villains in *Le Monde* and *Libération* relate to the government and its majority (Emmanuel Macron, Édouard Philippe [Prime Minister] and Benjamin Griveaux [government spokesman] above all) (23.2%) but also to the right-wing and far-right opposition (Éric Ciotti and Marine Le Pen) (7.1%).

However, the three newspapers are very evenly split when it comes to denouncing the Italian government and the far-right Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini (21.4%). The split is also relatively even for Malta (10.7%), Libya (8.9%) and Europe (especially the European Commission) (5.4%). By contrast, *Le Figaro* is the only newspaper to consider non-refugee migrants and 'economic migrants' as villains (3.6%). The same goes for *Libération*, which confirms its international interest by condemning certain German politicians (5.4%) as well as other countries (Hungary, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, etc.) (8.9%). *Le Monde*, for its part, presents a heterogeneous group of villains (anti-immigration forces, smugglers, and European countries in favour of the arbitrary detention of migrants in third countries) (5.3%).

### b) Settings

#### **Geography**

The first geographical references were: 'Valencia' (19.4%), 'France' (18.4%), 'Rome' (7.8%), 'Greece' (5.5%), 'the Union' (4.2%), 'Madrid' (4.2%), 'member' (3.2%), 'states' (2.8%), 'countries' (2.3%), 'Brussels' (1.8%), 'the EU' (1.8%), and 'Sicily' (1.8%).

This result indicates that the narrative focuses on the Spanish city of Valencia, which hosted the ship, as well as on the Spanish (Madrid), French and Italian (Rome) responses. Greece is also at the heart of the narrative because, like Italy, it received large numbers of migrants. The

problem is generally high at European level and can be explained by a lack of coordination between Member States. Finally, it is recalled that the Aquarius passed close to Sicily and received support from this region.

### ***People Mentioned***

In contrast to the war in Ukraine, but like the relocation, no positive correlation can be observed between the political orientation of politicians and of the media. The most quoted politicians are attached to the party of President Emmanuel Macron. The French government must deal with some of its own MPs, who criticise its silence and inaction. These MPs would like France to accept the migrants from the Aquarius.

The Italian far-right and the Spanish centre-left relate respectively to the governments of Matteo Salvini (refusing the Aquarius) and Pedro Sánchez (accepting the Aquarius). Joan Ribo, the mayor of Valencia, is the only representative of the Spanish left.

The distribution of non-political actors is collected as well. It is difficult to distinguish between the three media. The latter unanimously favour the word of the NGOs. SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders are the two associations chartering the Aquarius. The Spanish Red Cross is the one that subsequently organised, in part, the reception of the migrants in Valencia in Spain.

### ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The politicians mentioned but not quoted in the three newspapers come mainly from the Spanish government (Mariano Rajoy [former president], Josep Borrell [Minister of Foreign Affairs] and Pedro Sánchez [President of Spain] in particular) and the Italian government (Giuseppe Conte [President of the Council of Ministers] and Matteo Salvini [Minister of the Interior] in particular).

For all three newspapers, the non-political figures are mainly NGOs (SOS Méditerranée, but also the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders and Caritas) and maritime organisations involved in receiving migrants (Italian coastguards, but also the Spanish Civil Guard, the Italian ships 'Dattilo' and 'Orione', the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, etc.). A report in *Le Monde* aboard the Aquarius also looks at the immigrants on board (Nigerians and Guineans).

The texts are few and far between and refer mainly to the Dublin agreements. Finally, political organisations are virtually absent from *Le Figaro*. At *Le Monde*, they concern Spanish political parties, French structures, and even European structures. *Libération's* political organisations are varied and concern European organisations or those from Member States.

*Le Figaro's* references to the public include 'public opinion', a 'poll' and 'Eurobarometer'. *Le Monde* briefly refers to 'civil society' and Italian 'voters'.

### ***c) Moral of the Story***

The solutions put forward here are restricted to the European and French levels. The Italian and Maltese decisions are therefore not dealt with here.



The first solution put forward, notably by *Libération* and *Le Monde*, is the need to receive the Aquarius in a port closer to Valencia, in France or Italy, for example (25%). *Libération* considers that France should meet its relocation targets and not 'chase' migrants. *Libération* and *Le Monde* also believe that the next boats of migrants should be welcomed over the long term and that controls at Europe's internal borders should not be re-established (12.5%).

Other solutions highlight the need to put an end to the deaths in the Mediterranean, even if it means finding a European solution for rescues (9.4%). Regarding the EU, *Le Monde* and *Libération* favour a long-term European immigration and asylum strategy (9.4%). These two newspapers agree on the need to review the Dublin Regulation (6.2%) but differ on the need to strengthen (*Libération*), or not (*Le Monde*), a European border police force (6.2%). *Libération* believes that an end must be put to the Libyan 'hell' (6.2%). *Libération* and *Le Monde* have articles encouraging readmission agreements, but an article in *Le Monde* also opposes arbitrary detentions and refoulement to third countries, particularly where there is a risk of torture (12.5%). However, all three newspapers are satisfied with Spain's reception of the Aquarius and the sending of OFPRA agents to Spain (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) (9.4%). Finally, only *Le Figaro* stresses the need to distinguish between economic migrants and political refugees, particularly in detention centres (3.1%).

#### d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms

Plots are attached to solutions. The majority of these are of the 'Stymied Progress' type (53.1%) and are carried by *Le Monde* and *Libération*. These plots call for the adoption of new measures to improve the situation. The second type of plot ('Decline', 37.5%) deplors the current situation and considers that no relevant solution has yet been found. This plot is also defended mainly by *Le Monde* and *Libération*. Finally, the last plot ('Control', 9.4%), mainly supported by *Le Figaro*, expresses great satisfaction with the solutions that have been found.

Most causal links are 'intentional', as they refer to a solution that has been or will be adopted. Only one 'accidental' link concerns a solution encouraging the mobilisation of civil society in favour of an open and positive approach to migration (*Le Monde*).

#### e) Narrative Style

The Aquarius media narrative is 'lay' for the following reasons. Heroes, victims and villains are clearly delineated, even if they may differ from one newspaper to another, particularly when it comes to naming the villain. The attribution of responsibility for the problem is therefore unclear. The settings focus on just two geographical locations. Finally, one solution stands out from the others and is strongly encouraged ('Stymied Progress' and 'Intentional').

### 5.3 Narratives in Parliament

Parliament's main heroes are Spain, Corsica and France for their support for the Aquarius migrants (victims). However, the MPs regret France's silence (villain). The story is told from a French perspective (settings). The preferred solutions are to receive the Aquarius migrants (in France or elsewhere) and to adopt a long-term European solution for future boats with migrants on board (moral). The MPs consider that the problematic situation is essentially caused by

France ('Conspiracy') and that the solution adopted is unsatisfactory ('Helplessness'). However, they insist on the need for a political solution to solve the problem ('Intentional').

#### *a) Characters*

For the centre-left and far-left, the heroes are mainly Spain (26.1%) and Corsica (21.7%). France is the hero for the majority (21.7%). The far-right defends the Italian refusal (13%). The other heroes are Europe, the Aquarius, and the Libyan coastguards (17.4%).

All political currents, particularly centre-left and far-left, rank 'migrants' (86.7%) and 'asylum seekers' (6.7%) as 'victims'. 'France', which suffers from migratory flows, is also presented as a victim by the majority (4.4%). Finally, the far-right sees the 'French' as victims (2.2%).

Finally, 'France' is presented as a 'villain' mainly by the centre-left and far-left opposition (52.7%). Italy (12.7%) and Malta (3.6%) are also portrayed as villains by different political currents, except for the far-right. Europe and the European states are also blamed by a broad political spectrum for a variety of reasons (12.7%). Other countries are singled out (the United States, Panama, and African states, 5.4%). Human smugglers and traffickers were also highlighted (7.2%). Finally, the right and extreme right, in particular, blame NGOs and migrants (7.2%).

#### *b) Settings*

##### **Geography**

The first geographical occurrences were: 'France' (36.4%), 'the Union' (10.7%), 'Valencia' (5%), 'states' (4.1%), 'continent' (3.3%), 'Schengen' (3.3%), 'of origin' (2.5%), 'Africa' (2.5%), 'member' (2.5%), 'countries' (2.5%) and 'Rome' (2.5%).

This result indicates that Parliament is focused on the French response (or lack of response). The narrative also engages the responsibility of the EU ('continent') and its Member States and questions the relevance of the Schengen area. It also looks back at the reception in Valencia and the Italian refusal. Finally, the MPs focus on the countries of origin of the migrants on board the Aquarius (mainly in Africa).

##### **Speakers**

The following table shows that, as in the case of relocation, positions 'for or against' immigration are broadly in line with the political colour of the speaker. The colour of the majority (centre) is underlined in the table.

**TABLE 4. Aquarius: breakdown of speakers in parliament by support or opposition to immigration**

	For	Ambiguous	Against	Unknown
<b>Far-right</b>			4	
<b>Right</b>	1	5	4	
<b>Centre-right</b>		3		
<b>Centre</b>		6	1	2
<b>Centre-left</b>	17	3		1
<b>Left</b>				
<b>Far-left</b>	11	2		
<b>Independent</b>				1

POLITICAL POSITION: Far-right: Rassemblement national; Right: Horizons, and Les Républicains; Centre-right: Agir, and Union des démocrates et indépendants; Centre: Alliance centriste, Mouvement démocrate, and Renaissance; Centre-left: Europe Écologie Les Verts, Parti radical, Parti socialiste, Progressistes bretons; Far-left: France insoumise, Parti communiste français, and Pour La Réunion.

SOURCE: own elaboration

### ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The individuals and organisations most often mentioned (but not quoted) were European organisations (notably the European Council of 26–29 June and Frontex) (26.7%) and NGOs ('ONG', SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders in particular) (25%). While the entire political spectrum is interested in Europe, only the centre-left and far-left mention NGOs (with two exceptions). The whole political spectrum also refers to 'smugglers' (13.3%). The centre-left and far-left opposition also questioned the majority and welcomed the proposal to welcome the Aquarius by a Corsican MP (Michel Castellani) (8.3%). The various political currents also mentioned French organisations (the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in particular) (6.7%) and UN organisations (6.7%). Finally, the far-left attacks the European far-right and 'xenophobes' (3.3%). The last category ('Other', 10%) is scattered.

Parliament uses a wide repertoire to talk about the people. First, the 'French' and 'citizens' (especially on the far-left) are referred to by other expressions, such as 'public opinion', 'our compatriots', 'more voices than you think' and even 'our identity' (all political colours combined). The Parliament also refers to 'the Spanish people', 'millions of Europeans', 'the Europe of the peoples' and 'the peoples of the world' (centre-left and far-left). The far-right refers to the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. Other expressions, generally associated with the far-right in Europe, refer to 'anti-European populists', 'populisms' and the 'most extremist part of our population' (from the centre-left to the centre-right).

### ***c) Moral of the Story***

Two types of solutions stand out. The first regrets that France did not offer to take in the Aquarius (31.4%). This solution is supported by the centre-left and extreme left. The second type, which is more varied, proposes finding a solution at the European level (31.4%). Supporters of this second type of solution range from the centre-left to the centre-right. This solution sometimes stresses the need for European cooperation, without necessarily

specifying the form of this cooperation. However, more specific European solutions were put forward: creation of a European asylum agency, revision of the Dublin regulation, strengthening of external borders, combating people smugglers, concerted management of migratory flows, reception of new boats and, finally, cooperation with countries of origin.

Another type of solution, proposed by the right and far-right, envisages no longer welcoming migrants who upset the 'cultural balance of our country'. These two political currents regret that Spain welcomed the Aquarius and supported the Italian refusal. They also consider that France has no business helping Spain and that NGOs should end their sea rescue activities (11.4%).

Other solutions are satisfied with Spain's welcome and France's support for the Spanish authorities (5.7%). They also wanted Italy and Malta to accept the boat (varied, 5.7%). Similarly, they propose facilitating access to asylum, rejecting the current immigration bill (centre-left and far-left, 4.3% each) and welcoming more foreigners in the future (centre-left and far-left, 2.9%).

The last type of solution is heterogeneous and is supported by the centre-left ('Other', 2.9%). It suggests not waiting for a solution to be found at the European level and considers that the activities of the Aquarius should be put on a permanent footing (new flag, list of ports of destination, etc.).

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

The plots are of a very different nature compared with the media and the other two events. Two new plots, which have never been seen before, dominate the parliamentary debates: 'Conspiracy' (47.4%) and 'Helplessness' (26.3%). 'Conspiracy' is defended by the centre-left and far-left to show that the Aquarius event is in fact the consequence of a deliberate (but silent) refusal by France to offer support. 'Helplessness' is shared by a wide range of politicians and considers that nothing can be envisaged at French level because the solution lies at the European level.

The other plots are 'Blame the victim' (right and far-right, 14%), which calls for no more foreigners to be welcomed, 'Control' (mixed, 8.8%), which considers that France has done its utmost and that the situation is under control due to the Spanish decision, and finally 'Stymied Progress' (far-left, 3.5%), which believes that welcoming Corsican politicians has been compromised by the French government.

The causal links, on the other hand, are relatively like those seen above. The 'Intentional' link (76.2%) is the one that dominates the solutions proposed: it essentially refers to the Spanish reception and the French and Italian refusals to receive the ship. This link is supported by the centre-left and far-left opposition (mainly), which deplores France's silence. The 'Inadvertent' link (22.2%) refers to the lack of European cohesion (many political currents). It also refers to the responsibility of NGOs (right and far-right). Finally, the 'Accidental' link (1.6%) considers that France is experiencing a cyclical increase in migratory flows.

### *e) Narrative Style*

Parliament's narrative is 'lay'. The characters are clearly defined, even if they differ from one political tendency to another, mainly because of the conflict between the majority and the opposition (France is presented as a hero and a victim respectively). The settings focus on France. Only two solutions are strongly favoured. However, the plots are of a different nature to the other two events because, according to the parliamentarians, the first solution should have been adopted previously ('Conspiracy') and the second is not a French issue ('Helplessness'). The urgency of the action to be taken is therefore limited because the parliamentary debates take place from 12 June 2018, the day after the Spanish declaration agreeing to receive the Aquarius.

## **5.4 Relationship between media and parliamentary narratives**

For the first time, we can observe 'adaptation' of the narratives in the media and political debate in parliament. They both insist on the need to take in the Aquarius and thus present Spain as a hero. Conversely, France and Italy are presented as the main villains. The settings therefore focus on France and there is little satisfaction with the decision taken at national level (importance of the parameters 'Decline', 'Conspiracy' and 'Helplessness'). On the other hand, the main heroes may also differ: those of the media also include NGOs, while those of Parliament mostly focus on the French government. Similarly, the media settings include Spain and Italy, while the Parliament settings feature the EU and NGOs.

We will also see that, for the first time, there are a significant number of elements of the narrative that are rejected between Parliament and the media.

### *a) Characters*

The characters who are 'embraced' in both the media narrative and in parliament are the heroes (Spanish and French national and local authorities), the victims (migrants) and the villains (France, Italy, Malta, and the EU). Some characters can also be 'ignored'. This is the case for heroes (NGOs in the media), victims (France and the French in Parliament) and villains (Libya in the media, human smugglers, and traffickers in Parliament).

Finally, some characters are 'rejected'. These rejections concern the heroes (Italian towns in favour of welcoming migrants in the media, and Matteo Salvini's refusal in Parliament) and the villains (the right-wing and far-right opposition in the media, NGOs, and migrants in Parliament).

For all three events, Parliament presents the French government as both a hero and a villain.

### *b) Settings*

#### **Geography**

Most geographical settings are 'embraced' (Spain, France, Italy). Others are 'adapted' (the EU in the media, the EU and the Schengen area in Parliament). Others are ignored (Greece in the media, countries of origin and Africa in Parliament).

### ***Persons Quoted and Mentioned***

While NGOs can be found in both the media narratives and political debate, most of the people and organisations quoted or mentioned are not mirrored across the two arenas (France, Italy and Spain in the media, the EU, smugglers, and a Corsican MP in the Parliament).

#### *c) Moral of the Story*

Most of the proposed solutions are either embraced (welcoming the Aquarius, the need to find a long-term European solution, revising the Dublin agreements, etc.) or adapted (support for the Spanish decision and, in Parliament only, support for the deployment of French agents in Spain to legalise migrants).

Other solutions are ignored (putting an end to the Libyan ‘hell’ in the media) or even rejected (welcoming the next boats in the media, not welcoming any more migrants in Parliament).

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

Most plots are ignored (‘Stymied Progress’ and ‘Decline’ in the media, ‘Conspiracy’, ‘Helplessness’ and ‘Blame the victim’ in Parliament). Others, which are in the minority, are embrace (‘Control’).

As well, some causal links embrace each other (‘Intentional’ and ‘Accidental’) and others are ignored (‘Inadvertent’ in Parliament).

## **5.5 Narratives in a presidential statement**

The presidential statement considers France and a few other Member States to be the heroes of the story because of their help for the migrants on the Aquarius (victims). No villain is identified. The story is set at the French level (settings). The preferred solution is to welcome these migrants and the need to find a long-term European solution (moral). The press release insists on the need to adopt this European solution (‘Stymied Progress’) as well as on the effectiveness of the solutions that have been taken (‘Control’). The government shows great confidence in these two solutions (‘Intentional’).

#### *a) Characters*

The heroes are varied. They involve the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, of course, but also a group of European states that have joined forces to welcome the Aquarius to Europe (France, Malta, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Luxembourg). The victims are the migrants on the Aquarius. No villain is identified.

#### *b) Settings*

### **Geography**

The main geographical references in the presidential press release are: ‘France’ (50%), ‘states’ (16.7%), ‘the Union’ (16.7%) and ‘member’ (16.7%).

The French government is thus emphasising France's responsibility for this event, as well as that of the EU and its Member States.

### ***Speakers***

Only one document was selected. It concerns a press release issued by the Presidency of the Republic on 14 August 2018.

### ***Individuals and Organisations Mentioned but Not Quoted***

The only organisation referred to in this press release is the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons. Two other references are to formal texts ('law of the sea' and 'humanitarian principles').

No reference is made to the public.

### ***c) Moral of the Story***

The French government has proposed two solutions: firstly, to rescue the migrants from the Aquarius, and secondly, to set up a sustainable European mechanism to 'ensure that everyone assumes their responsibilities in terms of rescue, disembarkation and solidarity'.

### ***d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms***

Two plots stand out: the help already given to the Aquarius migrants ('Control', 50%) and the establishment of a mechanism, in the future, for similar crises ('Stymied Progress', 50%).

These two solutions refer to two causal links of the 'Intentional' type (66.7%). A final link concerns the reference to the 'drop in irregular flows in the central Mediterranean' ('Accidental', 33.3%).

### ***e) Narrative Style***

The narrative of the presidential press release straddles the line between the 'lay' and 'technocratic' styles, no doubt because it also straddles the line between the communicative and coordinative spheres. Two elements bring it closer to the technocratic style. Firstly, there are many heroes and no villains are identified. Secondly, a causal link is 'accidental', which reinforces the invisibility of responsibility. It should be noted, however, that this accidental link was also present in Parliament and in the media, and that the villain of the narrative was also confused in these two venues.

Other elements belong more to the 'lay' style: the settings focus on France, the proposed solutions are few (only two) and are either praised or strongly encouraged.

## **5.6 Relationship between the communicative and the coordinative spheres**

Most of the elements of the narrative in the presidential press release embrace those of the media and Parliament. These narratives emphasise the need to welcome the Aquarius and

---

present Spain in part as a hero. The settings also focus on France. However, many elements are also adapted, ignored, or rejected.

#### *a) Characters*

The heroes of the presidential communiqué include France and Spain ('embracing' the narratives in the Parliament and the media) and other Member States in favour of welcoming the Aquarius ('ignoring' with the media and the Parliament, which barely mentions Portugal, Germany, or Luxembourg, 'rejecting' with the media and the Parliament, which considers Malta to be a villain).

#### *b) Settings*

##### **Geography**

The geographical settings of the narratives in the three arenas overlap (France and the EU).

##### **Persons Quoted and Mentioned**

The main body mentioned in the presidential press release (the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) is also mentioned in the media and in Parliament ('embracing').

#### *c) Moral of the Story*

The two solutions proposed in the press release, to accommodate the vessel and to find a European solution, are also found in the media and in Parliament ('embracing').

#### *d) Plot and Causal Mechanisms*

The 'Control' plot embraces the media and Parliament, but the latter is in the majority in the presidential communiqué while it is in the minority in the media and Parliament. The 'Stymied Progress' plot is also embraced in the media but is ignored by Parliament.


Finally, the causal links in the communiqué ('Intentional' and 'Accidental') are also found in the media and in Parliament ('embracing').

## **5.7 Conclusion**

The graph below shows the chronological distribution of the data (12 press articles, 61 parliamentary interventions and 1 presidential press release).



**GRAPH 4. Aquarius: chronological breakdown of data**



SOURCE: own elaboration

This graph shows an overlap between media and parliamentary data, and even a slight overlap between parliamentary and governmental data (in average). Compared with the two previous events, the narratives of the Aquarius are unusual. For the first time, the media and parliamentary narratives are slightly different ('adapt') and even opposed ('reject'). Similarly, for the first time, the coordinative sphere (represented by a single presidential press release rather than several administrative circulars) largely mirrors the main elements of the media and parliamentary narratives ('embrace'), even if other elements differ ('reject' for the first time as well).

For the first time, too, parliamentarians are reacting on the spot: the parliamentary and media data are aligned over a period running from 12 to 19 June 2018. This temporal proximity would partly explain the difficulty parliamentarians had in drawing inspiration from the media narrative.

The similarity between the communicative sphere and the coordinative sphere can again be explained by the nature of the latter. We are no longer dealing here with administrative circulars, but with a short presidential communiqué which is modelled on the dominant narratives of the communicative sphere to attract sympathy and counter the criticisms levelled at the French government. This is particularly clear from the arguments used in the press release (the reception of migrants in Spain is being carried out 'at the initiative of France and Malta', 'France welcomes Malta's exceptional humanitarian gesture', 'the solution adopted complies [...] with the law of the sea [...]', etc.)

## 6. What do the interviews say?

The traditional media (written press, television, and radio) are used by parliamentarians and administrative staff for two purposes: to inform themselves and to disseminate information.

### 6.1 Staying informed through traditional media

Regarding the first objective (obtaining information), respondents said that they mainly used the written press and radio on migration issues. In the print media, the three newspapers most often mentioned were *Le Monde*, *Libération* and *Le Figaro*. To a lesser extent, respondents also mention *La Croix*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, *Courrier international*, *Politis* and *Mediapart*. They were generally very satisfied with the press review offered by their parliamentary group. They also stress the importance to them of the local press covering news from their constituency (MPs) or the policies they are implementing (administrative staff). Here's what one administrative staff member had to say:

I'm well aware that by being very technical, very much in this profession, we can be completely out of touch with what public opinion thinks (...) 'Yeah, great, that's good for Paris, it's good for the migrants themselves, because they'll no doubt have a better life, and accommodation. I mean, it's all great, but what do the local people think? What do the elected representatives think?' (...) I'm keeping a close eye on the regional daily press to see how things are going. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

The respondents also show a great interest in radio, mainly because of their frequent journeys by car (especially to and from Parliament). The most frequently cited radio station is *France Inter*. Two others follow: *France Culture* and *France info*.

I'm completely tuned into *France Info* in my car. Because *France Info* is abominably repetitive, but the advantage is that you can get the news at any time. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

Some respondents say they do not watch television. Only one relatively elderly MP regularly watches three channels (*France 2*, *France 3* and *LCI*). The majority of those interviewed also showed a certain annoyance with 24-hour news channels (*CNews* in particular, but also *BFM-TV*).

Look at a channel like *CNews*. It's distressing, really distressing. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

Overall, respondents cited media affiliated with their own political views (left-wing). They also said they consulted the right-wing press (mostly *Le Figaro*) to get an idea of opposing views (especially MPs):

To have another vision (...) to work to dismantle the arguments of the other side. **FR\_3 [Communicative sphere]**

The right-wing written press is also used to shed light on news that is not covered by other newspapers. On the other hand, the majority say they do not consult the far-right or 'celebrity' media:

As for the far-right media, I always have a bit of trouble with it, so I avoid it. And in this case, I have the impression that I have nothing to learn from it. (...) I mean, the extreme right is such a basic discourse that I don't feel I'm learning much. **FR\_3 [Communicative sphere]**

There are other, more 'celebrity' media that constantly promote the idea that foreigners = crime, foreigners = drugs, foreigners = crime, murder, delinquency. It's not always said explicitly, but it's so implicit that it's becoming totally banal. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

Media information can have several influences on parliamentarians. One of them says he uses the news to comment on it on his blog:

Well, right away I issue a press release, I write on my website, I publish an electronic letter every week (...) For example, this week I'm talking, firstly, about this decision by the Court of Cassation, on 12 May. I'm talking about the mayor of Saint-Brévin, to whom I offer my full support (...) You see, I'm completely in touch with current events, and I believe that politics consists of defending ideas and convictions in the context of the world as it is, of current events as they are. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

Another considers that media coverage can motivate some of his trips. He mentions examples where the integration of migrants is going well:

There's also journalistic work that will highlight something, and on which we'll say: 'Well, yes, there's something going on, maybe we need to go and see, maybe we need to check and see what's going on'. **FR\_3 [Communicative sphere]**

This same example of successful integration can also motivate a ministerial move according to these administrative staff:

When the press highlights a fine example of success in the commune of 'Trifouille-Léchouille', of the 'Stuff' family who have integrated superbly, sometimes, how can I put this, if you like, it inspires a ministerial trip. We say to ourselves: 'Hey, we'd love to go and see them, because things are going so well'. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

Conversely, a poor example of integration in the media can lead to a government response:

[And when things go wrong] (...), it's the minister's office that contacts us, saying: 'We saw this in the press, what's happened? This is not normal. A note on this, explain to us why this, why that'. And fairly quickly afterwards, you have a reaction to adapt the systems so that it doesn't happen again. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

The local press can also speed up the implementation of a government decision that was initially scheduled for a later date:

Pressure from the media on the healthiness of the camp: 'Do you realise what's going on? Well, we would have left the camp for a few more days, a few more weeks, because it's not easy to find, I don't know, six hundred or eight hundred places to stay. (...) But when the media start attacking you about hygiene, cleanliness, diseases (...) and you see in the press that there are cases of scabies. (...) Obviously, we can't let the press headline that there's scabies, and then leave these people with scabies, saying, 'We don't care, no'. That's not possible, so sometimes you must be very clear, sometimes it boosts the decision. (...) 'Well, the press informs us that, for example, the "Stuff" family had to take their two children out of school, because they were put in accommodation fifty kilometres from where they were', and then you say: 'Maybe we could have looked to see if the kids were in school (...)'. Well, when we evacuate camps, [we say]: 'Now you'll have to look at the situation of the children (...)'. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

For this parliamentarian, current events cannot influence legislative work (Parliament's primary function), which must be based on the long-term and not the short term:

And when we make laws, you know that laws that are made in a week in response to a current event are generally bad laws. It takes time and distance to make a law. I don't believe in topical legislation, even though I was once rapporteur for a law on Florange, where the aim was to save a factory, and we had to pass the law in three days, but that's exceptional. I believe that legislative work is a long-term process, which means that we need to take the necessary distance. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

On the other hand, this same parliamentarian believes that scrutiny of the government (Parliament's second function) can follow short-term media events:

You see, when I was rapporteur, co-rapporteur on the [anonymous] issue, I was right at the heart of the news. So it's more through our oversight role that we keep up with current events. **FR\_4 [Communicative sphere]**

MPs do not follow parliamentary news via the media ('it's all internal news [...] We generally get the information before the press does', **FR\_1 [Communicative sphere]**). The same applies to certain government trips ('when a minister is due to come [to our constituency], we know about it well before the press does [...] And we are asked not to leak it', **FR\_1 [Communicative sphere]**).

While they sometimes get local information before the local media do, national or international news is generally given to them by the media themselves:

When we read in the press that the offices of SOS Méditerranée had been invaded, that they had been attacked by a tiny far-right group. That's what the press told us. It wasn't the Bouches-du-Rhône prefecture, which is not our prefecture, nor the association itself. **FR\_1 [Communicative sphere]**

MPs and administrative staff use the national written press and national radio to keep themselves informed, find out about public opinion and, more rarely, get other news and prepare opposing arguments through the opposition media (*Figaro* in particular). They can also use the news to position themselves publicly (blog) and motivate personal or ministerial trips.

Bad news can also lead to an unexpected government response or to the more rapid implementation of public policies that have already been adopted. On the other hand, the adoption of new public policies in the wake of breaking news can be frowned upon by MPs, who prefer to take a long-term view of their work. Finally, the MPs and their teams say that they do not always need local news because they have other sources of information, but they are divided on this point. The news thus influences government action and, more rarely, legislative work. MPs and ministers may use the media to position themselves and act, but we do not know if they are inspired by their narratives.

## 6.2 Disseminating information through traditional media

Some MPs say they speak to the media without necessarily specifying which media they speak to or the context in which they do so. They also invite the media to cover their activities:

As a politician, how do you publicise something? For example, when we went to Montgenèvre on the French-Italian border, we went on solidarity patrols, we took turns throughout the winter (...) with members of parliament, with the ecologist group in the Senate and others (...) this made it possible to detect irregularities, but also to ensure that the pressure from the police, the prefecture, was less heavy on the associations. (...) through this, we also created a media event and we used the media to put the spotlight on it (...) then, we appealed, we filed a case and the prefect was condemned (...) afterwards, other members of Parliament came, there were articles, investigations by different journalists. **FR\_3 [Communicative sphere]**

Administrative staff may also intervene in the media to explain government action. One respondent said that in his previous administrative role, he had intervened about immigration in his former administration. On the other hand, in his current position, it is customary for his boss to intervene in the media (Sylvain Mathieu). He is more accustomed to answering journalists' questions by telephone (*France Culture*, *Médiapart*, etc.), even if it means being uncomfortable on certain subjects:

I think we can answer anything on these subjects (...) I don't see what the problem is. So when we're questioned, we answer. On the other hand, when something stupid is done, about schooling, or the examples I gave you, yeah, we struggle a bit to explain to the press that: 'Yes, my God, maybe we should have paid more attention to that'. **FR\_2 [Coordinative sphere]**

A member of the current majority (centre), involved on several immigration issues, also appeared in the media to denounce an immigration bill originating from the same majority. She left her parliamentary group shortly afterwards. But, according to her parliamentary attachés, her media appearances were rare because of her difficulty in expressing herself orally:

She was one of the most discreet. (...) She had difficulty expressing herself orally. (...) Sometimes she'd leave the speech to one side and go off on her own, even improvising. And she didn't know how to do that. It was really bad (...) 'There are times when you can't understand a word she's saying'. (...) Within the En Marche! group (...), they offered media training. [She] never wanted to access it, never wanted to take advantage of it. **FR\_1 [Communicative sphere]**

However, some of this MP's activities could have been publicised in the media: public demonstrations, public support for the Aquarius and then the Ocean Viking, visits to detention centres, attendance at the evacuation of the Grande-Synthe camp, discussions with the border police in Briançon, etc.

On the other hand, according to her parliamentary attachés, other activities of this MP had to remain discreet: following up individual cases of migrants to obtain visas or residence permits, regular meetings with the prefecture to defend these migrants, discussions with the Social Security to facilitate access to work for certain people, defence of homeless people in her constituency, etc.

When you're a member of Parliament or a parliamentary assistant, the doors and telephone numbers open immediately. (...) it's a subject that has remained discreet, that is generally dealt with away from microphones and cameras. The press doesn't report on it because nobody brags about it (...) appealing to the discretionary power that prefects may have (...) Discreet files, for example. In other words, cases that shouldn't get too much media coverage. **FR\_1 [Communicative sphere]**

Interventions in the national media may serve to justify the government's actions (administrative staff) or publicise someone's position (MPs). MPs may also invite the media to some of their activities to make public an event. However, some MPs may find it difficult to appear in the media. Similarly, some of their individual support for migrants may not be covered by the media. So not all politicians are able to get their views across to the media.

Respondents also use social networks and more technical sources to keep themselves informed and disseminate information. An administrative staff also talks about the influence he can have on Parliament and the government when he informs these two venues.

## 7. Conclusions across the three case studies

### 7.1 Key narratives on the three case studies

The narrative deployed for the three events thus shows a relatively positive discourse towards immigration, particularly in the media and in circulars. Parliament is more negative. This shows that illegal border crossings (Aquarius) and asylum (relocation and Ukraine) are not sensitive issues in France. The French narrative is usually negative on three other subjects: the integration of immigrants and Muslims in France, terrorism and the violence that can be committed by these populations (particularly to women).

For all three events, the heroes and settings are seen in terms of a 'geographical funnel': the media are more European in scope, the Parliament is more national, and the administrative circulars are more local. The presidential press release is halfway between the media and Parliament.

For each event, the victims and causal mechanisms ('Intentional') are similar for the communicative and coordinative spheres. On the other hand, villains, moral and plots vary

significantly from one type of venue to another. Villains from the media and Parliament are similar, but villains from policy documents (including the presidential press release) are often absent. Similarly, the policy solutions (moral) are similar between Parliament, the media and the presidential press release, but they are set out in a more technical manner in the administrative circulars. Finally, the plots vary slightly from one event to another and from one venue to another.

For the victims, we find no gender dimension to the war in Ukraine. Except for a right-wing parliamentarian insisting on the need to receive women and children from Ukraine as quickly as possible, this priority is not to be found in other documents or among other parliamentarians. This contrasts with what can be said about this conflict in the French public debate.

Regarding relocation, the EU and France are being asked to help asylum seekers by implementing this scheme and setting up hotspots. The Visegrád group is singled out for its opposition to these two measures. Concerning the war in Ukraine, France is above all asked to welcome refugees, and the narrative regrets the Russian invasion. Finally, as regards the Aquarius, Spain and France are asked to take in the migrants on board, and a longer-term European solution should be established for future boats. Unlike the first two events, where the communicative and coordinative spheres showed great confidence in the solutions proposed (or adopted), the case of the Aquarius is unusual in that the French solution has been strongly criticised by the media and Parliament.

Compared to the results highlighted in a previous report (Moncada 2023), the narratives given here are more positive. In particular, this report highlighted the negative narratives of the burkini controversy (2016) and the Nice attack perpetrated by a young Tunisian (2020). In contrast, the narratives of the illegal Channel Tunnel crossings (2015) were relatively neutral. This report and this study show that the national narrative is 'tense' on issues relating to integration (the burkini) or terrorism (Nice attack), but not on issues relating to the reception of asylum seekers (relocation and Ukraine) or illegal border crossings (the Channel Tunnel and Aquarius).

## **7.2 Circulation of narratives**

For relocation and Ukraine, the media and Parliament have broadly similar narratives ('embrace'), while the administrative circulars differ slightly ('adapt'). There are two explanations for this. On the one hand, parliamentarians intervened after the media, which leaves them time to draw inspiration from their narrative. This hypothesis is reinforced by the interviews, which show that the MPs (or their teams) make extensive use of the media. On the other hand, the singular nature of administrative circulars, designed to implement public policy, prevents them from adopting a tone like the 'communicative sphere' (media and Parliament).

In the case of Aquarius, the media and Parliament have slightly different narratives ('adapt'), whereas the presidential press release adopts most of the elements of their narrative ('embrace'). We also propose two explanations for these similarities. On the one hand, the media and Parliament intervened at the same time, which a priori did not leave parliamentarians time to draw inspiration from the media narrative. On the other hand, the presidential press release, which came later, had time to improvise a speech based on the

'communicative sphere' to respond to its opponents because the government was at the heart of the controversy. As well, the attacks on the French government provide a clear example of narratives that are explicitly 'rejected' – both within the 'communicative sphere' and between the 'communicative' and the 'coordinative' spheres.

The media largely focused on what politicians had to say, constantly quoting them in inverted commas. But they are mainly interested in French and European governments and neglect Parliament. The interviews show that not all MPs feel comfortable speaking to the media. Some of their actions, such as individual aid to migrants, are not suitable for media coverage either. Finally, parliamentarians do use the media to publicise an event, but very occasionally.

The interviews also show that the national media can be at the origin of parliamentary or government trips and initiate various government responses (press release, evaluation of a public policy, speeding up the implementation of a public policy that has already been adopted, etc.). Similarly, the parliamentarians feel that it is normal for government oversight (Parliament's second function) to sometimes follow the news in the media. But the long-term legislative work (first function) is detached from short-term media coverage.

Finally, politicians use other sources to obtain information or make their opinions known (Twitter, associations, prefectures, specialist immigration sites, parliamentary archives, etc.).

### **7.3 Lay and technocratic narratives**

We hypothesised that the communicative sphere favoured a 'lay' narrative, while the coordinative sphere favoured a more 'technocratic' style. This was borne out every time in our data. We even established that the Aquarius presidential communiqué, a document straddling the communicative and coordinative spheres, also used a narrative straddling the lay and technocratic styles.

In this respect, the coordinative sphere has a technocratic narrative for the following reasons. The characters are confused, rarely mentioning a villain, and the heroic nature of the heroes is demonstrated by numerous actions. The settings focus on the French case, and more precisely on numerous legal texts and organisations which are the (numerous) heroes of the narrative. The proposed solutions are also few and unanimous. They are analysed in greater depth (cost, impact, etc.) and presented as objectives to be achieved. Finally, the plots and causal mechanisms are not very varied ('Control' and 'Intentional' in the vast majority). The coordinative sphere is also more inclined to use the causal link 'accidental', which further contributes to masking the responsibility of a potential villain.

In contrast, the lay narrative of the communicative sphere is more colourful. The characters are clearly established, without necessarily explaining why. Heroes and villains are well polarised and not unanimous. For instance, France is always portrayed as a hero and a villain in Parliament, due to the conflict between the opposition and the majority. The villain is also presented as being responsible, directly or indirectly, for the problem observed. As with the coordinative sphere, settings focus on one or two geographical areas, often including France. But the settings in the communicative sphere generally focus on the national or European levels, while those in the coordinative sphere focus on the national and local levels in France only. Similarly, settings in the communicative sphere generally make no mention of public



programs or legal texts. The preferred solutions are more numerous, not unanimous, their beneficial nature is not always demonstrated, and the urgency of their adoption (plots) is very high. In contrast, the coordinative sphere does not emotionally charge the objectives to be achieved, nor does it emphasize this urgency.

On the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish between media and parliamentary narratives on a scale of 'lay' using these five variables (characters, settings, moral of the story, plots, and causal links). An additional variable can be added to establish this distinction. Allowing for the possibility that some of the 'lay' discourses may be 'populist' (Boswell and Smellie 2023, 7), we can analyse the way in which the narratives qualify the people. The quantity and diversity of these qualifiers can be used to place the documents on a scale ranging from 'lay' to 'technocratic'. By far the most 'lay' narratives come from Parliament, which uses a vast and diverse repertoire to talk about the people. Next come the media, followed by administrative circulars. The only presidential press release (coordinative sphere of Aquarius) is difficult to position because its five components place it somewhere between 'lay' and 'technocratic' discourse and it does not use any qualifiers to describe the people.

Parliamentarians are fond of expressions using the word 'people' ('Europe of the peoples', 'persecuted peoples', 'peoples of the world', 'sovereign people', 'right of peoples', 'aversion to peoples', 'Spanish'/'Ukrainian'/'French people', etc.). They also appreciate the use of possessives ('our people', 'our fellow citizens', 'our compatriots', 'our public opinion', 'our identity', etc.). Finally, they refer to 'anti-European' and 'nationalist' populism, specifically targeting the French far-right and, more rarely, the European far-right. These expressions are generally evenly spread across the political spectrum. The right and far-right use slightly more the 'people'.

The media use fewer and less varied terms. *Le Figaro* mainly refers to public opinion ('Eurobarometer', 'national sentiment', 'opinion polls', 'opinion surveys', 'poll', 'public opinion', etc.). The three newspapers also highlight a common European identity ('European peoples', 'our common European civilisation', 'we Europeans'). Finally, they rarely mention Viktor Orbán's 'populism'.

The administrative circulars mainly refer to people hosting foreigners in France ('citizen hosting offers', 'host families', 'private homes', 'private individuals', 'civil society actors', 'the population', etc.).

This sixth variable, relating to the people, is therefore a good indicator for differentiating between 'lay' and 'technocratic' narratives.

But we did not find any differences between events: all three types of venues use the word 'people' indiscriminately. The nature of the document, not the event, is thus the only parameter explaining the use of a more or less populist and more or less lay narrative.

Parliament is thus the place where the most lay narratives are expressed. It is also the place where these narratives are the most negative towards immigration. We can therefore imagine that there is a positive correlation between the lay style and the negative narrative. However, this hypothesis is counterbalanced by the following section, which shows that the government

has a rather negative discourse on immigration, even though it uses a narrative that is closer to the technocratic style than the lay style.

## 7.4 The government's narrative straddles lay and technocratic styles

Let's now isolate the government's speeches to Parliament, so that we can more clearly classify the government's 'lay' and 'technocratic' narratives according to context. The speeches by the ministers and secretaries of state total some 9,500 words over the three events into Parliament. The government's position on immigration is more negative than that of Parliament as a whole (for the three events) and than the position of each of the events (for all the documents). As with the Aquarius presidential communiqué, the government narrative straddles the line between lay and technocratic styles but is much closer to the technocratic style.

Five elements bring it closer to the technocratic style of the coordinative sphere. Firstly, the plots are mainly of the 'Control' type, to give the image of a government doing its utmost and rising to the occasion. This plot also encourages blame avoidance. Secondly, for Aquarius and relocation, only two expressions are used to refer to the people ('our public opinion' and 'nationalist populism' used for relocation). In addition, the government has a greater propensity to use the 'accidental' causal link (relocation and Aquarius only) to highlight the variation in the number of illegal arrivals or asylum applications. Furthermore, as with the coordinative sphere, the government always refers to France as the hero in virtually every one of its interventions. Finally, compared to parliamentarians, the government always refers to numerous public and private organisations and political figures (settings).

The 'accidental' link, which enabled the circulars to avoid designating a villain, has no such function for the government. Unlike the circulars, the government designates villains for relocation and Aquarius, but hardly any for the war in Ukraine – even though the latter has no 'accidental' link. The only villains for Ukraine are illegal migrants and rejected asylum seekers. Russia is never mentioned as a villain.

The identification and variety of heroes, victims and villains is, however, a constant feature of the government narrative (except for the villains for the war in Ukraine), which brings it closer to the 'lay' style. The Ukraine narrative also adopts a 'lay' style in terms of the many expressions designating the people: 'our compatriots' (very many), 'our fellow citizens' (many), 'the French', 'Ukrainian people' and 'French nationals'. A third element indicates that the government is adopting more of a 'lay' style for the war in Ukraine than for the other two events. The government uses emotionally charged vocabulary for the war in Ukraine ('humanitarian', 'solidarity', 'sang-froid', 'honour', 'generosity', 'fraternity', 'courage', 'challenge', 'firmness', etc.). This type of vocabulary is slightly less developed for the other two events. The relocation event essentially highlights the migration 'crisis' and the 'flows' and 'influxes' of migrants. It also emphasises the urgency and gravity of the situation ('at the risk of their lives', 'emergency', 'distress', 'under stress', 'dramatic', 'misery', 'unacceptable', etc.). The vocabulary of the Aquarius is slightly less insistent on the urgency of the situation ('urgent need', 'humanitarian distress', 'emergency situation', 'drama', 'dangers', 'risks', 'perils', 'law of the jungle', 'national egoisms', 'cruel and painful', etc.).

## 7.5 Confirmed and refuted hypotheses

We hypothesise that the pressure on the government is greater for the war in Ukraine than for the other two events. Indeed, the number of press articles on the war in Ukraine is greater than for the other two events. The same applies to the number of parliamentary debates devoted to the reception of refugees from Ukraine. For the same reasons, the Aquarius seems to be the second event putting the government under the most pressure.


However, the media and political focus on the war in Ukraine seems to have encouraged the government to adopt a more 'lay' style than usual. This **confirms the first hypothesis** of the work package (*'Increased political salience of immigration engenders more lay [including populist] narratives, which governments will be under pressure to respond to/embrace'*).

Conversely, the reduced media and political pressure on the government (relocation and Aquarius) is encouraging the government to adopt a more technocratic style, which **confirms the third hypothesis** (*'Where governments are more buffered from political pressure, they are more likely to embrace technocratic narratives'*).

We also observe a slight decoupling because the government uses a more negative narrative than that of the circulars. On the other hand, this decoupling is less significant for the war in Ukraine compared with the other two events, because the government's narrative on Ukraine is much more positive. However, the government narrative is far more populist for the war in Ukraine than for the other events, because it uses a variety of vocabulary to address the people ('our compatriots', 'our fellow citizens', etc.) The **fourth hypothesis** is therefore only **partially confirmed** (*'Where immigration is politically salient AND governments are under pressure to deliver tangible outcomes, they are likely to decouple rhetorical commitment to populist narratives from more evidence-based practice'*).

The government's most negative narrative is delivered for Aquarius. At this event, the government's narrative is not populist because it does not use any expression to refer to the people. On the other hand, this event is the only one where the media and Parliament (even within the majority) strongly oppose the government's inaction. The government is using a shaky justification by blaming Italy and Malta, without explaining the French refusal to take in the Aquarius. On the other hand, we do not find such an attack on the French government in the case of Ukraine when the government employs the most populist narrative. The **fifth hypothesis** is therefore **partly confirmed** (*'Where policymakers base policy interventions on populist narratives, they may be exposed to a "cognitive constraint" whereby expert or lay [experiential] knowledge exposes inconsistencies or inaccuracies in narratives'*).

The polarisation of Parliament is greatest for Aquarius according to the distribution of speakers in Parliament who are for or against immigration. However, this event does not lead to a populist narrative on the part of the government because neither the circulars nor the government use expressions to evoke the people. Conversely, the government's most populist discourse (based on its expressions describing the people) is conducted for the war in Ukraine and leads to uniformly pro-immigration narratives in Parliament. We thus **refute the second hypothesis** (*'Predominance of populist narratives leads to diversification/polarisation of*



*different narratives across actors and venues, especially where the latter are more technocratic or “evidence-based”).*

## References

- Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. 2014. 'Comparing Immigrant Integration in North America and Western Europe: How Much Do the Grand Narratives Tell Us?', *International Migration Review* 48 (S1): S263 – S291.
- Alba, Richard. 2005. 'Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (1): 20–49.
- Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner. 2016. 'How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes Towards Asylum Seekers', *Science* 354, 217–222.
- Baubérot, Jean. 2021. *Histoire de la Laïcité en France*, Presses Universitaires de France, 128 pages.
- Beaugé, Julien and Abdellali Hajjat. 2014. 'Élites Françaises et Construction du "Problème Musulman". Le Cas du Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (1989-2012)', *Sociologie* 5 (1): 31–59.
- Bertossi, Christophe. 2012. 'The Performativity of Colour Blindness: Race Politics and Immigrant Integration in France, 1980–2012', *Patterns of Prejudice* 46 (5): 427–444.
- Boswell, Christina, and Saskia Smellie. 2023. 'Migration Policy Narratives. Migration Narratives in Political Debate and Policy-Making. Conceptualising and Operationalising Work Packages 7 and 8.' *BRIDGES Working Papers* 19. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10066255>
- Brücker, Pauline, Daniel Veron, and Youri Lou Vertongen. 2019. 'Du Mouvement des Sans-Papiers à la "Crise" des Réfugiés : Évolution des Catégories d'Action et Enjeux Théoriques', *Critique Internationale* 84(3): 9–21.
- Cantat, Céline, Antoine Pécoud, and Hélène Thiollet. 2023. 'Migration as Crisis', *American Behavioral Scientist* (online). <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642231182889>
- Caponio, Tiziana, and Gaia Testore. 2012. 'L'Intégration: Nouvelle Frontière de l'Immigration?' *Migrations Société* (2): 285–294.
- Choy, Marina. 2022. 'Articulating the "Problem of Immigration": Nationalism and Dominant Mythological Formations around Immigration in France', *Postcolonial Interventions: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Postcolonial Studies* VII (1): 126–166.
- De Galembert, Claire. 2009. 'Cause du Voile et Lutte pour la Parole Musulmane Légitime', *Sociétés Contemporaines* 2 (74): 19 – 47.
- Delphy, Christine. 2006. 'Antisexisme ou Antiracisme? Un Faux Dilemme', *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 25 (1): 59–83.

Dennison, James, and Teresa Talò. 2017. 'Explaining Attitudes to Immigration in France', Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper n° RSCAS 2017/25. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/46245>

Durand, Anne-Aël. 2017. "“Relocalisation” des migrants en Europe : quels pays ont tenu leurs engagements ?", *Le Monde*. [https://www.leMonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/09/26/migrants-relocalises-en-europe-quels-pays-ont-tenu-leurs-engagements\\_5191777\\_4355770.html](https://www.leMonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/09/26/migrants-relocalises-en-europe-quels-pays-ont-tenu-leurs-engagements_5191777_4355770.html)

Escafré-Dublet, Angéline. 2019. 'The Whiteness of Cultural Boundaries in France', *Identities* 26 (5): 563–578.

Eurobarometer. 2021. Special Eurobarometer 519. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2276>

Eurobarometer. 2022. Standard Eurobarometer. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961>

European Social Survey. 2018. 'Les Attitudes à l'Égard de l'Immigration et leurs Déterminants' [https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/TL7\\_Immigration-Belgian-French.pdf](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/TL7_Immigration-Belgian-French.pdf)

European Social Survey. 2020. 'ESS Data Portal'. <https://ess-search.nsd.no/>

Gauthier, Jérémie and Fabien Jobard (eds). 2018. *Police : Questions Sensibles*, Presses Universitaires de France, 100 pages.

Gökariksel, Banu, and Katharyne Mitchell. 2005. 'Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject: National Narratives and Supranational Desires in Turkey and France', *Global Networks* 5 (2): 147–165.

Guénif Souilamas, Nacira. 2000. *Des Beuettes aux Descendantes d'Immigrants Nord-Africains*, Grasset, 360 pages.

Hachimi-Alaoui, Myriam. 2016. 'L'Immigration Familiale : une Obligation d'“Intégration Républicaine”'. Le Cas du Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration', *Recherches Familiales* (1): 79–93.

Hajjat, Abdellali. 2013. *La Marche pour l'Égalité et Contre le Racisme*, Amsterdam, 262 pages.

Hargreaves, Alec. 1996. 'A Deviant Construction: The French Media and the “Banlieues”', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 22 (4): 607–618.

Hargreaves, Alec. 2000. 'Half-Measures. Antidiscrimination Policy in France', *French Politics, Culture & Society* 18 (3): 83–101.

Harzoune, Mustapha. 2023. 'La 29e loi sur l'immigration depuis 1980', Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration. <https://www.histoire-immigration.fr/politique-et-immigration/la-29e-loi-sur-l-immigration-depuis-1980>

- High Council for Integration. 1991. "Pour un Modèle Français d'Intégration. Premier Rapport Annuel", La documentation française. [https://medias.vie-publique.fr/data\\_storage\\_s3/rapport/pdf/124000544.pdf](https://medias.vie-publique.fr/data_storage_s3/rapport/pdf/124000544.pdf)
- Ifop. 2022. IFOP/Fiducial for Marianne, 'Analyse du vote selon les pratiques médias', 10 April 2022. <https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/119097-Rapport.pdf>
- Jones, Michael, Elizabeth Shanahan, and Mark McBeth. 2014. *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, Palgrave Macmillan, 300 pages.
- Jouanneau, Solenne. 2017. 'Faire Emerger un "Islam Français" : Paradoxes d'une Action Publique Sous Contrainte (1970-2010)', *Sociologie* 3 (8): 247–264.
- Koenig, Matthias. 2005. 'Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States – a Comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany', *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 6 (2): 219–234.
- Laronde, Michel. 1988. 'La "Mouvance Beure" : Émergence Médiatique', *The French Review*, 61 (5): 684-692.
- Lepinard, Eléonore. 2015. 'Migrating Concepts: Immigrant Integration and the Regulation of Religious Dress in France and Canada', *Ethnicities* 15 (5): 611–632.
- Lessana, Charlotte. 1998. 'Loi Debré : la Fabrique de l'Immigré (partie 1, partie 2)', *Cultures & Conflits* (31–32). <https://journals.openedition.org/conflits/549?lang=en>
- Lettinga, Doutje, and Sawitri Saharso. 2014. 'Outsiders Within: Framing and Regulation of Headscarves in France, Germany and The Netherlands', *Social Inclusion* 2 (3): 29–39.
- Lochak, Danièle. 2006. 'L'Intégration Comme Injonction. Enjeux Idéologiques et Politiques Liés à l'Immigration', *Cultures & Conflits* (64): 131–147.
- Lorcerie, Françoise. 2008. 'La "Loi sur le Voile" : une Entreprise Politique', *Droit et Société* 1 (68): 53 – 74.
- Martigny, Vincent. 2016. *Dire la France. Culture(s) et Identités Nationales (1981-1995)*, Presses de Sciences Po, 376 pages.
- Mauger, Gérard. 2006. *L'Émeute de Novembre 2005. Une Révolte Protopolitique*, Broissieux, 157 pages.
- Miron, Alina, and Bérangère Taxil. 2019. 'Le Dernier Voyage de l'Aquarius', *La Revue des droits de l'homme*. <https://doi.org/10.4000/revdh.5925>
- Moncada, Marie. 2023. 'Migration Narratives in Media and Social Media. The Case of France', BRIDGES Working Papers 5, 109 pages. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7694790>

- Mouchard, Daniel. 2002. 'Les Mobilisations des "Sans" dans la France Contemporaine : l'Émergence d'un "Radicalisme Autolimité" ?', *Revue Française de Science Politique* 52 (4), 425–447.
- Mucchielli, Laurent, and Véronique Le Goaziou. 2007. *Quand les Banlieues Brûlent... Retour sur les Émeutes de Novembre 2005*, La Découverte, 176 pages.
- Mucchielli, Laurent. 2005. *Le Scandale des 'Tournantes'. Dérides Médiatiques, Contre-Enquête Sociologique*, La Découverte, 124 pages.
- Noiriel, Gérard. 1988. *Le Creuset Français. Histoire de l'Immigration, 19e-20e siècle*, Le Seuil, 437 pages.
- Peker, Efe. 2022. 'Finding Religion: Immigration and the Populist (Re) Discovery of Christian Heritage in Western and Northern Europe', *Religions* 13 (2): 158.
- Raissiguier, Catherine. 1999. 'Gender, Race and Exclusion: A New Look at the French Republican Tradition', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1 (3), 435–457.
- Reynié, Dominique (ed.). 2019. 'Islamist Terrorist Attacks in the World. 1979–2019'. <https://www.fondapol.org/app/uploads/2020/06/enquete-terrorisme-gb-2019-11-18versionfinale-3.pdf>
- Schmidt, Vivien. 2008. 'Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 303–326.
- Siméant, Johanna. 1993. 'La Violence d'un Répertoire : les Sans-Papiers en Grève de la Faim', *Cultures & Conflits* (09–10). <https://journals.openedition.org/conflits/218>
- Stone, Deborah. 1989. 'Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas', *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (2): 281–300.
- Stone, Deborah. 2002. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, W. W. Norton & Company, 448 pages.
- Varro, Gabrielle. 2013. 'Les Discours Officiels sur les Élèves Étrangers et l'Exigence de la "Maîtrise" du Français', *Éducation et Sociétés Plurilingues* (35): 43–56.
- Viprey, Mouna. 2010. 'Immigration Choisie, Immigration Subie : du Discours à la Réalité', *La Revue de l'IRES* (1): 149–169.



## Annex: Sampling details of the media, political and policy analysis

### LEGAL REFERENCES

Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 and (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece.

Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection.

Decree no. 2014-527 of 23 May 2014 amending the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum (regulatory part).

Law no. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 regulating, in application of the principle of secularity, the wearing of signs or clothing expressing religious affiliation in state schools.

Law no. 2006-911 of 24 July 2006 on immigration and integration.

Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in the public space.

Law no. 2011-672 of 16 June 2011 on immigration, integration and nationality.

Law no. 2012-1560 of 31 December 2012 on detention for verification of the right to stay and amending the offence of aiding illegal residence to exclude humanitarian and disinterested actions.

Law no. 2013-660 of 22 July 2013 on higher education and research (art. 86 on the reception of foreign students).

Law no. 2015-925 of 29 July 2015 on the reform of the right of asylum.

Law no. 2016-274 of 7 March 2016 on the rights of foreign nationals in France.

Law no. 2018-187 of 20 March 2018 to ensure the correct application of the European asylum system (draft law).

Law no. 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration.

Law no. 2021-1109 of 24 August 2021 to ensure respect for the principles of the French Republic.

Order no. 2014-464 of 7 May 2014 extending and adapting the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum (legislative part) to Mayotte.

## DOCUMENTS STUDIED

### *Le Figaro*

Bourmaud, François-Xavier. 2022 (16 March). 'Emmanuel Macron se prépare à l'afflux de réfugiés ukrainiens', *Le Figaro* : 12.

Cornevin, Christophe. 2015 (27 August). 'La France, solidaire de l'Allemagne, prête à partager l'effort mais sous conditions', *Le Figaro* : 4.

De Taillac, Mathieu. 2018 (13 June). 'L'Espagne se prépare à recevoir les passagers de l'« Aquarius » à Valence', *Le Figaro* : 7.

De Taillac, Mathieu. 2018 (16 June). 'L'Espagne s'apprête à ouvrir les bras aux réfugiés de l'« Aquarius »', *Le Figaro* : 10.

De Taillac, Mathieu. 2018 (18 June). 'L'« Aquarius » arrivé à bon port à Valence', *Le Figaro* : 7.

Heuzé, Richard, and de Taillac, Mathieu. 2018 (12 June). 'L'odyssée des 629 migrants de l'« Aquarius »', *Le Figaro* : 8.

Hubaut, Leonor. 2022 (12 March). 'Solidaire, l'UE gère sa plus grave crise migratoire', *Le Figaro* : 3.

Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2015 (24 August). 'Migrants : soyons collectivement courageux', *Le Figaro* : 19.

Mével, Jean-Jacques. 2015 (14 September). 'Asselborn : "Il faut mettre de l'ordre dans le chaos actuel"' (interview), *Le Figaro* : 4.

Mével, Jean-Jacques. 2015 (15 September). 'La crise migratoire fissure Schengen', *Le Figaro* : 3.

Quinault-Maupoil, Tristan. 2022 (8 March). 'La France "au rendez-vous" de l'accueil des Ukrainiens', *Le Figaro* : 4

Sapin, Charles. 2022 (3 March). 'L'accueil des réfugiés ukrainiens divise le camp nationaliste', *Le Figaro* : 10.

## **Le Monde**

Ducourtieux, Cécile, and Jean-Pierre Stroobants. 2015 (10 September). 'Juncker veut imposer l'accueil des réfugiés', *Le Monde*: 3.

Ducourtieux, Cécile, and Jean-Pierre Stroobants. 2015 (23 September). 'Réfugiés : L'Union Européenne en quête d'un accord', *Le Monde*: 1.

Ducourtieux, Cécile, and Jean-Pierre Stroobants. 2015 (24 September). 'L'UE impose la répartition de 120 000 réfugiés', *Le Monde*: 6.

Ducourtieux, Cécile, Jean-Pierre Stroobants, Frédéric Lemaître, and David Revault d'Allonnes. 2015 (5 September). 'François Hollande rejoint Angela Merkel sur les quotas d'accueil de réfugiés', *Le Monde* : 2.

Gautheret, Jérôme, and Sandrine Morel. 2018 (13 June). 'Matteo Salvini exulte après la crise de l'« Aquarius »', *Le Monde*: 6.

Lemaignen, Julien. 2022 (2 March). 'Ukraine : les candidats à l'Élysée et la question des réfugiés', *Le Monde* : 14.

Lemarié, Alexandre, and Cédric Pietralunga. 2018 (14 June). 'Le sort des migrants de l'« Aquarius » divise la majorité', *Le Monde*: 6.

Pascouau, Yves. 2018 (15 June). 'L'affaire de l'"Aquarius" contribue à l'abaissement de notre niveau d'humanité', *Le Monde* : 20.

Pascual, Julia. 2022 (14 March). "On va avoir besoin de solidarité nationale", *Le Monde* : 9.

Pascual, Julia. 2022 (14 March). 'Le désespoir des non-Ukrainiens face à la différence de traitement', *Le Monde* : 9.

Rérolle, Raphaëlle, Jérôme Gautheret, and Sandrine Morel. 2018 (19 June). 'L'odyssée de l'« Aquarius »', *Le Monde*: 14.

Stroobants, Jean-Pierre. 2022 (5 March). 'L'Europe retrouve le sens de l'accueil pour les Ukrainiens', *Le Monde* : 5.

## **Libération**

Caño, Antonio, Oliver Duff, Jan Helin, Johan Hufnagel, Laurent Joffrin, Christian Jensen, Anna B. Jenssen, MatúšKostolný, Ezio Mauro, Adam Michnik, András Murányi, Andreas Paraschos, Amol Rajan, and Bernd Ulrich. 2015 (10 September). "L'Europe en fait trop peu, trop tard", *Libération*: 2.

Alonso, Pierre, Gurvan Kristanadjaja, Luc Mathieu, and Stéphane Siohan. 2022 (11 March). 'Ukraine. Une enfance sous les bombes', *Libération*: 2.

Musseau, François. 2018 (18 juin). “Aquarius” : à Valence, “il fallait prendre une mesure de décence”, *Libération* : 6.

Davier, Margot. 2022 (28 February). “Il faut se battre, sinon notre pays va disparaître” : à Paris, le départ de la diaspora ukrainienne’, *Libération* : 7.

Masseguin, Léa. 2022 (2 March). ‘Près de 700 000 réfugiés ukrainiens ont fui leur pays’, *Libération* : 6.

Durand, Marion. 2022 (11 March). ‘Scolarisation des réfugiés ukrainiens à Paris : “Leur permettre de retrouver leur condition d’enfant”’, *Libération* : 6.

Quatremer, Jean. 2018 (13 June). “Aquarius” : Rome abandonne le navire, l’Europe prend l’eau’, *Libération* : 13.

Auffray, Alain, and Laure Equy. 2018 (13 June). “Aquarius”: la France refuse de se mouiller, Macron éclaboussé’, *Libération*: 10.

Mathiot, Cédric, and Fabien Leboucq. 2018 (15 June). ‘Tout ce que vous avez voulu savoir sur l’accueil des migrants en Europe’, *Libération*: 6.

Quatremer, Jean. 2015 (21 August). ‘Migrants : les Vingt-Huit dépassés’, *Libération* : 4.

Quatremer, Jean, and Sylvain Mouillard. 2015 (5 September). ‘Migrants : en Europe, les voix discordantes du continent’, *Libération* : 15.

Vallet, Cédric. 2015 (24 September). ‘Migrants: l’Europe au pied du mur’, *Libération* : 12.

### **Administrative Circulars**

Information of 23 May 2016 on the implementation of resettlement operations for Syrian refugees and the mobilisation of the housing required to accommodate them (NOR: INTV1613717J).

Instruction no. DGCS/SD5A/SD5C/SD1A/2016/156 of 19 May 2016 on the 2016 budget for the ‘Reception, accommodation and social integration’ sector (NOR: AFSA1613344J).

Information of 19 April 2016 on aid to municipalities for the creation of CADA or AT-SA places for asylum seekers and the provision of long-term accommodation for refugees (NOR: INTV1606556J).

Regional reception plans for asylum seekers of 25 January 2016 (NOR: INTV1523797C).

Implementation of the European relocation programme of 9 November 2015 (NOR: INTV1524992J).

Organisation of the reception of 30,000 asylum seekers and refugees on 12 September 2015 (NOR: INTK1500245J).

---

Instruction of 10 March 2022 on the implementation of the Decision of the Council of the European Union of 4 March 2022, taken in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (NOR: INTV2208085J).

Access to accommodation and housing for displaced persons from Ukraine benefiting from temporary protection from 22 March 2022 (NOR: LOGI2209326C).

Instruction of 8 February 2023 on the priorities for 2023 of the integration policy for new arrivals<sup>1</sup> including refugees (NOR: IOMV2303177J).

### **Presidential Press Release**

Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic on 14 August 2018 on the Franco-Maltese initiative concerning the disembarkation of people rescued by the humanitarian vessel Aquarius.

### **Parliamentary Debates**

National Assembly, sitting of 1 March 2022 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 35 of 2 March 2022:2180–2207).

National Assembly, sitting of 15 July 2015 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 89 of 16 July 2015:6696–6740).

National Assembly, sitting of 16 September 2015 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 97 of 17 September 2015:7282–7329).

National Assembly, sitting of 28 July 2022 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 52 of 29 July 2022:3248–3282).

National Assembly, written question no. 328 from Mme Véronique Riotton (*Journal Officiel* of 26 July 2022:?) / National Assembly, response from the Ministry of Solidarity (*Journal Officiel* of 29 November 2022:5882).

National Assembly, written question no. 60 by M. Pierre Cordier (*Journal Officiel* of 12 July 2022:?) / National Assembly, answer by the Ministry of the Economy (*Journal Officiel* of 22 November 2022:5578).

National Assembly, written question no. 912 from Mr. Vincent Seitlinger (*Journal Officiel* of 23 August 2022) / Answer from the Ministry of the Economy (*Journal Officiel* of 22 November 2022:5581).

Senate, session of 30 November 2015 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 138 of 1 December 2015:11872–11968).

Senate, sitting of 12th July 2022 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 31 of 13th July 2022:2286–2327).

Senate, sitting of 13 October 2015 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 109 of 14 October 2015:9452–9571).

Senate, sitting of 16 September 2015 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 97 of 17 September 2015:8304–8389).

Senate, sitting of 1st March 2022 (*Journal Officiel de la République Française* no. 28 of 2 March 2022:2210– 2236).

Senate, written question no. 01812 by Mr. Pascal Martin (*Journal Officiel* of 28 July 2022:3947)/Senate, response from the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty (*Journal Officiel* of 24 November 2022:5890).

## **INTERVIEWS**

**FR\_1:** 17 May 2023, former parliamentary attaché to a majority MP in En Marche! (centre). Same MP as FR\_5.

**FR\_2:** 10 May 2023, inter-ministerial delegate for housing and access to housing (DIHAL).

**FR\_3:** 25 April 2023, Senator assimilated to Europe Écologie Les Verts (centre-left).

**FR\_4:** 16 May 2023, Senator for the Socialist Party (centre-left).

**FR\_5:** 16 May 2023, former parliamentary attaché of a majority MP to En Marche! (centre). Same MP as FR\_1.

# BRIDGES

Assessing the production and impact of migration narratives

**BRIDGES:** Assessing the production and impact of migration narratives is a project funded by the EU H2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation and implemented by a consortium of 12 institutions from all over Europe. The project aims to understand the causes and consequences of migration narratives in a context of increasing politicisation and polarisation around these issues by focusing on six European countries: France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. To do so, BRIDGES adopts an interdisciplinary and co-productive approach and is implemented by a diverse consortium formed by universities, think tanks and research centres, cultural associations, and civil society organisations.

**The BRIDGES Working Papers** are a series of academic publications presenting the research results of the project in a structured and rigorous way. They can either focus on particular case studies covered by the project or adopt a comparative perspective.

## **How to cite this Working Paper:**

Moncada, Marie. 2023. "The impact of narratives on policy-making at the national level. The case of France". *BRIDGES Working Papers* 20. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10200819>

© BRIDGES Consortium 2023

The texts are published in digital format in open access and under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) license.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10200819>

ISSN: 2696-8886

Editorial Coordination: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 101004564. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or of the participants of the research. The European Commission and the Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.