Migration narratives in media and social media

The case of France

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Assessing the production and impact of migration narratives

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Abstract

How can we understand the success of a narrative in France? To answer this question, three events are studied: the attack on the Nice basilica in 2020, the intrusions on the Channel Tunnel in 2015 and the burkini controversy in 2016. This report uses a mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis of three media: press, television and Twitter. Ten interviews with journalists complement the data. The results show, among other things, the ease with which hatred of migrants and Muslims is propagated in *Le Figaro* and on Twitter. Moreover, newscasts are benevolent towards this population compared to the press. Several factors are put forward in the report to understand these rhetorical differences.

Keywords: migration, narratives, media, social media, France, Nice, terrorist attacks, crossings, Channel Tunnel, burkini

1. Introduction

1.1 Research objective and questions

BRIDGES is a H2020 research project funded by the European Commission. It focuses on migration narratives, i.e., written and oral discourses on migration and migrants.

The narratives are 'causal stories' (Stone 1989) with a beginning, a middle and an end. They generally present a plot, characters (heroes, good guys, bad guys, experts, etc.), a scenario and a final moral. Put another way, '[a] narrative is a story with a temporal sequence of events unfolding in a plot that is populated by dramatic moments, symbols, and archetypal characters that culminates in a moral to the story' (Jones and McBeth 2010, 329).

The plot can be a problem and the moral, a political solution. In narratives, causal relationships between actions and between characters are usually shown, but not demonstrated. Their primary function is therefore to facilitate decision-making: public policy narratives thus 'make social problems understandable and accessible to human action. Typically, they suggest a series of actions rather than others, linking the present to the future' (Radaelli 2000, 257).

The title of the project – BRIDGES – reflects the ambition to bridge the gaps between disciplines (political science, media studies, sociology, history, social psychology, etc.) on the one hand, and between research and practice on the other. BRIDGES operates on three levels: scientific, political and social.

From a scientific point of view, first of all, BRIDGES analyses the processes of production of migration narratives, their impact and their mutual interactions through four questions:

1. Why do some stories become dominant over others?
2. How do these narratives shape individual attitudes in Europe and in countries of origin and transit?
3. How do these narratives influence public policy at national and European levels?
4. How do individuals and policy-makers in turn become 'shaped shapers' and influence each other?

At the policy level, BRIDGES aims to contribute to the formulation of evidence-based policies. The project will produce a typology of government strategies to propose alternative narratives and more inclusive policies.

Finally, at the social level, the objective of BRIDGES is to create spaces for dialogue between social and scientific actors in the production of migratory narratives. In this sense, BRIDGES encourages exchanges of good practices between researchers, policy-makers, artistic communities, journalists, civil society organisations and migrant communities on how to construct narratives that promote the integration of migrants.

The project is divided into eleven work packages. The drafting of this report is carried out in Work Package 3 (WP3). The latter aims to investigate how narratives on immigration are produced, circulated, and reacted in the media and social media at the local and national levels. It conducts a comparative analysis of six current or former Member States (France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom) since 2014. This report is therefore an interim report focusing on the French case only.

1.2 Research design and rationale

The WP3 examines why some narratives become dominant over others and what makes them successful: at what conditions do certain contents make their way across the media arena at the expense of others? Who says what, where, and when? To this end, we aim to explore the following questions (the '4 Ws'):

1. WHAT: What are the successful narratives? What are the main features of these successful narratives?
2. WHEN: In which context do these successful narratives obtain a competitive edge?
3. WHERE: Where do these success stories emerge and how do they circulate from one medium to another?
4. WHO: Who carries these successful narratives? How do they access these media?

This report is organised in three main parts each dedicated to each event, plus a final section where we answer the 4 Ws. A subsection also concerns the local, national and international dimension in each case study.

We consider subgenres where stereotypical narratives may emerge. We selected three relevant subgenres: 'arrivals and migration crises', 'debates on migrants' rights', and 'supremacist or jihadist terror attacks'. The three events that were selected for the French case are the attack on the Nice basilica on 29 October 2020 ('supremacist or jihadist terror attacks'), the spike in attempted intrusions on the Channel Tunnel on the two nights of 27–29 July 2015 ('arrivals and migration crises') and the burkini controversy starting around 16 August 2016 ('debates on migrants' rights').

Three types of media were chosen: press (national and/or regional), television (news) and Twitter. For the press, all newspapers are paid daily newspapers to facilitate the comparison. They were selected because of their large circulation,[1] their generalist coverage and their geographical location. Thus, for this last criterion, only *Nice-Matin* (Nice attack) and *La Voix du Nord* (Eurotunnel) are regional dailies chosen because of their local grounding. The burkini controversy, spread evenly over the territory, does not have a regional daily press. *La Croix,* which is a Catholic newspaper, is added to the sample of the Nice attack because it took place in a basilica. *Libération* is present in the burkini data because of its large circulation. Finally, press articles were collected using the Europresse database (Europresse 2022) and the Factiva database (Factiva 2022). Factiva does not provide PDF versions of the articles, so the *Nice-Matin* images – the only journal collected with Factiva – were viewed on the PressReader site (PressReader 2022).

Newscasts are always the 8 p.m. news. Two channels were selected based on their high general audience ratings[2] and their business model: TF1 (private channel) and France 2 (public channel). Three special editions of the newscasts, broadcast between 6 and 8 p.m., are also present for the Nice attack.

Finally, for Twitter, the number of retweets (2 or 10 retweets) is a set threshold to get about 100 tweets for each event. We chose Twitter for two reasons. First, it is the platform most integrated with mainstream media, as politicians, journalists, writers, bloggers, and social media teams use Twitter to promote their views and impose them on newspapers and newscasts, making it one of the main backbones of the hybrid media system (Chadwick 2013). Second, Twitter hosts a politically active part of society, as hashtags are mobilising devices used by social movements, influencers, and politicians alike.

1. In 2021, according to the Alliance pour les Chiffres de la Presse et des Médias (ACPM), *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* are the two leading paid national dailies in France. *Libération* and *La Croix* are in 5th and 6th place respectively. The ACPM puts *L'Équipe* and *Les Échos* in 3d and 4th place. However, these two newspapers are respectively interested in sport and the economy. The search hits therefore offered very few press articles for these two newspapers (ACPM 2022).
2. In 2020 and 2021, the average audience of TF1 and France 2 is thus by far the highest compared to the other historical and DTT (digital terrestrial television) channels (Médiamétrie 2022).

The political orientation of the press and television is given in brackets in the following table. For television and the national press, this is determined according to an IFOP survey (Ifop 2022) carried out in 2022, on the day of the first round of the presidential election in France. This study thus cross-references media practices with the electorate and has the advantage of specifically questioning the audience of the 8 p.m. newscast of TF1 and France 2. The political orientation of *La Voix du Nord* is determined with the help of a page preparing for the Sciences Po entrance exam (Anonymous 2022).[3] Finally, the political orientation of *Nice-Matin* is given in a scientific article (Bézias 2016).

A television sequence is defined as a round trip around the anchorperson. Here are some examples of cutting:

– Sequence 1: Anchorperson/Report/Anchorperson.
– Sequence 2: Anchorperson/Interview (live)/Report/Anchorperson.
– Sequence 3: Anchorperson/Interview (live or onset)/Anchorperson.

Video excerpts (e.g., excerpts from presidential speeches) can be used to punctuate these sequences if the anchorperson is the sole commentator.

The table below shows the composition of the samples for each of the three events.

TABLE 1. Presentation of the data

EVENT	PRESS (DAILY)	TELEVISION (8 P.M. NEWS)	TWITTER
Nice attack (28 October - 15 November 2020)	***La Croix*** (centre-right, national): 6 articles. ***Le Figaro*** (right, national): 33 articles. ***Le Monde*** (centre-left, national): 17 articles. ***Nice-Matin*** (centre-right, regional): 32 articles.	**TF1** (right, private): 28 sequences. **France 2** (left, public): 26 sequences.	**93 tweets** (i.e., those retweeted at least twice).
Illegal Eurotunnel crossings (27 July - 10 August 2015)	***La Voix du Nord*** (left, regional): 34 articles. ***Le Figaro*** (right, national): 15 articles. ***Le Monde*** (centre-left, national): 13 articles.	**TF1** (right, private): 8 sequences. **France 2** (left, public): 6 sequences.	**135 tweets** (i.e., those retweeted at least 10 times).
Burkini controversy (15 August - 23 September 2016)	***Le Figaro*** (right, national): 21 articles. ***Le Monde*** (centre-left, national): 13 articles. ***Libération*** **(‘*Libé*’)** (left, national): 17 articles.	**TF1** (right, private): 11 sequences. **France 2** (left, public): 12 sequences.	**154 tweets** (i.e., those retweeted at least twice).

In addition to these data, ten semi-structured interviews were conducted with journalists – five women and five men – involved in the three events (see Appendices. Appendix 1). On average, these ten journalists have worked for their media for 17,6 years.[4]

3. See, as well, an article on the anti-far-right position of *La Voix du Nord* (Balle 2016).
4. More precisely, here is the seniority of these ten journalists in ascending order: 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 24, 24, 30 and 39 years.

Press articles, newscasts and tweets were collected by search occurrences. These occurrences always favoured cross-referencing between migratory occurrences ('immigrant', 'foreigner', etc.) and event-specific occurrences ('attack', 'Eurotunnel', 'burkini', etc.). Unfortunately, this cross-referencing was not possible for television. The option to remove duplicates was used for Factiva, i.e., for the Nice-Matin newspaper only. The newscasts were viewed in different consultation centres of the French National Audiovisual Institute. Duplicates were also removed by artificial intelligence for Twitter: some tweets are thus absent from the database. The search hits are specified in Appendix 2.

For the press and television, a reading of articles and a viewing of newscasts was then necessary to complete and qualitatively clean the database. Duplicates were removed a second time using plagiarism detection software for these two media.

These data are now given in the histogram below showing the chronological distribution of press articles, newscasts and tweets for each event (in order: the Nice attack, the Eurotunnel and the burkini).

GRAPH 1. Nice attack: temporal distribution of press articles, newscasts and tweets



GRAPH 2. Eurotunnel: temporal distribution of press articles, newscasts and tweets



GRAPH 3. Burkini: temporal distribution of press articles, newscasts and tweets



For the burkini, the peak of 26 August 2016 is the only one to be covered by the three media (press, television, and Twitter). This last peak is thus the most important.

These histograms show that *Le Figaro* and, to a lesser extent, the local press (*Nice-Matin* and *La Voix du Nord*) react on the spot (if we consider 26 August 2016 as being the peak of the burkini). *Le Monde, Libération* and *La Croix* are one to four days behind. As well, Twitter and television react on the day of the event. The two television channels follow each other in equal proportions over the whole period. Finally, Twitter and television 'deflate' more quickly than the press. The latter thus prolonged the coverage of the event, particularly at local level (*Nice-Matin and La Voix du Nord*). Finally, the 'deflation' is different for each event: the Nice attack is the only one to deflate rapidly compared to the other two events. This may be due to media 'fatigue' in the face of the succession of Islamist attacks in France since the 2010s.

Regarding the Nice attack, the delay by *Le Monde* is astonishing in view of the testimony of this journalist working for this newspaper and who said how quickly he was on the ground.

> When it happens one morning, I get a phone call from the Elysée Palace offering me to accompany the president who is going to Nice. […] We took a Falcon which followed the President's Falcon. [FR_I_7]

To ensure that this is not a bias created by our own search hits, a new collection of press articles is carried out using 'Nice' as the only hit on Europresse (2022). The result shows that, on 30 October 2020, only 3 articles in *Le Monde* mention the attack, compared to 25 in *Le Figaro*. This imbalance is also visible the following day (11 articles for *Le Monde* against 24 for *Le Figaro*). These elements confirm that *Le Figaro* always reacts on the spot compared to *Le Monde* which is usually a day late. The three events are now analysed.

2. Case studies

2.1 The attack on the Nice basilica on 29 October 2020

The attack on the basilica in Nice is a knife attack caused by a 21-year-old Tunisian. He came illegally in France across the Mediterranean Sea via the Italian island of Lampedusa around 48 hours before his act. The attacker killed three people in the basilica. This is the third Islamist attack in Nice since 2015. In the first attack in 2015, three soldiers were injured in front of a Jewish community centre. Then, in 2016, on National Day (14 July), 86 people were killed and 458 injured in a ram truck attack on the 'Promenade des Anglais'. This attack is the second deadliest of the 2000s in France.

Over the period 1979 to 2019, France is ranked 27th among the countries most affected by Islamist terrorism worldwide based on the number of attacks (not victims). Only two countries of the Organisation for economic cooperation and development are ahead of it (excluding Russia): Israel and Turkey. It is thus the first European country to be affected by these attacks (Reynié 2019, 54). Since the 2000s, the most striking attacks have been those of 2015.

This year, two attacks were carried out from 7 to 9 January in the Île-de-France region. Eight members of the editorial staff of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* were killed. The newspaper was accused of having published cartoons of the Prophet. Three days later, a hostage situation in a Hyper Cacher shop took place to demand the release of those responsible for the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, to no avail. As a reaction, on 10 and 11 January, 'Republican marches' were organised throughout France in the name of freedom of expression under the slogans 'Je suis Charlie' (I am Charlie) and 'Nous sommes tous Charlie' (We are all Charlie). 44 international leaders took part in the Paris march on 11 January and over four million people marched over the two days. The number of demonstrators was probably the highest since the 18th century (*Le Monde* 2015).

The attack on the basilica in Nice is a knife attack caused by a 21-year-old Tunisian. He came illegally in France across the Mediterranean Sea via the Italian island of Lampedusa

Finally, the seven attacks of 13 November 2015, at the Bataclan in particular, were the deadliest of the 2000s in France. They involved around 10 terrorists and 20 accomplices and left 131 dead and 413 injured. Other attacks also left their mark, as for instance the one carried out in the church of Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in 2016 (death of Father Hamel) and the one executed in front of a secondary school in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, in 2020, which resulted in the death of a schoolteacher named Samuel Paty. The latter was targeted, on social networks, for having allegedly shown cartoons of the Prophet during a lesson on freedom of expression.

The Nice attack of 2020 is thus one of the many Islamist attacks that have affected France since the 1980s. The media coverage of this attack is also part of an international war against the Islamic State since late 2014.

The link between immigration and terrorism in France is addressed by the scientific literature from different angles. Most studies use the *European Social Survey* to understand the hostility of individuals towards migrants and Muslims in France and Europe in the light of the recent attacks (Giani 2021; Colombo, Rotondi, and Stanca 2022; Savelkoul, te Grotenhuis, and Scheepers 2022). This hostility is also processed using other databases (Cohu, Maisonneuve, and Testé 2016; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, and Foucault 2018; Vergani et al. 2019).

Other studies linking immigration and terrorism are very diverse and are presented here in a non-exhaustive manner. One study, for example, establishes a positive correlation between the risk of terrorism

and the poor integration of second-generation immigrants in France (Dell'Isola 2022). Two other studies of public discourse (television and political figures) also show how the link between immigration and terrorism has unfolded and seems to be taking root in France (Nail 2016; Ezzati 2021).

Another article criticises Niall Ferguson's assertion that the terrorist attacks of November 2015 are comparable to the 'fall of the Roman Empire' in antiquity, which highlighted the failures of France's immigration policies (Gillett 2017). Another one evokes the birthplaces, mainly French, of the last terrorists who acted in France (Meyer 2016). Finally, a last study asks whether pedagogy, curriculum and educational policies have an impact on the radicalisation of young people with a migrant background (Duckworth 2016).

Immigration is now an electoral issue because it has been shaped, above all, as a security issue since the early 2000s (Bigo 2002). The link between immigration and terrorism, however, does not seem to be explored from a media perspective.

a) Representation: Main, collateral, and counter-narratives in traditional and social media

Main Genre

For press and television, the main genre is composed of two elements:

1. 'Course of events' items, and;
2. 'Analysis' items.

The 'Course of events' items are further divided into four elements:

a. Items mainly describing the progress of the investigation (arrests, profile of the killer, course of events, etc.);
b. Items focusing on the portrait of one of the victims (mother, churchgoer, local man, tribute from the Brazilian community, etc.);
c. Items detailing the actions and decisions of major institutions, without judging them (presidential speeches, ministerial visits abroad, debates in the Chamber, national tribute, etc.);
d. Items relating the feelings of people affected by the event and taken on the spot (Nice residents, French people abroad, etc.).

The 'Analysis' items are also divided into four categories:

a. Items with a high number of positive or negative judgements on the government's action;
b. Items suggesting certain actions to be taken (intelligence, video surveillance, deportations, etc.);
c. Items offering a certain interpretation of the event (responsibility of Muslims, difficulty in controlling Lampedusa, link between immigration and terrorism, relations with Turkey, role of major Islamist organisations, etc.);
d. Items reporting on the emotions of national political figures, mainly, and usually mixing the three previous subcategories (a, b and c).

The breakdown of press articles and television sequences is given in Appendix 3. It shows a strong contrast between, on the one hand, Le Figaro, which prioritises analysis, and, on the other hand, television, and the local press, which emphasise the more neutral course of events. Le Monde and La Croix have a balanced distribution of these two types of writing.

The chronological distribution of these two categories for the press shows a great interest in 'Analysis' articles when the news is hot (the first two days), whereas the latter are relatively neglected afterwards. This observation is essentially explained by the speed with which *Le Figaro* prioritises analytical articles.

Overall, there is a balance between the two types of writing: in total, 48 press articles are counted as 'Analysis' and 39 as 'Course of events'.

The opposite is true for television, where sequences on the first two days are largely of the 'Course of events' type for both channels. Overall, 39 sequences are coded as 'Course of events' and only 11 sequences are of the 'Analysis' type. Thus, while these two types of writing are relatively well shared in the press – to different degrees depending on the newspaper –, television is closer to the facts without making judgements about the policies carried out.

The relative neutrality of television contrasts, overall, with the more politically engaged press. This journalist from the Information Department of France 2 explains this by the desire of both channels to maintain a large audience:

> Because television is such a unifying media, we need so many people, we are so unifying that we work on a lowest common ideological denominator to try to unite as many people as possible, and so we avoid shocking and dividing as much as possible. Television, and in particular the 8 p.m. newscast, are very unifying programmes. (…) When TV is so unifying, so powerful, it tends to avoid divisions when it can. [FR_I_6]

Prior to the interview, this journalist was aware of the above table on the political positioning that we have assigned to this channel. He showed his astonishment as follows:

> [S]eeing France 2, the 8 p.m. newscast, as 'Leftist' in a table offends me because it's not at all the vision that I have […] [W]e receive a lot of letters from people on the left who reproach us for being on the right. [FR_I_6]

The press thus asserts political positions more clearly than television: it assumes, notably at *Le Figaro*, points of view and interpretations. In contrast, television is factual and avoids offending its viewers: it seeks, above all, to acquire a high audience.

Finally, for Twitter, the main genre is composed of three elements:

1. 'Commentary' tweets are personal commentary on current events;
2. 'Event' tweets include all or part of a media headline and usually include a link to the media;
3. 'Reaction' tweets copy a quote from a public figure and usually include a link to that quote.

A single tweet may contain two to three different elements. The chronological distribution of these categories is given in Appendix 4. It shows that comments dominate the hot news and then decrease. They are also the most numerous to be published (56 'Commentary' tweets, compared to 30 'Event' and 18 'Reaction'). Twitter is thus a very political social network where interpretation outweighs information.

Settings

The 'settings' are the objects and places mentioned in press articles and on television. These terms concern the staging (i.e., dramatisation) of the writing. They can be divided into five categories:

1. Weapons and other combat objects;
2. Terms relating to the terrorist's journey between the Tunisian and French borders;
3. Locations;
4. Other objects;
5. Other terms collected.

About two hundred words or expressions were collected by hand, during the coding. These occurrences and expressions were then searched using NVivo software to systematise the collection. The same search was therefore carried out for the press and television. The word clouds in Appendix 5 (press) and Appendix 6 (television) show the quantitative results. These word clouds were made by NVivo.

These data reveal several elements:

1. Three words follow one another in both media: 'nice' (1st position for the press and television), 'France' (2nd), and 'basilica' (3d). This constant reference to 'France' creates a sense of woundedness in the national body and gives the event a national dimension.
2. Among the weapons and other objects of combat, the 'knife' (singular or plural), i.e., the weapon used by the terrorist, comes up regularly. The size of the blade is usually recalled (17 or 30 centimetres). The 'electric pulse gun' used by the police to arrest the assailant is also often mentioned. Other terrorist attacks are mentioned through these objects: 'truck', 'mincer', 'rifle', 'Kalashnikov', etc. The violence of the act is thus underlined by this term. This violence is accentuated by the notion of 'war' in the press, which is in 6th place. The use of the word 'war' is important because it dramatises the event and can give the impression of a common enemy (Muslims and migrants).
3. As regards the terms relating to the terrorist's journey, the press emphasises the 'borders' (4th position), while television focuses more on the island of 'Lampedusa' (5th position). The border is generally mentioned in the sense that the 'Schengen' area needs to be strengthened and called into question (8th position in the press). Combined with the notion of 'republic' (5th position in the press), it also gives the impression that the whole French body is hurt by this attack. Conversely, the island of Lampedusa refers more to migrants crossing the Mediterranean. This privileged point of entry is associated with 'Italy' (7th position in the television) to point to this clandestine route. The reference to non-governmental organisations may also suggest possible complicity in the minds of readers and viewers, even if this complicity is not given by the two media ('Red Cross', 'Rhapsody', 'NGO', etc.).
4. Finally, like the weapons, the other objects show an attention to detail in line with the statements of the Anti-Terrorist Prosecution Service and the Interior Ministry. These objects are generally those of Brahim A. (the assailant): 'shoes', 'Koran', 'down jacket', 'personal effects', 'expulsion order', 'photo of Abdoullakh Anzorov' ('the murderer of Samuel Paty'), 'mobile phone', 'bag' and 'telephone'. The other objects are devoted to 'caricatures' of Mohammed and video surveillance ('cameras', 'images'). This sense of detail accentuates the importance of the event and invites the reader and viewer to participate in the investigation.

Characters

The persons mentioned, including people interviewed by journalists, are listed below according to their category. We consider here only those people quoted by one of the three media, i.e., either put in inverted commas (press and Twitter) or questioned orally (television).

1. The 'Individual' category corresponds to people who do not have a given function. They are usually mentioned by their first name ('Annie', 'her older brother', 'a parishioner', etc.);
2. The 'Group' category concerns a set of individuals ('the retired people of the commune', 'the crowd' and 'the Catholics of Pérenchies Nord'). The other 'groups', which are not individuals, are therefore designated in their respective categories;
3. The 'Collectivity' category is a broader group ('the Brazilian community');
4. The 'Public official' category refers to people who are not elected, but still hold a public office ('policewoman', 'ambassador', 'public prosecutor', 'prefect', 'magistrate', etc.) Two cases also concern a public organisation ('Court of Auditors' and 'European Commission');
5. The 'Politician' category includes people who are elected or wish to be elected and their close relatives

('minister', 'deputy', 'mayor', 'vice-president of the Rassemblement National', etc.). Rare cases concern a political institution ('the Rassemblement National', 'the Élysée' and 'the Quai d'Orsay');
6. The 'NGO' category is attached to people who are very involved in an association or non-governmental organisation ('Secours catholique', 'Caritas Ventimiglia', 'Tous citoyens!', etc.);
7. The 'Activist' category is used for terrorists ('Brahim A.', 'Abdouallakh Anzorov', 'Zaheer Hassan Mahmood', etc.) and Islamist organisations ('Islamic State', 'Daech', 'Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb' and 'Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula');
8. The 'Expert' category is sparse. It includes individuals from the public or private sector who are interviewed for their knowledge ('researcher', 'political scientist', 'president of the Robert Schuman Foundation', 'defence lawyer', etc.). It also includes people who are more distant from the subject ('essayist', 'psychologist', 'philosopher', 'anthropologist') or those who are close to the executive branch ('presidential adviser', 'French consultant', 'Macronist strategist');
9. The 'Clergy' category includes religious functions ('father', 'imam', 'monsignor', 'altar server', etc.);
10. The 'Legal text' category concerns legal texts ('Schengen Regulation');
11. Finally, the 'Unclear' category includes those whose status cannot be determined.

The table in Appendix 7 shows the number of people mentioned by gender. If the same person is mentioned several times in the same article, he/she will be counted only once. It is possible that some politicians are women – although this is very much on the margin. Indeed, this journalist from Le Monde (asked about the Nice attack) explains the way he anonymises his sources:

> For example, when we go off the record, it's very often a [male] minister, a [male] adviser. And the problem is that, in fact, sometimes, if it's a [female] adviser or a [female] minister who has spoken to me, given that there are sometimes fewer of them, if I say a [female] minister or a [female] adviser, I risk burning my source. So, I write a [male] minister or a [male] adviser. [FR_I_7]

One of his colleagues does the same.

> If it is a woman, I can say 'a [male] manager' to avoid helping to identify her. [FR_I_10]

Several observations can be made from the results:

1. The local press (*Nice-Matin*) has little interest in national representatives ('Politicians' and 'Public Officials'). On the contrary, the latter favours the actors on the ground ('Caritas Vintimille', 'Tous citoyens!' and 'Roya Citoyenne' for the 'NGO' category, and 'Individuals'). Similarly, the 'Politicians' are mainly local ('Christian Estrosi' and 'Éric Ciotti' mainly). Concerning the 'Clergy', only *Nice-Matin* promotes the word of imams – the national press being limited to Christian personalities.
2. *La Croix* logically puts forward the word of the latter ('Clergy') but also has the particularity of interviewing numerous parishioners ('Individuals') and writing in the name of 'Catholics' ('Group'). The paper has a small interest in 'Politicians'.
3. *Le Figaro* favours, by far, the voice of 'Politicians' and 'Public officials'. The other categories are poorly represented. One exception is the 'Experts', but they are very far from the event ('Alain Finkielkraut', 'Claude Lévi-Strauss', 'Malika Sorel', 'Marie De Hennezel' or 'Rémi Brague' for example). *Le Figaro*'s expertise comes more from 'Public Officials' ('International Organisation for Migration', 'prefect', 'anti-terrorist prosecutor', 'high magistrate', 'diplomat', etc.).
4. Finally, *Le Monde* also favours the words of 'Politicians' and 'Experts'. The latter may also be remote from the event ('Alex Nowrasteh', 'Saint-Just' and 'Victor Davis Hanson') but this remains a minority compared to *Le Figaro*.
5. Concerning television, a contrast can be made between *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*, on the one hand, and TF1 and France 2 on the other. Thus, if the national press values, by far, the word of the 'Politicians', this is not the case for television, which gives pride of place to the 'Individuals'. The emotion and content of these two media should therefore differ. According to a journalist

from the Information Department of France 2, this choice is essentially explained by the desire to obtain higher ratings:

> the French press is very political. The French press was born of political opinions, it is a press of opinion. It was born of politics (…) I think that if you omit, in too great a proportion, to give a voice to the people in the street, you get a completely disembodied television which serves to give a lot of information (…) and which, in the end, will not attract many people. A good example is the audience for the Arte newscast. Everyone loves the Arte newscast, and I'm the first. Except that no one watches it (…) their potential is to make… come on, on scoop days, they make 6% of audience share. As against 21 for France 2 and between 22 and 23 for TF1. [FR_I_6]

Quoting too many politicians would thus contribute to reduce the television audience because of the excessive amount of information that the viewer would have to ingest. The use of individuals is a way for television to lighten the information it gives while increasing the viewer's interest in, and even identification with, the people he or she is watching. The desire to 'embody' reality – an expression frequently used in the interviews – is thus an objective that television would give itself.

6. Compared to the national press (including *La Croix*), television gives slightly more value to NGOs.
7. Newscasts are also sensitive to the word of the clergy.
8. Finally, Twitter exclusively prioritises politicians and experts.

The table also shows an under-representation of women in all categories, except for 'Individuals' where they are slightly over-represented. Journalists are thus concerned about gender balance in the 'individual' category. A journalist from *Nice-Matin* confirms this attention for individuals and experts as well:

> (Among these people, do you try to balance between men and women?)
> Yes, yes. Sometimes I try. (…) I subscribe to expertes.fr. (…) [I]t's a website for journalists that offers to find a [female] expert on a subject by using keywords. [FR_I_4]

The same applies to this France 2 journalist interviewed on the burkini controversy:

> When I do street interviews, if I say to myself: 'Here I have two women who are really good, I need a guy'. If I have two guys who are great, I'll say to myself: 'I need a woman', but that's quite instinctive. [FR_I_1]

Women make up 63% of TV individuals – a greater proportion than in the press (54%). The qualitative analysis shows that the testimonies of women and men in the television are not used in the same way. Women would show more sadness and fear: 'it's very sad' (France 2, 2020b), 'how can you not be upset' (France 2, 2020c), 'it hurts' (France 2, 2020b), 'it's upsetting' (France 2, 2020b), 'it's terrible' (France 2, 2020a, 2020c; TF1, 2020a), 'it's a horror' (France 2, 2020a), 'it's a shock' (France 2, 2020b), 'it could have been me' (TF1, 2020d), 'it's frightening' (TF1, 2020a), 'it's horrible' (TF1, 2020a), 'I'm very sad' (TF1, 2020b), 'I have no words' (TF1, 2020a), 'I'm trembling inside' (TF1, 2020a), 'it touches your heart' (France 2, 2020b), 'we think a lot about the victims, we pray for them' (France 2, 2020b), etc.[5] It is also common for women to be interviewed while they are crying. For example: 'We just heard on TV that our sexton was murdered, it's a shock. I imagine him. I always see him walking around, lighting the candles. And now we are told that he is no more [crying]' (France 2, 2020b), 'Every morning I saw him opening the doors and now I know that I won't be able to see him and chat with him [crying]' (France 2, 2020c), 'we will miss her very much [crying]' (France 2, 2020d). The following excerpt was even broadcast twice, on the same channel, on the same day. It comes from a young woman in tears, whose words are incomprehensible for a long time at the end: 'The last time I

5. The extracts in this section are not exhaustive.

saw him, I didn't know it was the last time I would see him. I was thinking about it, I was saying "Goodbye, see you tomorrow! I'll come by for the 6 p.m. mass" He said "OK", he closed at 7 p.m. But I didn't know it was the last time. Otherwise I was going to take my [crying, unintelligible]' (TF1, 2020a).

Emotion is also conveyed by the women when they describe the three victims: 'She had a lot of gentleness (…) she always had a smile (…) she was always there for others' (TF1, 2020c), 'when I saw her photo, oh my, yes it made me… Good and especially for her mother, her daughters. He has two daughters' (TF1, 2020b), 'She was a woman of incredible kindness, full of gentleness, always smiling' (France 2, 2020d), 'Despite the little time (…) she had, (…) alone with her children to manage, (…) she was there for others, (…) she kept smiling in all circumstances' (France 2, 2020c).

The women also said they were reassured by the security measures deployed to avoid another attack: '[The journalist] What would reassure you? [The woman] If there was a control at the entrance, if there were security people, if people were searched, why not?' (TF1, 2020a), 'It's reassuring and, uh, for everyone, it gives us a bit of peace' (France 2, 2020c), 'we feel better, we feel more secure' (France 2, 2020c).

Conversely, sadness and fear are not very present among the male individuals, even though these emotions may be found among them: 'I don't believe it, we don't believe it' (TF1, 2020a), 'I have no words. I'm sad actually' (TF1, 2020a), 'It makes me cry a lot' (TF1, 2020c), 'we're all scared now' (France 2, 2020c). Men can also attribute certain emotions to others: 'Many people were affected, in my circle' (TF1, 2020a), 'They were people from Nice and it is important for them (…) we must support their loved ones' (TF1, 2020d), 'All the students in the company are in shock, all devastated' (France 2, 2020d).

In the context of the Nice attack, women were used by journalists as catharsis: they were questioned, on the spot, about their feelings, the profile of the victims and the confidence they had in the security arrangements.

Similarly, one man interviewed by the two channels valorises one of the victims with difficulty: 'A person who was smiling and lively, um she loved um she had the joy of living. She was always, uh, expressing her pleasure, uh, and enjoying life' (TF1, 2020b), 'A person who enjoyed life. She was always radiant, joyful uh full of, full of life' (France 2, 2020c). Another tries, also clumsily, to highlight another victim: 'Not very religious, not really, but she went, she prayed for herself, she prayed for us, she prayed for her friends, for everyone I think' (France 2, 2020d).

The men were clearly not asked about the security arrangements. Finally, they stand out because, unlike the women, they evoke, or even contest, the conflation between Muslims and terrorists: 'It's now or never that the Muslims of France or Europe rise up to put an end to all this' (TF1, 2020b), 'We target too much the, uh, the Muslim community when it's not, it's not generalised' (France 2, 2020c), 'We have to justify ourselves, that's what hurts. No, it's really offensive, it's really very offensive. We go out of our house, we see neighbours who say "what do we think" (…) It's heavy' (France 2, 2020c), 'What they do is not Islam. I have never, I have never seen that. And yet I know the Koran by heart, we have never seen that. (…) they are not human beings' (France 2, 2020b).

In the context of the Nice attack, women were used by journalists as catharsis: they were questioned, on the spot, about their feelings, the profile of the victims and the confidence they had in the security arrangements. It is therefore mainly women who carry the feelings of sadness and fear on television. Male witnesses are less comfortable expressing emotion and are not asked to take a position on security measures. Journalists do, however, seem to invite men to comment on a possible continuity between Islam and terrorism – something that women are never asked to do. Women are thus relegated to their personal emotions while men are asked to become interpreters of the Koran.

The breakdown of 'Politicians' is given in the Appendix 8. Four observations can be made based on it:

1. *Le Monde* quotes more right-wing politicians than *Le Figaro*, which is contrary to the political positioning of these newspapers: *Le Monde* is a centre-left daily, whereas *Le Figaro* is right-wing;
2. The far right is slightly more represented than the far left in the press and on television. It is also overvalued for Twitter;
3. The same social network does not quote any left-wing personalities. Overall, left-wing and far-left political figures are rarely, if ever, heard;
4. In view of the personalities belonging to the 'N/A' category ('Jacques Chirac', 'Xavier Bertrand' and 'Marion Maréchal', etc.), the score of the right and extreme right can be increased.

Right-wing and far-right political figures are thus very much heard by the media.

Finally, the tweets were classified according to the category of Twitter users. This category was determined in July 2022, based on the account description and the information available online when the account was not anonymous. This classification highlights 33 individuals, 31 journalists (and media) and 22 politicians (including parliamentary assistants and former elected officials) – as well as 2 think tanks, 1 member of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 4 accounts that no longer exist. The names of the accounts and the photographs suggest that there are 45 men and 14 women (as well as 7 'unclear' and 27 'not applicable'). Many accounts support a former far-right presidential candidate: Éric Zemmour. No single account dominates the sample – the maximum corresponding to 4 tweets from the same author (two anonymous accounts).

Emotional tone

The table in Appendix 9 shows the distribution of emotions for press and television. *Le Figaro* stands out for its anger and impatience ('bellicose', 'exhortation', 'frustration', 'impatience', 'irritation', 'offended' and 'scandalised'). There are no articles in this newspaper that are marked by empathy for the victims, mourning, sadness or solidarity.

In line with what has been suggested about the distribution between 'individuals' and 'politicians' on television and in the national press (*Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*), emotion also differs between these two media. Fear and sadness, for example, are emotions that are very present on television, but more effaced in the press. It would seem surprising, for example, if politicians expressed their fear, as this could be perceived as powerlessness and could increase citizens' fear.

To a lesser extent, anger and compassion are also present on television. Anger is also a feeling that dominates Twitter to a large extent. The tweets include the following emotions: 53 'Anger', 15 'Little anger', 4 'Recollection', 3 'Curious', 3 'Ironic', 1 'Touched', 1 'Worried' and 13 'Neutral' (absence of emotions).

The emotion is thus very present. For the press and television, the absence of emotions mainly concerns the items of the 'Course of events' type (and not of the 'Analysis' type).

Formats

Regarding the format of the press, several variables are cross-referenced in the Appendix 10. This table reveals several rhetoric features:

1. First, *Le Monde* makes little use of opinion pieces ('Op-ed'), interviews and editorials. This may give the impression that the newspaper does not make the terrorist attack a priority. The total number of words in the 88 articles does not, however, show a lack of interest in the event on the part of *Le Monde* (25,676 for *Le Figaro*, 19,760 for *Le Monde*, 16,894 for *Nice-Matin* and 4,167 for *La Croix*).

The national dimension of the event is again affirmed by the coverage in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* – in comparison with *Nice-Matin*.

2. *Le Figaro* attaches great importance to 'Op-ed'. This importance of op-ed is consistent with the creation of the Figaro Vox in 2014. This online platform is an extension of the 'debates and opinions' pages of the journal and is directed by Vincent Trémolet de Villers. *Le Figaro* also uses a lot of interviews. It is therefore easier to understand the difference between the experts used by *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. The experts in *Le Figaro* are more distant from the event because they are there, above all, to illustrate an opinion but not to construct it ('Claude Lévi-Strauss', 'Malika Sorel', 'Marie De Hennezel', etc.). Conversely, *Le Monde*'s experts are mobilised to understand the event ('economist', 'sociologist', 'historian', 'migration policy specialist', 'French Institute of International Relations', 'think tank', 'French Institute of Public Opinion', 'terrorism analysis centre', etc.).
3. Local and national news invoke a vast repertoire of feelings, especially at the national level. The national dimension of the event is thus, once again, supported here.
4. The interviews are conducted on the spot, i.e., within two days of the event.
5. Finally, the local press has a later average date than the national press because it covers the event for longer.

The format is given for television in Appendix 11. Four formats are used:

1. The 'studio' format is for onset interviews;
2 . The 'with footage' format refers to a studio voice (usually that of the anchorperson) illustrated by images or video in the background;
3. The 'live' format defines a live interview by the anchorperson to a person outside the set. This person is often a journalist;
4. Finally, the 'edited' format is a report presented with a voice-over. This is the most common format.

A sequence can have several formats. For example, a sequence may include, in order, a short introduction by the anchorperson, a replay of a presidential speech, a commentary by the anchorperson and then a studio interview. This example will be called 'with footage/studio'. The appendix shows several elements:

1. The voice-over report ('edited') is the one that largely dominates;
2. France 2 prefers to interview one of its journalists on location ('live') while TF1 prefers to interview its journalists indoors ('studio');
3. These formats are used indiscriminately over time;
4. The studio format is usually used in the middle or at the end of the newscast, unlike the other formats;
5. Emotions are relatively evenly distributed between these formats.

Main frames

The frames correspond to the themes dealt with in the articles. To frame is to 'select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (Entman 1993).

They were constructed, first, in a qualitative manner, during the reading and rereading of the articles. They were then attributed in a more systematic and homogeneous way thanks to certain research occurrences. More precisely, the reading of the paragraph in which these occurrences took place made it possible to assign, or not, new frames to the articles. It is rare that an article has only one frame. These frames and search hits are given and described in the table below.

TABLE 2. Nice Attack: description of frames

FRAME	DESCRIPTION	HITS
CARICATURES	Should or did the Mohammed cartoons be banned? Were the cartoons the cause of this attack?	caricature*
CIVILISATION	Should we review our cultural model? Is the Muslim religion compatible with our culture ('demographic battle', 'cultural battle')?	civilisation OR laïcité OR communauta* OR multicultur* OR 'cinquième colonne'
CLOSURE OF PLACES OF WORSHIP	Should certain mosques and Muslim religious associations be closed?	None
EX-PRISONERS	What should be done with radicalised former prisoners? Should we create a 'French-style Guantanamo' (Éric Ciotti)? Should they be placed under house arrest or use geolocated bracelets? Should we facilitate administrative searches of their homes?	détenus OR guantanamo
IMMIGRATION (ASYLUM)	Did the terrorist apply for asylum? Should the criteria for asylum be restricted?	d'asile OR asile OR réfugié*
IMMIGRATION (BORDER CONTROL)	Should we fight against illegal immigration? Should we reinforce our border controls? Should Schengen be reformed or even suspended?	Frontières
IMMIGRATION (DEPORTATION)	Should foreigners in general or radicalised foreigners be expelled? Should a residence ban be added? Why was Brahim A. not deported from Italy?	expuls* OR renvoy* OR réadmission OR consulaires OR reconduit*
IMMIGRATION (DETENTION)	Should the detention of foreigners in general or radicalised foreigners be increased? Why was Brahim A. not detained in Italy?	rétention OR sûreté
IMMIGRATION (NATIONALITY)	Should French nationality be withdrawn from radicalised or terrorist persons?	déchéance OR déchoir
IMMIGRATION (SOCIAL RIGHTS)	Should we restrict the social assistance granted to immigrants? ('state medical aid', 'allowances', 'APL')	None
IMMIGRATION (STOP)	Should immigration be drastically reduced? Should the borders be closed?	quota* OR stop OR flux
INTELLIGENCE	Was the terrorist on file? How can we improve our intelligence services?	renseignement OR Eurodac OR Europol OR Eurojust OR 'Radicalisation Awareness Network' OR 'passenger name record' OR PNR OR FSPRT OR fichier OR DGSI OR fiché*
INTERNET	How can we fight against the spread of terrorism on social networks?	réseaux sociaux OR internet
PATHWAYS	Where did the terrorist go before coming to Nice?	Lampedusa OR 'périple migratoire'

POLICE INVESTIGATION	What is the exact sequence of events before the attack? What is the status of the investigation? Were there any mistakes?	None
PROFILE	What is the identity of the terrorist?	Brahim A. OR Aouissaoui OR Brahim I. OR Issaoui
REMEMBRANCE	How do the French mourn this attack?	recueill*
SECURITY	What protection has France deployed to prevent further attacks?	vigipirate OR sentinelle OR société de vigilance OR borne* OR urgence attentat
STATE OF EMERGENCY	Is there a need for a state of exception or a state of emergency ('legislation of war', 'exemption from the laws of peace', 'legislative arsenal of war')? Is the rule of law sufficient to combat terrorism?	'd'exception' OR 'état d'urgence' OR 'lois de la paix' OR 'de guerre' OR 'de la guerre'
TURKEY	Is Turkey indirectly responsible for this attack?	Turquie OR Erdogan OR Erdogan OR turc* OR turque*
VEIL	Should the veil be banned?	voile OR burkini OR burka OR burqa
VICTIM	What is the profile of the victims of this attack?	Loquès OR Barreto OR Devillers
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE	Can video surveillance help prevent future attacks? Did CCTV help in this investigation?	vidéosurveillance OR faciale OR vidéo-surveillance OR caméra*

ACRONYMS: APL: 'Aide personnalisée au logement' (Personalised housing assistance); CCTV: closed-circuit television.

These frames are being distributed in the press in Appendix 12. This table shows several elements:

1. Descriptive frames ('Pathways', 'Police investigation' and 'Profile') are prominent in the press, but to varying degrees. On average, the local press favours them more than the national press.
2. The measures specific to immigration ('border control', 'deportation', 'asylum', 'detention', 'stop', 'nationality' and 'social rights') are mainly found in *Le Figaro*. The preferred measures are border control, deportation and restriction of the right to asylum.
3. The other possible solutions ('Intelligence', 'State of emergency', 'Video surveillance', 'Internet', 'Security', 'Ex-prisoners' and 'Closure of places of worship') are relatively evenly distributed among newspapers and journalists. An exception can be noted for *Le Monde*, which shows a certain appetite for these devices ('Intelligence' and 'Internet' in particular).
4. The cultural dimension ('Civilisation' and 'Veil') is essentially privileged by *Le Figaro*.
5. The issue of the cartoons is mainly of interest to the national press (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*). On the other hand, the possible responsibility of Turkey is mainly pointed out by *Le Figaro*. The link between Turkey and the cartoons is tenuous. Indeed, the week before the attack, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish president, condemned France for two reasons: the defence by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, of the Mohammed cartoons following the assassination of Samuel Paty, and the front page of Charlie Hebdo caricaturing the Turkish president in pants, with a can in his hand, and lifting a woman's hijab, revealing her buttocks.
6. Finally, the articles on remembrance and homage ('Remembrance' and 'Victim') come mainly from *Le Monde* and *Nice-Matin*.

These 'frames' thus contribute to a double conflation: between immigration and terrorism, on the one hand, and between Muslims and terrorism, on the other. These two categories of population are thus sometimes the object of very strong resentment, particularly in *Le Figaro*.

Concerning the first population – immigrants – this editorial in *Le Figaro* sums up the newspaper's bias towards the immigration policies mentioned above: 'Borders are to the Islamist threat what masks are to Covid' (Trémolet De Villers 2020). All the migration policies proposed in this media contribute to this conflation.

Concerning the second population (Muslims), the texts of *Le Figaro* are the only ones that sometimes show hostility towards these human groups. They have the particularity of demanding, on the part of the French, to 'reconnect with the pride of being French' (Rioufol 2020b), 'the pride of belonging to one and only nation' (Tétreau 2020). This feeling of pride would thus be incompatible with any form of apology towards Muslims, victims of 'supposed inequalities' (Rioufol 2020b): 'we should be self-flagellating, regretting colonisation' (Rioufol 2020b); 'Whatever the advocates of the culture of excuses may say, France has nothing to be ashamed of' (Thréard 2020). The aim is to protect 'ordinary French people' from 'newcomers [with] spectacular morals' (Tétreau 2020), by rebuilding France 'on its identity fundamentals' – this France that would have been 'emptied of its soul' (Rioufol 2020a).

Every Muslim would be, more precisely, a potential terrorist: 'This attack reveals the continuity that exists between ordinary Islamism and bloodthirsty terror' (Finkielkraut 2020). Muslims are thus conceived as a 'backyard' carrying 'Islamism in its sling': 'hundreds of thousands of individuals (…) put Sharia law above the rules of the Republic' (Thréard 2020).[6] More precisely, the suburbs are a breeding ground for this fundamentalism: 'I was not surprised when the prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes discreetly informed us that demonstrations of joy had greeted the action of the jihadist commandos in Paris in his department' (Rondeau 2020).

In the whole press, one of the hardest articles against Muslims is undoubtedly written by Ivan Rioufol. The latter denounces the 'mantras inviting to "make France" in an "inclusive and united us"'.[7] The journalist thus condemns those 'who have opened wide the doors of the nation to Islam' by accepting to 'compromise with this civilisation with its "destructive appetite" (Claude Lévi-Strauss)' (Rioufol 2020a).[8] Ivan Rioufol thus uses this authority figure (Claude Lévi-Strauss) to express his contempt for Islam. Denouncing the 'blindness' of three ministers, Ivan Rioufol indirectly considers that Islam is not 'respectful of democracy', is not 'a religion of peace' and that there is, once again, a continuum between the Islamic State and the Muslim religion (Rioufol 2020a).

The table in Appendix 13 now breaks down these frames for television. Several observations can be drawn from this table:

1. France 2 places a greater emphasis on remembrance, while TF1 emphasises security measures (in addition to remembrance). These two frames are noticeably neglected by the press. Grieving no doubt explains the importance of the feeling of sadness in the newscasts.
2. Similarly, television (particularly France 2) highlights the profile of the victims, whereas the press is not interested in. This explains a priori the presence of the feeling of compassion in the newscasts as well.

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6. Yves Thréard refers to the result of an Ifop poll (Ifop 2020) in which 74% of French Muslims under 25 years of age said that they put their religious convictions before the values of the Republic. This poll was taken up by two other articles (Julliard 2020; Finkielkraut 2020).
7. This type of opponent is more commonly referred to as a proponent of 'living together' ('*vivre-ensemble*') for the three events.
8. This quotation from Claude Lévi-Strauss is given here at greater length: 'The brief contacts I have had with the Arab world have inspired in me an ineradicable antipathy. (…) I had to meet Islam to measure the danger that threatens French thought today. (…) the concern to find a tradition was accompanied by a destructive appetite for all previous traditions. (…) [T]he contact of non-Muslims anguish them. (…) [They are] unable to bear the existence of others as others. (…) [T]he Islam has cut a more civilised world in two' (Lévi-Strauss 2007, 475–490). Claude Lévi-Strauss also insists on the 'rusticity of the morals' of Islam, which provokes a feeling of inferiority and humiliation in Muslims and is at the origin of their 'compulsive' proselytism and intolerance.

3. Finally, while TF1 values deportation in comparison to France 2, immigration policies are generally little discussed by the television channels.

Finally, two new Twitter frames have been added:

1. 'Italy's responsibility' stresses Italy's failures in controlling its borders. It also refers to the issuing of an obligation to leave Italian territory to the terrorist which was not followed up.
2. The 'Responsibility of NGOs' accuses non-governmental organisations of complicity because the terrorist had set foot on an NGO boat before arriving in Italy and had documents from the Italian Red Cross.

The tweets are divided by frame in the Appendix 14. The 'comments' tweets mainly refer to the terrorist's passage through Lampedusa and suggest three essential measures: closing the borders, deporting foreigners, and a better border control. But unlike the press, stopping immigration is the priority for the users of this social network. Deportation is also accompanied by a term ignored by the press: 'remigration', i.e., reverse immigration aimed at sending back immigrants, especially non-Europeans, over several generations. This term comes from the far right in France ('Bloc identitaire' in particular). 'Event' and 'Reaction' tweets also have the particularity of favouring the closure of borders.

The tweets and their respective comments were also coded according to their position 'for' or 'against' immigration. Thus, only 2 tweets are pro-migration and 11 tweets are neutral (neither for or against). In total, 80 tweets are therefore unfavourable to immigration. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 41 tweets have comments against immigration and only 6 have comments in favour (14 tweets have comments that do not comment on immigration and 40 tweets have no comments at all).

Unlike the press, stopping immigration is the priority for the users of this social network. Deportation is also accompanied by a term ignored by the press: 'remigration', i.e., reverse immigration aimed at sending back immigrants, especially non-Europeans, over several generations.

The tweets sometimes include comments calling for the murder of community activists and migrants. For example, two tweets sharing an article by 'Français de souche' – a far-right website – have comments calling for the sinking of NGO ships carrying migrants. These comments have the particularity of masking possible keywords that could be spotted by artificial intelligence. One of these comments uses a GIF showing a plane propelling missiles with the comment 'Maritime surveillance'. Another comment avoids using the word 'missile' and comes from a current supporter of Éric Zemmour (Damien Rieu): 'You have to send him a missi missili… 😇'.[9] Other comments, however, do not use any filter. For instance, this comment comes from the account of 'Français de souche': 'Put these islamogauchists in the water and sink the bobo boats!'.

The frames in the television are thus very different from those in the press and on Twitter. The newscasts emphasise mourning and contemplation and largely neglects migration policies. They emphasise the sadness of passers-by and often interview people who are moved or on the verge of tears. The security measures are also explained and are mixed with the citizens' feeling of fear. These two frames – Remembrance and Security – are very much erased in the press and on Twitter.

9. Damien RIEU was the cofounder then spokesperson of 'Génération identitaire' (far right) – movement dissolved by the Ministry of the Interior in 2021. He has also been a candidate in various elections with the Rassemblement National (far right) and Reconquête (Éric Zemmour).

Visual documentation

The image analysis deals, in order, with the press, television and Twitter. The press photographs cannot be reproduced here due to copyright.

First, regarding the press, a large part of the illustrations shows politicians – almost all male: Emmanuel Macron (7 photographs, President of the Republic), Christian Estrosi (5, Mayor of Nice), Gérald Darmanin (4, Minister of the Interior), Éric Ciotti (3, local MP), Éric Dupond-Moretti (2, Minister of Justice), Bruno Le Maire (1, Minister of the Economy), Jean Castex (1, Prime Minister) and Jean-Yves Le Drian (1, Minister of Foreign Affairs). Only one woman is visible as a politician: Florence Parly (1, Minister of the Army). The preponderance of the President of the Republic and the ministers reinforces the national dimension of the event.

Two other categories of images are in equal proportions: those relating to the remembrance (10 photos) and those relating to the enquiry (11 photos). The photos of the remembrance are taken during the day and at night. They mainly show wreaths of flowers and lit candles near the basilica. They also show the portrait of the victims, the Brazilian community's tribute to Simone Barreto Silva, the mass of reparation – celebrated on 1 November to cancel the desecration triggered by the attack – , and the new public memorial honouring the three victims.

One of these images of remembrance also shows an improvised memorial located just a few metres in front of the basilica. This memorial includes a drawing of a French flag bloodied by the attack. The red vertical stripe of the flag thus transpires drops of blood (Malleck 2020). This image from *Nice-Matin* contributes to the idea that the whole French Republic was affected by the attack. It also contributes to the national dimension of the event.

The images relating to the investigation in the press, now, mainly show the forensic police at the basilica, sometimes accompanied by the municipal police and an elite unit of the national police (the 'RAID' for 'Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence'). These photographs may also reveal other elements of the investigation, such as the administrative offices where the killer had applied for social housing before his act, a building where arrests were made, a photograph of a Muslim who had falsely claimed responsibility for the attack, and a portrait of a Tunisian man who was falsely accused of being the terrorist by far-right Italian newspapers.[10] A screenshot from the television channel 'BFM-TV' is also used to illustrate a press conference by Jean-François Ricard, the prosecutor of the anti-terrorist prosecution service.

Some experts may also be depicted during interviews. Only three images are photographs (Michel Foucher, geographer, Nicolas Baverez, lawyer and Jean-Charles Brisard, president of a think tank on terrorism). The other six are pencil drawings, from *Le Figaro* (Rémi Brague and Alain Finkielkraut, philosophers, Daniel Rondeau, diplomat and Édouard Tétreau, private financial adviser).

The rest of the images can be attached to different scattered categories: 5 photos on Islam (Muslims speaking about the attack, demonstrations burning the French flag and Macron's portrait abroad, etc.), 6 photos on immigration (diagrams on residence permits and expulsions in France, migrants in a bus or a boat, detention centre, etc.), 2 photos on the attack in Vienna, Austria and 1 photo on the attacks of 13 November 2015 in France.

These images are in line with the 'Police investigation' frame (in 5th position), the large number of quotes relating to male politicians and male experts, the national dimension of the 'Settings' and the importance of the 2015 attacks. They are, however, in contradiction with the emotion of the articles where sadness

10. This Tunisian is also known in Tunisia for being an activist for LGBT rights.

and recollection are rare. The same is true for the 'Remembrance' frame, which is one of the last frames in the press. Nor do they reflect the predominance of frames relating to immigration.

This discrepancy can be explained, in part, by the freedom journalists give to choose their photographs. Thus, of all the interviews, only one journalist from *Nice-Matin* (below) is concerned about the photographs accompanying her articles.

> I want it to fit the angle of my paper. I like it when a photo has a bit of humanity in it. (…) I don't know, but I like a photo that gives off something and that goes with the angle of the paper. As a general rule. [FR_I_4]

But usually, the journalists do not choose the photographs of their articles (in order: *Libération, Le Monde* [four journalists] and *Le Figaro*):

> (Did you select the photographs that were used?)
> No, no.
> (Who took them, who chose them?)
> We have an iconography department at Libé. It's people who choose the photos. [FR_I_3]
> I didn't choose the photo to be published, but I didn't make the title of the article either. [FR_I_5]
> (Concerning your photographs, in general, do you select them or are they selected for you?)
> We have nothing to do with that, we don't take care of the photos. It's the photo department. And then the people who take care of the layout take care of them. No, we don't. Except very, very rarely. [FR_I_9]
> My job is simply to write the articles. All the headlines, intertitles, choice of photos, are done either by the head of the department, or by the editorial secretaries, or by the management of the newspaper. [FR_I_7]
> I don't select the photographs, no. [...] It's the photo department that chooses the photos. I have no say in this. […] It is not up to me to decide which photos should appear in the newspaper [FR_I_10]
> (Do you choose the images?)
> No, it's not us. [FR_I_8]

Second, regarding the television, the second-by-second coding of images is separated into two categories:

1. images specific to the event (police intervention, evacuation of the terrorist on a stretcher and images of the terrorist) and;
2. other images, aimed at understanding the event (maps, 3D animations, interviews, churches, the island of Lampedusa, images of the Notre-Dame basilica, portraits of victims, police and military patrols, etc.). These other images never include the anchorperson.

Concerning the images specific to the event, TF1 devotes 253 seconds to images of the attack, compared to 188 for France 2. TF1's footage focuses mainly on amateur images of the event shot from telephones. These images are divided into three steps: people taking cover on the orders of the police, the police assault from two entrances to the basilica, then the evacuation of the terrorist on a stretcher. Some police officers are blurred out, which has become a journalistic habit during terrorist attacks.[11] These three steps are very often reused by TF1, together or separately. To a lesser extent, the private channel also uses 3D animations to reconstruct the beginning of the attack, when the assailant enters the basilica. This reconstruction allows the viewer to see different entrances to the basilica and the arrival

11. Article 413-14 of the Penal Code (2016) imposes anonymity on special forces and intervention units specialising in the fight against terrorism.

of the terrorist through one of these entrances. The channel also shows the firemen (and their sirens) intervening after the assault and the video surveillance images of the assailant before his arrival at the Notre-Dame Basilica. Finally, TF1 shows a passport photograph of the terrorist, with his eyes blurred, as well as the same photograph held by his mother, in tears.

France 2 uses, overall, the same amateur images filmed by telephone, but to a lesser extent. Unlike TF1, the public channel shows the identity photograph of the terrorist, also with blurred eyes, on numerous occasions. As with TF1, this is either given on screen or shown in the hands of his mother. The public channel therefore does not try to convey the panic of the attack by repeatedly showing images of the attack, the sirens of the fire trucks on the move and the video surveillance extracts. It also does not use 3D animations to recreate the event.

Concerning the identity photograph, it stems from a desire, on the part of the television channels, not to embellish the killers, as explained by this journalist from the Information Department of France 2:

> We also show them less than before [the photographs of the terrorists]. And when we do show them, we've been given clear instructions to show them in as neutral a way as possible, but not in a way that enhances them. So we love identity photos, for example. (…) We made the mistake of playing over and over again the only image of Mohamed Merah that we had [the perpetrator of the March 2012 killings in Toulouse and Montauban], (…) playing the fool with a car. (…) we see a nice jerk being a jerk (…) we shocked the victims enormously. [FR_I_6]

As well, according to the same journalist, the audience may be diminished by violent images. For example, despite the panic that could be generated by the TF1 footage, no bodies were shown during the attack on either channel – neither of the victims nor of the wounded assailant. In this sense, this journalist avoids showing denuded or bloodied bodies on the screen. The same applies to 'anniversary' photographs of victims of attacks and images of people in shock, unaware of what they might say.

> Contrary to what many people think, we don't try to shock for the sake of shocking. It's not at all good for the audience to shock. [FR_I_6]

Concerning the three steps filmed by telephone, the telephone format is visible but not specified by the two television channels. Amateur videos are thus mixed indistinctly with professional videos. Moreover, the TF1 images are always more animated because of the image that is split in the background. This double movement increases the viewer's panic. Conversely, the black background on France 2 slows down the action and relaxes the viewer's gaze. In both cases, these backgrounds are necessary to compensate for the vertical format of videos taken by telephone.

Three other amateur videos show, for both channels, the intervention of the police in the basilica, through two different entrances, and the evacuation of the assailant. TF1's doubled background is again visible. The similarity of all these images is also a further illustration of the strong similarities between the two newscasts.

Turning now to the other images, aimed at understanding the event, one of the most important categories of images is undoubtedly that of the security arrangements. Municipal and national police officers, on the one hand, and military personnel deployed under the Vigipirate plan on the other, dominate the screen. The stationary police officers usually protect the basilica, divert traffic, attend the national tribute ceremony and conduct interviews. They may also train at a shooting range (TF1) and lay bouquets of flowers in front of the basilica (France 2). Mobile police officers patrol several cities in France, near places of worship or in the streets, and carry out checks, arrests and searches. The military can also be mobile or stationary, in several French cities but also in Italy. However, their presence is less than that of the police. The other, less preponderant, security devices mainly concern three elements: the

emergency call stations of the city of Nice that made it possible to report the attack to the municipal police, the surveillance cameras that filmed the terrorist and their urban supervision centre that allows their images to be viewed, and finally the forensic police stationed on the square in front of the basilica (notably on TF1).

The visual presentation is also a tool that TF1 uses a lot in comparison to France 2. In addition to the 3D animations mentioned above, the private channel regularly inserts text in an animated way to make itself understandable. For example, in terms of security, TF1 shows, in writing, several elements: the channel lists the new measures taken by the French government (protection of places of worship and schools, etc.), it explains the difference between the three levels of the Vigipirate plan, it shows the numerical increase in the number of military personnel deployed on the territory due to the triggering of the third level of this plan (entitled 'Urgence attentat') – twice – , and, finally, it creates a graph on the increase in the number of police personnel since 2014 in France. TF1 also lists, again in writing and twice, several characteristics of the terrorist ('21 years old', 'Tunisian nationality', 'from Lampedusa', etc.). A 3D animation also shows the belongings contained in the attacker's bag and the text message sent by the latter (*Chiens mécréants*/Unbelieving dogs). Similarly, the figure of '42,000' is highlighted to remind us that there are 42,000 churches in France – too many to ensure safety. This visual presentation is present on France 2 for, among other things, the profile of the killer, the objects in his bag, the various alerts of the Vigipirate plan and the content of the third level of this plan. But the proportion is lower than on TF1.

In addition to the security arrangements, two other categories of images are predominant in both channels: those of the Notre-Dame Basilica, on the one hand, and of the victims, on the other.

Finally, the private channel gives a migratory dimension to the event with the help of three photomontages relating to solutions that could be used to prevent future attacks: 'deport', written on a picture of an aeroplane, 'lock up', written on barbed wire, and finally 'identify' written on a surveillance camera. This migratory dimension is accentuated by the numerous reports of the private channel on French and Italian detention centres and on the island of Lampedusa. The report on Lampedusa contrasts two dimensions: the tourist dimension, very quickly treated with the help of a cruise ship and the pretty, colourful houses on the island, and the migratory dimension, which is exploited to a greater extent (inflatable boats full of migrants arriving, the island's detention centre, foreigners retrieving their belongings from a lorry, makeshift boats, crowds of migrants waiting to embark on a large ship, Red Cross checks, military and coastguard boats, etc.). In comparison, France 2's images of the island are few and far between.

In addition to the security arrangements, two other categories of images are predominant in both channels: those of the Notre-Dame Basilica, on the one hand, and of the victims, on the other. Firstly, regarding the images of the basilica, some have already been mentioned because of the law enforcement agencies present in front of the building. However, the most frequent images of the basilica are not security-related: they show, above all, day and night, people lying candles or flowers and meditating in front of the religious building. Close-ups are regularly used on faces, candles and flowers. Many people, including crying women, are interviewed. The two channels also conduct numerous interviews with parishioners in the vicinity of other French churches, including several in Paris (as Notre-Dame Cathedral – which was a model for the construction of the Notre-Dame basilica in Nice – and the basilica of the Sacred Heart), but also in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, Saint-Étienne-de-Tinée, Auch and Lourdes. St. Peter's basilica in the Vatican is also shown.

The basilica is also shown as the scene of the crime, in a neutral way, or used for the interview of journalists, politicians and priests. The mass of reparation is also the subject of an entire report on both channels. Finally, the knell (the bell of the dead) of the various French and Italian churches is broadcast for several seconds on both channels.

The victims – Vincent Loquès, Simone Barreto Silva and Nadine Devillers – are also very present on the screen. Only Vincent Loquès, the first of the victims to be identified, is visible only in photographs and not on video. The two women are the subject of an entire report where it is possible to see them in motion: one video shows Simone Barreto Silva in the middle of a cooking class (France 2) and another shows Nadine Devillers on stage, during a theatre performance (TF1 and France 2). The cries about the loss of Vincent Loquès come mainly from his parishioners. Those for Nadine Devillers come from her theatre company. Finally, the tears concerning Simone Barreto Silva came mainly from a tribute from the Brazilian community in Nice (TF1). Both channels devoted an entire report to the national tribute, focusing on the three portraits of the victims, each presented on an easel during the outdoor ceremony. The memorial flame, the firing of the cannon, the orchestra, the local and national politicians, and the police officers being decorated are also images that are associated with this national tribute.

Images relating to the security arrangements, the Notre-Dame basilica and the victims are the most recurrent on both channels. To a lesser extent, other images are also frequent. First, both channels devote an entire report to the National Assembly where the Prime Minister, Jean Castex, learns of the attack. A minute's silence is then held in the Chamber and political figures are interviewed in the Assembly corridors, including Marine Le Pen (far right) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (far left) – present on both channels.

Moreover, images of previous attacks are regularly shown, especially on France 2. TF1 is content with a single report on Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray where Father Hamel was murdered. France 2 thus films the memorials and sites of the attacks in 2015 (Paris), 2016 (Nice and Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray) and 2020 (Conflans-Sainte-Honorine). It also films several copies of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, filming a 'front page' of the newspaper, a pile of newspapers on a table, a newsstand display, a person buying a copy and then reading it outside. The two channels also conduct interviews with individuals on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, where the 2016 attack took place. Finally, in a more succinct fashion, the two channels show demonstrations in several countries around the world showing French flags and portraits of Emmanuel Macron being burned because, among other things, of the French President's support for the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.

Overall, France 2 gives more space to interviews of Muslims around mosques – including the Grand Mosque in Lille and the mosque in Drancy. On the other hand, TF1 devotes an entire report to Nice's gun shops and the likelihood that arms sales are on the rise in Nice.

Finally, TF1's educational effort once again surpasses that of France 2 in terms of geographical location. The private channel uses more maps than the public channel. TF1's maps mainly show the Alpes-Maritimes department (locating Nice) and often use a 3D animation from a satellite view of Nice to locate the basilica. The channel also uses numerous maps of the Mediterranean, in several reports, to locate different cities linked to the terrorist's route (Bou Hajla, Sfax, Lampedusa, Bari and Nice). An animated map also allows it to better explain the chronology of this migratory route. Other maps are used in various contexts: France (locating Nice or Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray), Oise (Beauvais), Italy (Lampedusa) and Saudi Arabia (Jeddah). In comparison, France 2 focuses mainly on maps locating the city of Nice in France, the basilica in Nice, the island of Lampedusa in the Mediterranean (and its detention centre) and the various locations of the terrorist from Italy to France. The public channel also gives greater emphasis to the arrests in the town of Grasse, with a map and computer graphics of the arrested suspects.

Most of these observations are in line with the television frames. For example, the visibility of the victims, the cries, the people mourning and the various tributes correspond to the frame that comes first in both channels ('Remembrance'). Similarly, the difference observed for the 'Immigration (deportation)' frame (8.2% on TF1 compared with 2.9% on France 2) reflects TF1's strong migration dimension. TF1's animated infographics on the new security arrangements and the two reports on police training and the

sale of arms in Nice are also in line with the results of the 'Security' frame (15.5% on TF1 compared to only 2.9% on France 2). Finally, the images of the terrorist, more numerous on France 2, match with the 'Profile' frame (4.1% on TF1 compared to 8.6% on France 2).

However, some differences between frames are not visible on the screen. This is the case, for example, for the frames 'Victim' (7.2% on TF1 and 14.3% on France 2), 'Intelligence' (9.3% and 4.3%) and 'Video surveillance' (1% and 7.1%). It is also not clear from the footage why France 2 interviews few men compared to TF1. Conversely, some differences in images between the two channels do not correspond to any of the other parameters used previously (frames, emotions, quotations, etc.). Thus, for example, no parameter reflects the importance of religion illustrated by the many images of churches and the multiple sounds of bells. Similarly, the interest of France 2 in the previous attacks is invisible in the previous results. The same is true for the sense of panic provoked by TF1's images. The images therefore offer a reading of the event that can be independent of the words used to describe it.

Moreover, unlike television, the press does not show a single photograph of the terrorist. This choice is explained by this *Nice-Matin* journalist as a desire not to sadden the victims' relatives:

> Unfortunately, we had the experience of July 14 attack where we made a lot of mistakes, more in the iconography than in the texts. (…) For example, we will never again put a photo of a presumed terrorist or a terrorist. (…) Because we put Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel's picture like everyone else [the killer of the Nice attack in 2016]. (…) we realised how shocking, hurtful and painful it could be for the victims' families. [FR_I_4]

Third, regarding Twitter, the images are often videos showing politicians. A photograph from an article on the far-right website 'Français de souche' (2020) is also often shared. It shows a boat of the German NGO 'Sea-Eye' which is involved in rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean. The NGO is wrongly accused by the article of being 'co-responsible' for the attack. The terrorist had in fact travelled from Palermo to Bari on an Italian company's ferry provided by the government (the 'GNV Rhapsody' of the company 'Grandi Navi Veloci').

Images of the basilica are also visible (security cordon or forensic police), as well as videos of knells in France. Two photomontages, opposed to immigration, are also singular. The first one, from 'Action française' (a far-right political party), is entitled 'Immigration, Trojan horse' and includes the hashtag 'Let's hunt down the Islamists'. It shows the terrorist on the ground, wearing only boxer shorts and possibly handcuffed by the hands under his buttocks. A fireman is dressing his wounds. The second is from Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (a far-right politician) and is entitled 'Borders open to murderers: enough is enough! Let's control our borders, let's expel the illegals'. The link between immigration and terrorism is thus very present on the social network.

As well, four images can be highlighted. The first two are illegal collages of far-right activists. These images show, again, the importance of this political trend on Twitter. The first tweet, from the group 'Bordeaux Nationaliste' reads: 'Nice: the terrorist is a 21-year-old migrant of Tunisian origin who arrived in France at the beginning of October. 3 new victims of multiculturalism!'. The second, from 'Action française' (a far-right political party), is worded as follows: 'Islamism – Republic accomplice. Collage of the Perpignan section'.

The other two images link the attack to Cédric Hérrou and cannot be shown here to keep users anonymous. The two tweets show a recent book written by him with Michel Henry (2020). Cédric Hérrou is a French farmer active in helping illegal immigrants on the French-Italian border, near Nice. He is notably the subject, in 2018, of a legal decision creating a constitutional principle of 'fraternity' allowing to help others for humanitarian purposes. This decision relaxed the repression of aiding the illegal entry

and residence of foreigners. These tweets illustrate the 'Responsibility of NGOs' frame of Twitter. The first tweet reads: 'Mr. Cédric Herrou and the NGOs complicit in the uncontrolled arrival of migrants have indeed changed the world of the victims of the Nice attack and their families… This despicable character should be in prison…' (anonymous). The second is written as follows: 'We no longer hear from Cédric Herrou. Did the smuggler of the Alps, the smuggler of illegal immigrants, play an active role in the days preceding the Nice attack?' (anonymous).

A commentary on the last tweet ('He may have been eaten by his hosts. 😟') also compares migrants to cannibals. The Twitter images thus establish a very strong parallel between immigration and terrorism, on the one hand, and between NGOs and terrorism, on the other. If the first conflation was already present in the press, the second is new. Twitter's images are thus consistent with four of the social network's top five frames ('Immigration [stop]', 'Immigration [deportation]', 'Responsibility of NGOs' and 'Immigration [border control]').

Previous terrorist attacks mentioned

The previous terrorist attacks cited by the press (and excluding the Nice attack of 2020) primarily concern those of September 11 (New York) and 2002 (Bali, Djerba, Karachi and Mombasa). There is also a slight peak in 2012 (Toulouse). Nevertheless, for the press, the three most important peaks concern the attacks of 2015 (medium peak), 2016 (small peak) and 2020 (large peak). The 2015 attacks are mainly related to Charlie-Hebdo and the Bataclan. The 2016 attacks are essentially those on the 'Promenade des Anglais' (Nice) and, to a lesser extent, on Father Jacques Hamel (Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray). Finally, the year 2020 is mainly dedicated to the murder of Samuel Paty in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, which took place about two weeks before the attack on the basilica in Nice. 2020 is also synonymous with an attack in Vienna, less than a week after the one in Nice. A knife-wielding Afghan was also arrested in Lyon, a man attacked a guard at the French consulate in Saudi Arabia, another was shot dead in Avignon and an attack was carried out near the former offices of Charlie Hebdo.

The press therefore mainly refers to events close in time to the Nice attack. It is also marked by the 2015 attacks in Paris. But, and this is surprising, the attack on the 'Promenade des Anglais' in Nice (2016) is little mentioned. It would thus seem that the 2015 attacks mark a turning point in the way terrorism is understood in France for the press.

The chronological distribution of these events is given in Appendix 15 for the press. Each of the events was collected qualitatively, so no search hits were used to harmonise the coding. The same breakdown is given for television in Appendix 16 with the same quoted terrorist attacks. The three most important peaks for television are those of 2015 (medium peak), 2016 and 2020 (large peaks).

In this sense, the press is more sensitive to the attacks of 2015 (Charlie-Hebdo and Bataclan) while television focuses more on the attacks of 2016 ('Promenade des Anglais' and Father Hamel). This phenomenon may possibly be understood by the wound that the Charlie Hebdo represent, particularly for print journalists. Charlie-Hebdo effectively called into question the possibility of blasphemy in France by using, for instance, cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. More broadly, this attack – in addition to that of Samuel Paty – also affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press. This journalist from *Le Monde*, who covered the Nice attack, expressed this idea in these terms:

> the attack in itself against Samuel Paty was so unprecedented in its form, so strong and in its symbolism, but in a symbolism that, for the time being, is new. Charlie Hebdo was already one, but it just seemed obvious that… it still hit… France is still stunned by what happened. So it's obvious that it was transpiring in this new terrorist act, it was inevitably touching. [FR_I_7]

b) Narrative making and success

WHAT: What are the successful narratives?

The 'what' consists of the 'verbal' narrative (written or oral) and the 'visual' narrative (image or video). First, regarding the **verbal narrative**, the press and Twitter are primarily interested in the terrorist's journey to understand how he arrived in France. The profile of the assailant is therefore not their priority. This interest in the path taken by the Tunisian serves as an introduction to a rhetoric mainly centred around border control and migrants' deportation. To a lesser extent, the right to asylum and the intelligence services are also questioned.

Unlike Twitter, the press also focuses on the course of the investigation and the exact course of events before and after the attack. It also questions the compatibility between Islam and France and the ability of Muslims to integrate. It also questions the appropriateness of banning the Mohammed cartoons. To a lesser extent, it encourages a discussion on the interest, or not, of establishing a 'state of emergency' – without clearly defining it – , of increasing administrative detention of foreigners and of deploying video surveillance and other security measures more widely on the territory (Vigipirate plan, emergency call points, individual notifications, etc.). Finally, it insists at times on the need to better control social networks.

Conversely, Twitter conveys the message that it is urgent to stop immigration and proposes three solutions: drastically reduce the flow, close the borders, or even reverse the migratory flows ('remigration'). The social network also insists on the responsibility of NGOs and Italy in the attack.

Finally, the discourse of television is very different. This medium essentially emphasises mourning and the feelings of citizens. This mourning is accompanied by long sequences of the victims' profiles. The investigation is also followed closely and the security arrangements in the country are described at length. To a lesser extent, the effectiveness of the intelligence services is discussed.

Secondly, concerning the **visual narrative**, the press mainly shows male politicians and images related to the investigation and the remembrance of citizens. For its part, television returned to the amateur images of the attack and focused essentially on the security arrangements, the Notre-Dame basilica and the portrait of the victims. TF1 also focuses on the migratory dimension of the event and uses educational computer graphics to support its arguments. France 2 puts more emphasis on images relating to previous attacks in France and gives more voice to Muslims. Finally, Twitter focuses on politicians as the press. The images of the social network also assume the conflation between immigration and terrorism, on the one hand, and between NGOs and terrorism, on the other.

The correspondence between verbal and visual narratives is relatively good, although some dissonance can be observed – especially in the press. This dissonance could be explained by the fact that journalists do not choose the photographs for their press articles.

WHEN: In what context do these successful narratives take place?

The link between immigration and terrorism in the French press has been important since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, USA. Indeed, looking at these occurrences –'terrorism AND immigration' –, Europresse (2022) shows a constant media treatment between 2001 and 2014. Press articles then undergo an exponential increase due to the 2015 attacks in France. Its effects extend into 2017 due to the presidential elections which had seized this subject. This link between immigration and terrorism then falls back due to the health crisis and the war in Ukraine. The Nice attack in 2020 tends to slow down the fall of this curve without preventing it. The data on this media treatment are given below.

GRAPH 4. Nice attack: press articles crossing the occurrences of 'terrorism' and 'immigration' in France (Europresse)



WHERE: How do these successful narratives circulate from one medium to another?

Two parameters allow us to quantify the mutual citations between media:

1. A search of occurrences carried out by NVivo and including the list of the main French, English and American media (media present in the press and on television) (Appendix 17);
2. The list of URLs shared by each tweet (media present in Twitter).

The results in NVivo are then sorted according to the context of the hits. When a tweet concerns the Twitter account of a media outlet (press, television, or radio), it is counted as this media and not as 'Twitter'. The 'press' also includes the online press. Three Youtube channels belong to the 'Television' category for Twitter (*). The result of this quantitative analysis is given below. Four other sources, including two websites of the Rassemblement National (far right), are missing from this table.

TABLE 3. Nice attack: mutual references between media

	PRESS IN...	TELEVISION IN...	RADIO IN...	TWITTER IN...
PRESS	18	4	6	9
TELEVISION	2	5	2	2
TWITTER	26	20*	6	2

On Twitter, the two main media most cited are 'Français de souche' (10, far right website considered as an online press) and *Le Figaro* (5). This table shows that the press can spread a story widely. To a lesser extent, television is also widely reported on Twitter.

Regarding the quoting of tweets by television, this member of the Information Department of France 2 considers that the practice has definitely become part of journalistic habits.

> Today, no one would think of not quoting a tweet because it would be ugly. (…) we have written a charter for the use of social networks on air and, for example, it is strictly forbidden to redact a tweet. [FR_I_6]

Conversely, the mention of television in social networks is also a major concern for France 2. An email from the Digital Communication Department is sent every day to the company's hierarchy, around 6 p.m., to summarise the impact of a given sequence or a public announcement. This report is based on public data collected by the Talkwalker tool over a 24-hour period. It covers tweets, Facebook and Instagram posts from public pages or groups, comments, online articles, blogs, public forums, etc. A gauge is designed for each topic to observe the positive or negative impact of a sequence or announcement. The colour defines the level of criticality of the subject for the company, from the most positive (dark green) to the most critical 'with reputational risk' (red), in accordance with the following model.

GRAPH 5. Graphical summary of the impact on social networks at France 2

On average, the three topics with the highest number of repercussions are described in this short study. This study attempts, as best as possible, to capture the 'pros' and 'cons' of a sequence or announcement. Hyperlinks are always used to find the origin of the spillover effects described in the text. Here is a fictitious example based on one of these emails. The (fictitious) hyperlinks are underlined.

> The upcoming broadcast of the programme X (6.3K repercussions), which had its press conference yesterday, is still causing a stir. The announcement of X was the subject of factual media coverage (Le HuffPost, L'Obs, BFM-TV). The journalist x1 yesterday underlined the announced quality of the programme. A committed publication of x2 concentrated the criticism on the use of the audiovisual fee for this programme. Criticism of the programme was deplored by the x3 movement, which was pleased that the programme could promote a forgotten practice. However, commentators have criticised the lack of diversity in the casting.

Television is thus aware of the impact it can have on social networks. In this sense, social networks may influence the content of the media and of television, which constantly aims to obtain a large audience.

WHO: Who carries these successful narratives?

In the press, male politicians are by far the most frequently mentioned. The same applies to Twitter, although this social network is more gender-balanced between male and female politicians. In contrast, television prioritises, in order, female individuals, male individuals and, only afterwards, male politicians. The narratives of the press and television thus differ radically.

For politicians, the political parties most represented in the press and television are, by far, the right (Les Républicains) and La République en Marche – the party of President Emmanuel Macron. Twitter, for its part, values the extreme right. For all three media, the far left is poorly represented compared to the far right.

Twitter users are mainly individuals, journalists (and media) and politicians. Men and the far right also dominate the sample.

Do the cases studied have a local, national or international dimension?

The local or national dimension is measured using three variables: the format of the press (number of words and emotions), the 'Settings' and the place given to politicians.

First, the national press (*Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*) devoted a greater number of words to the event than the local press (*Nice-Matin*). Similarly, the emotions mobilised by this national press are more varied than those of the local press.

Regarding the 'Settings', the word 'France' is in second place in the press and on television after the word 'Nice'. This constant reminder of the country helps to raise the event to a national level.

Finally, the greater the place of politicians, the more the event can be placed at national level. For the Nice attack, the position of politicians seems to be high (39% of those mentioned), but it is better to compare this data with the other two events. A priori, the Nice attack can therefore be placed at national level.

Finally, the international dimension of the event is measured using two parameters: the frames and the presence of foreign politicians. The frames are those related to the commentary of the event by foreign media. However, for the Nice attack, no frame concerns these comments because the foreign media are not mentioned much. The second parameter, relating to foreign politicians, indicates that they represent only 7.2% of the total number of politicians mentioned – which seems to be low. However, it is better to compare this figure with the other two events to make sure that this event does not have an international dimension.

2.2 The attempted intrusions on the Eurotunnel site on the two nights of 27–29 July 2015

On the night of 27 to 28 July 2015, around 2,100 attempts were made to enter the Channel Tunnel (or 'Eurotunnel') at Coquelles, near Calais. Migrants tried to reach England via this tunnel managed by the namesake company – Eurotunnel.[12] Around 15 migrants were injured. The next day, 2,300 attempts were again recorded and a Sudanese man died. The Eurotunnel company considers that this second night is a record 'since 2002' (Pascual 2015a). Since June 2015, 1,500 to 1,900 intrusion attempts have been recorded every night according to *Le Figaro* (De Mallevoüe 2015, 3) and nine people have died. This number of intrusions is partly explained by the protesting occupation of the three ferries of the company MyFerryLink in the port of Calais. This partial blockage helped move cars, trucks and migrants into the tunnel.

This debate on the Eurotunnel is strongly linked to the one on the Calais 'jungle' – a name commonly used to refer to the various shanty towns where migrants live around the port and the tunnel. Indeed, this space generally allows migrants to organise their attempts to enter. The predecessor of the Calais Jungle is the Sangatte centre, created in 1999 in a Eurotunnel hangar managed by the French Red Cross. Quickly overcrowded, dangerous and unhealthy, this hangar was destroyed in 2002. Since then, unauthorised camps have been set up and dismantled. In parallel, the 'Jules Ferry' day centre was built in 2014. In 2015, faced with the volume of arrivals, migrants were massively sent back elsewhere in France and in the world. The Jungle was destroyed by the authorities in 2016, but a 'New Jungle' was quickly recreated. The Calais Jungle is a high-profile issue, both nationally and internationally, and is the source of sometimes stormy diplomatic relations between France and the UK.

12. In this sense, 'Eurotunnel' will refer to both the Channel Tunnel and the company that owns it.

Recently, the issue of illegal crossings at the Eurotunnel is also part of the wider debate on the 'migration crisis' of the 2010s. This 'crisis' is notably manifested by an increase in the arrival of Syrians, Kosovars and Afghans in the European Union.

The scientific literature has given little attention to the link between immigration and Eurotunnel. Recent articles focus, for example, on the forced mobility carried out by the public authorities to remove migrants from the site (Bonnaud 2020; Guenebeaud 2021). Another article focuses on an anti-migrant group created in 2013 and using violent methods (attacks on squats, reporting of migrants, calls for self-justice, etc.) (Gardenier 2018). A last article, more ancient, deals with the lobbying of the Eurotunnel company, in 2001–2002, to encourage the dismantling of the various camps in Calais and thus prevent the migrants from organising their assaults (Schuster 2003). The media therefore do not seem to be studied.

a) Representation: Main, collateral, and counter-narratives in traditional and social media

Main genre

For press and television, the main genre is composed of two elements:

1. 'Course of events' items, and;
2. 'Analysis' items.

The 'Course of events' items are further divided into four elements:

a. Items mainly dedicated to the census of migrant crossings;
b. Items mainly dedicated to counting the wounded and the dead;
c. Items detailing the traffic delays caused by the crossings, migrant sit-ins and the social movement of MyFerryLink, and;
d. Items reporting on the positions taken by national authorities (Bernard Cazeneuve, Theresa May, French and British MPs, etc.), without judgement.

The 'Analysis' items are also divided into four categories:

a. Items with a high number of positive or negative judgements on the action of the French and British governments;
b. Items suggesting certain actions to be taken (control of illegal work in the UK, reinforcement of security at the entrance to the tunnel, reception of migrants in France, etc.);
c. Items reporting on the positions of local authorities (mayors of Calais, Dover and Folkestone) and other actors (Eurotunnel, migrants, English tabloids, associations, etc.), and;
d. Items offering a certain interpretation of the event (push-pull factors, ease to work illegally in the UK, insufficient security of the site, too much security of the site causing the deaths, etc.).

The breakdown of press articles and television sequences is given in Appendix 18. Regarding the items double-coded as 'Course of events/Analysis', they mainly report the opinions of national authorities offering a certain reading of the event and not detailing the measures taken: they are thus closer to 'Analysis' type items.

For press and television, the event is treated primarily in an analytical manner. There are few 'Course of events' items because no police investigation is followed. It is also possible that these investigations are not carried out much or are carried out more quickly. Similarly, the government and major institutions do not mobilise much: in particular, official trips are rare and there is no national tribute. The victims are also rarely described, even when their identity is known. Finally, except for the inhabitants of Calais (one

press article), the national community is not questioned about the event. For both media, there are 45 'Course of events' items (compared to 14 'Analysis' items).

For the press, 'Analysis' type articles dominate the first two days of the event. For television, on the contrary, the distribution between these two types of writing is more balanced on these two days. Once again, there is a desire for television to treat the event in a factual and neutral manner when the news is hot, which is not the case for the press.

Finally, for Twitter, the main genre is composed of the three elements identical to those of the Nice attack: 'Commentary' tweets, 'Event' tweets (from a media) and 'Reaction' tweets (from a public figure). A single tweet may contain one to two different categories. The chronological distribution of the tweets is given in Appendix 19.

It shows that the media ('Event') are the first to be broadcast the day after the event and the 'Reactions' are very low – confirming the very low mobilisation of political figures on this subject. Overall, the event was mainly disseminated on Twitter by major media (78 'Event' tweets, compared to 56 'Commentary' and 7 'Reaction' tweets). Comments are also very present on the first two days.

Settings

The 'settings' are the objects and places mentioned in the documents. They can be divided into two categories:

1. The locations;
2. The objects;
3. The other elements.

As before, about 100 words and expressions were collected by hand when reading press articles and newscasts transcripts. These occurrences were then detected by NVivo to systematise the search. The word clouds in Appendix 20 and Appendix 21 show the results for the press and then for television. Several observations can be made:

1. Regarding locations, the occurrences can be grouped into five sub-categories:

    a. The main geographical areas ('France', 'Calais', 'Channel', 'Schengen', 'Great Britain', 'borders', etc.);
    b. Places linked to the Eurotunnel site and the port ('ramp', 'quay', 'car park', 'platform', 'railways', 'basin', etc.);
    c. Roads ('traffic jam', 'bypass', 'kilometres', 'motorways', 'queue', etc.);
    d. Housing locations ('centre', 'jungle', 'swamp', 'shanty town', 'camp', etc.);
    e. Other locations ('court' and 'companies').

'Calais' is in the first position in the press and on television among all categories ('locations', 'objects' and 'others'). However, this word does not belong to the occurrences that made it possible to collect the data. The large geographical areas are also at the top of this list for both media ('Channel', 'United Kingdom', 'Great Britain' and 'border[s]' in particular). This desire to locate the event geographically by 'zooming in' is also associated with the issue of the Calais 'Jungle'. Similarly, in comparison with the Nice attack, the notions of 'France' and 'Republic' are erased. This striking difference anchors the event locally and limits its national scope.

2. The objects are now divided into four sub-categories:

   a. Means of transportation ('truck', 'shuttle', 'ferry', 'freight', 'train', 'car', 'boat', etc.);
   b. Barriers ('fence', 'razor blade', 'gate', 'grill', 'barbed wire', 'wall', 'hole', etc.);
   c. English media ('tabloid', 'English press', 'British newspapers', 'daily papers', 'television', etc.);
   d. Other objects ('perishable goods', 'ballast', 'tarpaulin', 'shack', 'tear gas', 'electric arc', etc.).

'Trucks' are, by far, at the top of the list as they are both an object of hope (where migrants can get in) and of fear (where migrants can die or get injured). The press and television thus give the image of a 'ballet', sometimes deadly, between these people and these objects. The other most cited objects are also those used by this population ('shuttle[s]', 'ferry', 'train', etc.). The most common barriers ('barrier', 'fence', 'gates') are not only less cited, but also convey little of the danger they may represent for migrants. An exception can be noted for the image of 'razor wire', which is sometimes mentioned in the press but not on television.

3. Finally, concerning the other elements, the 'night' is very often used to support, maybe, the clandestine nature of the crossings (3d position on television and 6th in the press).

Characters

The quoted persons, whether interviewed or not, are given in Appendix 22 according to the same categories as the Nice attack, with some adjustments:

1. The 'Individual' category generally corresponds to migrants ('Ahmadi Mahmood Jan', 'Sadam Matar', 'an exile', etc.);
2. The 'Group' category refers to a group of individuals ('the protesters');
3. The 'Public official' category refers to persons holding a public office ('prosecutor', 'prefect', 'military', etc.);
4. The 'Politician' category includes people who are elected or wish to be elected ('Prime Minister', 'Place Beauvau', 'Mayor', etc.);
5. The 'NGO' category is linked to associations ('Médecins du *Monde*', 'Secours catholique', 'l'Auberge des migrants', 'France terre d'asile', 'Kent Refugee Help', etc.);
6. Unlike the Nice attack, the 'Activist' category relates to trade unions ('SGPPolice FO', 'National Transport Federation of Nord-Pas-de-Calais', 'Force ouvrière', etc.);
7. The 'Expert' category is for a historian and a geographer;
8. The 'Clergy' category refers to a bishop of Dover;
9. The 'Legal text' category concerns several legal texts ('opinion of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights', 'Dublin Regulation', 'award of the International Arbitral Tribunal of The Hague [2007]', 'concession treaty [1986]', etc.);
10. Finally, the 'Company' category is new and includes various companies ('Eurotunnel', 'CCI Côte d'Opale', 'Deroo', 'TSA', 'Confederation of British Industry', 'Transmanche', etc.).

As before, a person expressing himself/herself several times in the same article is worth 'one'. Several remarks can be made from the results:

1. Again, the Politicians are the people favoured by the national press and, to a lesser extent, by the local press (*La Voix du Nord*). The politicians highlighted by *La Voix du Nord* are, as for *Nice-Matin*, local personalities ('Emily Arnold [Mayor of Folkestone]' and 'Chris Precious [Mayor of Dover]'). As well, the local press highlights, again, local actors ('Individuals', 'Activist' and 'Company').
2. However, the local press has the particularity of ignoring the associations that act, however, on the ground. The humanitarian dimension ('NGO') is therefore emphasised by *Le Monde*.
3. Another result similar to the Nice attack is the interest shown by *Le Figaro* in 'public officials'. The newspaper thus seems to have privileged access to this type of personality.

4. The experts are largely neglected by the press and television. The desire to understand the event is therefore relatively absent.
5. On the other hand, for the first time, companies are being listened to by the press, television, and Twitter. They thus seem to be replacing the experts and reinforce the economic dimension of the event.
6. 'Individuals' are essentially migrants explaining their crossings and, to a lesser extent, truck drivers irritated by the situation. Migrants intervene punctually, and in a homogeneous manner, over the period.
7. Finally, while politicians once again form the core of Twitter's testimonies, the social network is also diversifying by giving a voice to companies, NGOs, and public officials.

Compared to the Nice attack, women are not very present here among the 'Individuals' because the former are mainly male migrants. On the other hand, they are proportionally better represented among the 'Politicians' thanks to the English women politicians ('Theresa May', 'Harriet Harman' and 'Emily Arnold'). Their participation in NGOs is also notable, probably because of the journalists' interest in volunteers rather than leaders.

An interesting fact concerns, as well, the political affiliation of the quoted persons in Appendix 23. Unlike the Nice attack, where right-wing and far-right personalities invaded the media, the Eurotunnel event is the subject of more contrasting opinions. The Socialist Party, in power in France, is better represented. This party is also quoted at the same level as the British Conservative Party – also in power in that country. The same observation can be made as for the Nice attack: the far right is not counterbalanced by a far left narrative.

Finally, the tweets were classified according to the category of Twitter users. This category was determined as for the Nice attack. This classification presents 84 journalists (including several media, one press cartoonist and one press photographer), 26 politicians (including 3 former elected officials), 22 individuals, 1 NGO and 2 accounts that no longer exist. It would appear that there are 41 men and 8 women (as well as 10 'unclear' and 76 'not applicable'). Many accounts support a former far-right presidential candidate: Éric Zemmour. The tweets come mainly from AFP (11 tweets), France Info (6), *Le Figaro* (6), *20 Minutes* (5), BFM-TV (5), I-Télé (5) and Karim Ouchikh (5, a politician supporting Éric Zemmour).

Emotional tone

The distribution of emotions in the press and television is given in Appendix 24. It shows that the absence of emotions ('neutral') is more present than for the Nice attack (press and television) while, paradoxically, the number of victims is greater for the Eurotunnel. Anger is also less present in the press. Le Figaro again remains in the register of anger and impatience, while the other newspapers also use compassion for the migrants, sadness, and contemplation.

Television again uses anger, fear, compassion, and sadness. These same four emotions were also present for the attack. The fear, however, is not that of the citizens: this time it concerns the migrants themselves.

Finally, the absence of emotions ('neutral') is also the emotion that dominates Twitter. The tweets are more precisely distributed as follows: 76 'Neutral', 24 'Anger', 17 'Little anger', 8 'Cynical', 5 'Ironic', 2 'Critical', 1 'Curious', 1 'Proud' and 1 'Sceptical'.

The absence of emotion thus contrasts with the hundred or so deaths caused each year by the Eurotunnel crossings.

Formats

The format of the press is detailed in Appendix 25. Several results emerge from this classification:

1. The local press (*La Voix du Nord*) has a slight preference for opinion pieces ('Editorial' and 'Op-ed'). This suggests that the newspaper is making this event a priority. This hypothesis is partly confirmed by the total number of words written by the three dailies (11,851 for *La Voix du Nord*, 9063 for *Le Monde* and 7830 for *Le Figaro*). The Eurotunnel is therefore, above all, a local event.
2. The single interview is written one week after the event. In this sense, either the journalists do not ask their respondents about the Eurotunnel, or the latter do not take a stand on this event themselves.
3. Compared to the terrorist attack, the absence of emotion is more prevalent in the op-eds, reflecting the overall coverage of the event. However, unlike the attack, the local press uses a wide range of emotions. This once again reinforces the local dimension of the event.
4. Finally, the average date of articles in the local press is later than in the national press, because the local press is interested in the event for longer.

The format is now given for television in Appendix 26. The variables are the same as before ('studio' for a studio interview, 'with footage' if there is footage to illustrate what the anchorperson is saying, 'live' for a live interview and 'edited' for a report with voice-over). Sequences are spread out over a shorter period in the newscasts, particularly at the peak. Thus, on 29 July 2015, five sequences were broadcast, on average, at 8:01 p.m. for the Eurotunnel. In comparison, on 29 October 2020, twenty-two sequences are broadcast at 8:11 p.m. on average for the Nice attack. Two special editions of the newspaper are also broadcast at around 6 p.m. on the same day. The Eurotunnel is therefore quickly dealt with at the beginning of the newscast while the Nice attack occupies a more important place in it. This lower priority accentuates the absence of emotions of the media coverage for the Eurotunnel.

Main frames

As for the Nice attack, the frames define the themes of each article as defined by Robert Entman (1993). They are determined in two stages: qualitatively (double reading) and quantitatively (search for occurrences), after checking the context in which these occurrences are inserted. These frames, and their respective occurrences, are given below.

TABLE 4. Eurotunnel: description of frames

FRAME	DESCRIPTION	HITS
ASYLUM	Some migrants are asylum seekers. This is because of asylum policies.	asile OR réfugié*
CASUALTY	People died or were injured (involves, in rare cases, police officers or the Mediterranean Sea)	morts OR morte OR décès OR 'la vie' OR fracture OR fractures OR noyées OR noyés OR blessées OR blessés OR entorse OR victime OR victimes OR percuté OR percutés OR percutée
COMPENSATION	The city of Calais and Eurotunnel demand financial compensation (in rare cases for truckers and holiday-makers).	compensation OR compensations OR 'aide financière' OR indemnisation OR indemnité OR préjudice OR préjudices OR facture OR compenser

DELAYS	Traffic was disrupted.	embouteillage OR embouteillages OR bouchon OR bouchons OR ralentissement OR ralentissements OR retard OR retards OR congestions OR perturbations OR perturbé OR perturbe OR perturbés OR interrompu OR bloqué OR stoppé OR interruptions
DEMONSTRATION	Demonstrations have been carried out (in general: MyFerryLink) (concerns, more rarely, 'No Border' activists, migrants and pro or anti-migrant demonstrations in the UK).	MyFerryLink OR manifest* OR sit-in
DEVELOPMENT	We must support the development of the countries of emigration and stop the conflicts abroad.	développement
ECONOMY	The economy is affected by these migrant intrusions.	'chiffre d'affaires' OR 'chiffres d'affaires' OR économie OR croissance OR endommagent OR rétroviseurs OR périssables OR l'économie OR pertes OR économ*
EUROPEAN COORDINATION	Cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, or at the European level, is essential.	coordination OR quotas OR coopération
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	These intrusions indirectly restrict the freedom of movement – especially of businesses.	liberté
HUMANITARIAN	The migrants of Calais live in inhuman conditions.	abris OR eau OR nourriture OR santé OR maladies OR hygiène OR vêtements OR électricité OR température OR froid OR chaud OR vent OR couvertures OR bidonville OR toilettes OR survi*
ILLEGAL WORK IN THE UK	The lack of identity cards in the United Kingdom encourages illegal work and is a magnet for migrants.	travail* OR identité OR 'au noir'
INFORMATION	Migrants must be informed, in their country of origin or in the vicinity of the tunnel, of the risks they are taking.	information
OPERATION STACK	Operation Stack, aimed at parking trucks on a portion of the highway, has been deployed.	stack OR portion OR 'zone d'attente'
PRESS IN THE UK	The British media is covering the event.	tabloids OR tabloïds OR presse OR télévision* OR BBC OR journaux OR quotidiens
SECURING	The security of the site is ensured by various means.	clôture* OR barrière* OR grille* OR barbelés OR grillage* OR mur* OR chiens OR sécurité OR caméra OR rapatriement OR expulsion* OR détention OR blocus OR éclairage OR gaz OR alarme OR arrestation* OR plainte* OR sécurisation

SMUGGLER	Smugglers help migrants.	'd'êtres humains' OR passeur*
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THE UK	British welfare benefits, especially for asylum seekers, are a magnet for migrants.	mineurs OR prestations OR '50 euros' OR '36 livres'
TENANTS	Landlords who harbour illegal immigrants will be punished. In return, rental evictions will be easier.	propriétaire* OR locataire* OR loue*
VOTER EXASPERATION	Some voters are worried or angry.	employés OR salariés OR calaisien* OR habitants OR routiers OR vacanciers OR riverains OR transporteurs

These frames are broken down by press article in Appendix 27. This distribution reveals several results:

1. The security devices are, by far, those that focus the attention of the press, in equal proportions between newspapers. 'Securing' and the verb 'to secure' are cited in 26 articles out of 62 (42%), equally between newspapers. However, this notion is ambivalent because it is used for the security of the site but not for that of the migrants.
2. These same casualties are the second focus of the press. Most of them concern people who have died, not people who have been injured. Deaths are usually counted and placed on the calendar ('the eleventh since…'). These losses are very often explained ('hit by a truck'). This level of detail, combined with the absence of emotions that dominates the articles, is reminiscent of the 'Police investigation' type articles of the Nice attack: the facts are given, but not 'experienced'. The absence of emotions is accentuated by the absence of a 'Victim' type frame that would have put a face on them. The number of deaths is also put into perspective by the number of intrusions which is more commonly mentioned (23 articles mentioning an 'intrusion' against 13 articles reporting a 'death'). Consequently, a reader could consider, for example, that one death for more than 2000 intrusions is not very many. The number of victims thus seems to fade in comparison with the other quantitative data.
3. The economic impact of intrusions falls into four frames ('Delays', 'Economy', 'Compensation' and 'Freedom of movement'). Cumulatively, it can therefore be put at the same level of priority as site security. The event is therefore understood in terms of its monetary impact. The number of deaths thus competes with other data, including the growth points lost, the hours of waiting on the roads, the financial envelopes deployed to secure the site, the requests for financial compensation, etc.
4. This economic dimension is accentuated by the consequences of the protesting occupation of the three ferries of the company MyFerryLink. This partial blockage of the port would have contributed to reducing the economic development of the region. According to a journalist from *Le Monde* (Eurotunnel), this economic dimension may be explained by the difficulty a reporter may encounter to give migrants' point of view:

   > in a migrant centre, I kind of landed with a contact. In fact, it was very complicated there. It was tense and there were lots of people who didn't speak English. I remember spending two or three or four hours in there, and coming out sweating like crazy (…) Telling these stories is longer, more complicated, and that's why it takes time, and that's why, perhaps in part, it does answer the question of why do we talk about traffic jams? It's easy. [FR_I_5]

5. The exasperation of the 'voters' encompasses the feelings of weariness and anger of non-migrants: transporters, holidaymakers, truckers, Calaisians, port or Eurotunnel employees, etc. This frame is mainly covered by the local press.

6. With the exception of 'Casualties', the other frames relating to migrants or their daily life are little covered ('Asylum', 'Humanitarian', 'Smuggler'). This contributes to accentuating the 'accounting' dimension of the media treatment (how many intrusions, how many deaths, how many hours waiting in traffic jams, etc.).
7. The UK is finally placed on the same level as migrants (except for the casualties of course). The press is thus preoccupied with its pro- and anti-migrant demonstrations, its media treatment and its policies ('Illegal work', 'Operation Stack', 'Social rights' and 'Tenants'). Similarly, European coordination is generally treated from the perspective of France/UK cooperation.
8. Finally, the local press is more interested in the delays and demonstrations in the port and generally neglects the UK. There are also differences between *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro. Le Monde* is focused on asylum and the associated welfare. It also focuses on the British media and the humanitarian dimension. Conversely, *Le Figaro* prioritises demonstrations, the economic dimension and illegal work in the UK.

These frames are then distributed for television, by sequence, in Appendix 28. 'Casualty' and 'Securing' frames are again prominent on television. TF1 places slightly more emphasis on the victims, while France 2 places slightly more emphasis on the security arrangements. The exasperation of voters, and in particular truck drivers, is very present on TF1. France 2 will focus more on the economic dimension of the event. Overall, the television coverage is very similar to that of the press. This similarity contrasts with the Nice attack where the press and television had relatively different discourses.

On television, again, no female migrants are interviewed. Compared to France 2, the migrants' testimonies presented by TF1 insist more on the danger of the crossing: 'People have died (…) When people die, we stop' (TF1, 2015a), 'Sometimes the lorries drive and it is a bit dangerous, we have to run very fast' (TF1, 2015b). TF1 also highlights the reinforcement of security at the site: 'Yes, the police are trying to push us back, sometimes with tear gas' (TF1, 2015c), 'they have raised the barriers' (TF1, 2015a), 'security has been reinforced. They have raised the fences, they have increased the number of rounds inside' (TF1, 2015a).

The emphasis on the danger of the crossings is also shown by a simple search of occurrences: the root words 'danger*' and 'risqu*' are thus present in six TF1 sequences compared with three for France 2. This is also true of the frames, where 'casualties' are slightly valued on TF1.

Conversely, the France 2 newscast highlights the benefits that migrants derive from these crossings: 'It was easier for me to come to a country where English was spoken (…) I'm happy because I was able to study here, get a qualification, and all that helped me to find a job' (France 2, 2015b), 'England is a wonderful country (…) I love England because here everything is free, the medicines, here they give us everything (…) Now this is my home' (France 2, 2015b). An injunction from a migrant is also given by the channel: 'Your government has received so much money from the British to protect the border and prevent us from going to England that now, OK, if you don't want us to stay here, open the borders and let us pass' (France 2, 2015a). France 2's testimonies can thus accentuate the antipathy towards this population, unlike TF1, which appeals more to compassion.

Finally, the Twitter frames differ greatly from the Nice attack, where they were largely based on the press account. Five frames are therefore created here:

1. 'Crossing' simply describes the crossings and attempted crossings of migrants. This frame is, of course, implicit for the press and television, but it was still necessary here because many tweets simply mention the intrusions;
2. 'Eurotunnel' considers that the company is responsible for securing the site;
3. The 'Government' believes that the government is responsible for securing this;
4. 'Not Eurotunnel' believes that the company is not responsible;
5. 'Social rights in France' sees the social assistance granted to migrants in France as a migration magnet.

The table in Appendix 29 breaks down these frames by type of tweet. The table shows several elements:

1. The importance of 'Event' type tweets is confirmed here. This may be explained by a desire, for the Nice attack, not to directly highlight the terrorist's migratory route by the medias in their tweets. On the contrary, it is more difficult to avoid this subject in the context of the Eurotunnel. In other words, it may be easier to obtain 'event' type tweets for the Eurotunnel because the cross-reference between 'migration' occurrences and event-specific occurrences is easier to obtain in these tweets. This hypothesis is also confirmed by the number of tweets selected. Thus, to obtain a sample of about 100 tweets, the Eurotunnel is the only event where the tweets are retweeted at least 10 times (compared to 2 times for the other two events). The intersection of these two types of occurrences (migratory and event-specific) thus generates more tweets for the Eurotunnel than for the other two events. It is therefore possible that there could have been more 'event' type tweets for the Nice attack if we had not forced the crossing between these two types of occurrences during data collection.
2. These 'Event' tweets accumulate on the 'Crossing' frame, showing a desire to talk about intrusions without judging them. This partly explains the lack of emotions in most tweets (56%).
3. Conversely, 'commentary' tweets are more judgemental and generally focus on the government's responsibility rather than that of the company Eurotunnel.
4. Reactions are rare and are more divided on the issue of responsibility.

Furthermore, out of 135 tweets, 60 are openly anti-migrant and only 8 are in favour of immigration (63 are neutral, i.e., neither for nor against immigration). Of these 135 tweets, 80 have anti-migrant comments and 34 have pro-immigration comments (14 tweets have non-immigration comments and 26 tweets have no comments). In the light of the Nice attack, anti-migrant tweets and comments are therefore significantly less preponderant.

Twitter differs greatly from the other two media because of the pressure it puts on the government. The tweets believe that the government is responsible for illegal crossings. This position follows a statement by Bernard Cazeneuve, then Minister of the Interior, in 2015 that Eurotunnel should be responsible for securing the site. Casualties are therefore not, in Twitter's view, a key issue.

Some of the comments in the tweets are also unbelievably violent: numerous calls for the killing of migrants, humour or satisfaction regarding their death, hatred towards journalists taking pictures of migrants and accused of complicity (or even called 'smugglers'), migrants compared to pests or parasites, insistence on the alleged laziness of migrants, etc. Here is a striking example of a comment from the newspaper *20 Minutes*: '🎶"Driver… if you're a champion… step on it…"🎶👟💨 And "PAF", the migrant!!!'.

Around twenty calls to murder were recorded in the comments of the 135 tweets. In comparison, the burkini (154 tweets) and the Nice attack (93 tweets) each had less than ten. During this work, reports were made to Twitter about these. Twitter always replied that this did not violate its policy.

Thus, either the hate speech detection algorithms do not apply to an earlier period (2015–2016), or they are not able to understand the comments that have been reported. In any case, it seems that Twitter has made progress in processing reports and deleting hateful content. For instance, in May 2017, a group of French associations annulled an action brought against Twitter in 2016 because of an improvement in the rate of deletion of hateful content in their testing (MRAP 2017). This progress had been made at the beginning of 2017, i.e., after the burkini and Eurotunnel events.

Visual documentation

The image analysis deals, in order, with the press, television and Twitter. The press photographs cannot be reproduced here due to copyright.

First, regarding the press, the migrants most shown are men, usually depicted crossing a fence or walking along rails. To a lesser extent, the face-to-face between security forces and migrants, in motion or not, is also visible. Even more rarely, these migrants may be leaning against a guardrail along the motorway, carrying out a sit-in on the motorway in protest, hiding on or under a truck or shuttle, or waiting in the cold. Women are very rarely shown. These images are given in varying proportions in the three newspapers: 47% of the articles in *La Voix du Nord* have a photograph showing migrants (compared to 33% for *Le Monde* and 25% for *Le Figaro*).

In addition to photographs of migrants, images of politicians also appear in the press (Bernard Cazeneuve, David Cameron, Theresa May, mayors of Folkestone and Dover, etc.). The same applies to lorries, with images of Operation Stack, various traffic jams, trains carrying them and lorries parked in a car park. Two types of signs are also frequently visible: motorway signs saying 'Channel Tunnel' and 'Danger of Death' signs near the tracks.

The Folkestone demonstration between pro- and anti-migrants as well as police and anti-migrants is also highlighted in the press. As well, compassionate images are visible: burial of a migrant, marching in tribute to dead migrants, and parallels with migrants who died in the Mediterranean (thanks to the photograph of a boat with migrants on board).

Among the photographs described above, two examples from the newspaper *Le Monde* may arouse this feeling of compassion. The first picture shows a migrant hidden under a truck. It is possible to imagine, on the one hand, the suffering of his position and, on the other hand, the risks he is taking when this truck is driving for miles. The man is folded in half, behind the rear wheels, sitting on the chassis of the truck, under the container (De Montvalon 2015).

The second image shows a group of migrants waiting in the cold, at night, in the tunnel area. Their gaze seems to be directed towards the police who have stopped them. The feeling of compassion can then arise from the difficulty they have in protecting themselves from the cold, their young age and the respect they show towards the police. It is also one of the few images to show the migrants' faces in close-up – thus helping to humanise them (Pascual 2015b).

Second, concerning the television, the analysis of the second-by-second coding of television images is divided into two categories:

1. images specific to the event (migrants, on the move, trying to enter the tunnel) and;
2. other images, aimed at understanding the event (maps, written quotes, interviews, Calais Jungle, demonstrations, security arrangements, means of transport and other shots relating, above all, to migrants). These other images do not include the anchorperson.

Concerning the images specific to the event, France 2 gives an extra minute or so to footage of migrants attempting to cross (155 seconds for TF1 and 200 seconds for France 2). These images are themselves divided into six categories: confrontations between police and migrants (35 seconds for TF1 and 44 seconds for France 2), migrants crossing or going along a motorway (31 and 107), migrants crossing a fence (22 and 40), migrants clinging to the roof of a moving lorry (3 and 9), migrants hiding in a bush or crossing a wasteland close to the tunnel (60 for TF1) and migrants opening the trailer of a stationary lorry (4 for TF1).

TF1 prioritises the accompaniment of migrants trying, at night, to enter the tunnel by passing through the wasteland located nearby. The camera in the hand, at night, is thus the tool favoured by the private channel. The channel's reports thus make it possible to obtain more varied image categories. TF1 also manages to film a large group of migrants trying to get through an imposing fence, shouting 'We are human beings' to the police on the other side. The same group is then pushed back by tear gas and a close-up shows them coughing.

France 2 favours the crossing of migrants on the motorway and even, to a lesser extent, the confrontations with the police and the crossing of fences. Despite the time devoted by the public channel to the intrusion attempts, the same shot is used four times in a total of 96 seconds. Similarly, a fence crossing takes place in Melilla, Spain (12 seconds) and an arrest takes place in Ventimiglia, Italy, using footage from June 2015 (13 seconds). Finally, the channel prioritises wide shots and does not hesitate to use CCTV footage in addition to archive material. Compared to TF1, the public channel does not seem to have prioritised reporting for this event. It uses motorway crossings to compensate for the lack of footage closer to the tunnel. Finally, the channel is also the only one to show a migrant taking a young child over a barrier (19 seconds).

Concerning the other images, aimed at understanding the event, the two channels have big differences. In terms of form, TF1 is the only one to use written quotes and maps of the Pas-de-Calais – the latter being present in almost every sequence. In this way, the channel favours education and the local anchoring of the event. The main towns highlighted are Calais (and its tunnel), Folkestone (the town where the tunnel starts or ends) and Arras (the second most populous town in the Pas-de-Calais). In terms of content, TF1 also focuses on images relating to the security of the site and the Calais Jungle.

Regarding the security of the site, on the one hand, the private channel insists heavily on the barriers, the holes in the fences, the barbed wire, the workers installing these barriers, the 'Danger of death' signs on the fences, the video surveillance cameras, the private security patrols with dogs, the police officers and their various vehicles and the police interventions (control of the inside of the lorries, roadside check, etc.). The private channel even goes so far as to list, on the screen, the security devices used. In comparison, security means are rarely filmed on France 2, no doubt because of the low number of reports made by the public channel.

Compared to TF1, the public channel does not seem to have prioritised reporting for this event. It uses motorway crossings to compensate for the lack of footage closer to the tunnel.

The Calais Jungle, on the other hand, is also the subject of several reports on TF1, allowing for numerous interviews with migrants and community activists. The daily life of the shantytown often highlights the goodwill of the immigrants and the solidarity that exists among them. These images show, for instance, a makeshift church built by their own hands, an improvised grocery shop, a future restaurant in the making, adults and children taking classes, a person being shaved by another and a sign saying 'You are welcome' on a makeshift shelter. The rare images of migrants eating or queuing for meals are in the minority. TF1 thus gives the image of active immigrants involved in the life of the slum. The image of their children playing in the shantytown, of migrants attending mass, of people hobbling with a crutch or showering with a hose also contributes to soften their image. On France 2, the daily life of the jungle is relatively absent. TF1 is also the only one to film a march in Calais in tribute to the dead migrants.

Finally, the numerous reports of the private channels offer the viewer a variety of angles. In this sense, some images are not found on France 2: the Jules Ferry reception centre, migrants waiting on the grass or on the wasteland near the tunnel, migrants sitting or, more often, walking in the jungle, various courts in Pas-de-Calais, a MyFerryLink ferry, etc.

France 2 focuses more on the occupation of a disused high school in Paris by undocumented migrants, on immigrants who have been living in London for several generations (several reports), on migrants in transit in Ventimiglia, Italy, and on the Gare du Nord station, in Paris, where a migrant died while trying to board a UK-bound Eurostar train. These four subjects are absent from TF1.

However, other types of images are present, in equivalent quantities, in both channels: queues of blocked cars and trucks, tunnel entrance, passing train, pro- and anti-immigrant demonstration in Folkestone and archive images of the Sangatte centre.

These observations are consistent with some TV frames ('Demonstration' more prominent on TF1, 'Delays' equivalent on both channels, 'Casualty' very strong on TF1 due, presumably, to more interviews with community activists) but not with others ('Securing' more prominent on France 2). Television images can therefore offer an independent reading of its own frames because the visual narrative may slightly differ from the verbal narrative.

In the press and on television, images of migrants crossing a fence illegally are generally made from an angle that does not allow them to be recognised. This is explained by the 'Charter of Professional Ethics for Journalists', which founded the profession and was first written in 1918. The next excerpt comes from a journalist from the Information Department of France 2:

> the rule is clear, when someone is committing a crime, we blur it. We are not police auxiliaries, that's in the journalist's charter. (…) We anonymise the person as much as possible. (…) And when, on the judicial requisition, we are asked for our rushes, well, we have lost them. It's crazy how messy we are. [FR_I_6]

Moreover, for the press and television, there are no images of the deceased (archive images of them or testimonies of relatives after the accident). Unlike the Nice attack, it is therefore impossible to put a face on the victims. This contrasts with the 'Casualty' frame, which is in first and second position on television and in the press respectively.

Third, as regards Twitter, the images of the social network focus on trains entering or leaving the tunnel, and on the tunnel entrance with the 'Eurotunnel' logo. Images of migrants walking along rails or through fences are also common. To a lesser extent, migrants are also shown crossing a road or waiting on a guardrail. They are also often confronted by police officers. Finally, rare images of the French Prime Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, of the Folkestone demonstration between pro- and anti-migrants and of migrants on the roof of a lorry may appear. Twitter images thus prioritise the representation of the event itself and not of side events. Migrants are shown as active, not passive, individuals attempting to cross the tunnel. This is in line with the primacy of the 'Crossing' frame in Twitter.

The positions 'for' or 'against' immigration are more subtle among the images. For instance, two women and a child, also present from a different angle in *La Voix du Nord* (Goudeseune 2015), suggest the danger of the crossing by putting, for example, the child on the same level as the barbed wire and by reminding us, too, that migrants are not only men. More exactly, the image shows two women, one of whom is carrying a child on her back. The child is only a few centimetres away from barbed wire behind a guardrail. This tweet from Agence France-Presse reads: 'In Coquelles, migrants on the Eurotunnel site after overcoming police roadblocks'.

Two other drawings also show a much stronger pro-migrant stance. The first one, from the cartoonist 'Péji', is entitled 'Migrant drama' and shows a policeman saying: 'We can't take it anymore! We also want to leave to work in England!'. This drawing ironises the suffering of the police in relation to that of the migrants. The second is entitled 'The death of migrants in Calais' (anonymous). The 'sleeve' of Death (pronounced the same way as the English Channel [\mɑ̃ʃ\] in French) becomes the Channel Tunnel itself. All these images cannot be shown here in order to preserve the anonymity of users or for copyright reasons.

Thus, compared to the Nice attack, the Eurotunnel is the subject of less harsh tweets about migrants despite the many calls for murder in their comments. This relative benevolence is mainly explained by the preponderance of 'Event' type tweets.

For the three media, no photographs of victims are given and no investigation, illustrated by the presence of the forensic science, seems to be conducted. The dead of the Eurotunnel are largely invisible.

b) Narrative making and success

WHAT: What are the successful narratives?

The 'what' consists of the 'verbal' narrative (written and oral) and the 'visual' narrative (image or video). Regarding the **verbal narrative**, firstly, the press and television have a comparable discourse. These two media insist, above all, on the means deployed to secure the site (fences, barriers, cameras, etc.). They also emphasise the migrants who died during the attempted intrusions. Their injuries are mentioned more occasionally. The exasperation of Eurotunnel employees, transporters, holidaymakers and local residents is also discussed, particularly on television. Logically, the delays caused by these intrusions on road traffic are mentioned, especially in the press. Finally, these two media frequently point out that these intrusions are essentially explained by the partial blockage of the port of Calais linked to the internal conflict at MyFerryLink.

Compared to television, the press put more emphasis on the negative economic consequences of these intrusions and on the demands for financial compensation from the city of Calais and Eurotunnel. Conversely, television tends to focus on the disastrous living conditions of the migrants in terms of access to water, food and hygiene.

Twitter's discourse differs radically from that of the press and television. This social network is generally content with mentioning the attempted intrusion of migrants and the measures taken to secure the site. When the tweets are more radical, they generally consider that Eurotunnel is not responsible for securing its site and, more broadly, for border control. On the contrary, it should be the government that ensures this control. More rarely, this social network mentions the deaths that occurred during the various crossings.

Secondly, regarding the **visual narrative**, the press, the television, and Twitter prioritise images of migrants waiting or in motion, walking along the tracks or crossing a fence. Twitter also favours images of trains in motion and the tunnel entrance with the 'Eurotunnel' logo.

As well, the press and television highlight images of trucks, trains, and demonstrations. But while the press highlights French and British politicians, the television emphasises more the security measures (barbed wire, police, cameras, etc.) (TF1), the Calais Jungle (TF1) and migrants living in London (France 2). Security measures were also highlighted on television for the Nice attack. These observations are line with the distribution of people quoted where the press favours politicians while television values individuals (migrants).

The 'verbal' and 'visual' frames generally match, but they can sometimes be slightly out of sync. For example, the 'Casualty' frame, although very present verbally in the press and on television, is visually absent.

WHEN: In what context do these successful narratives take place?

The cross-referencing of the occurrences of 'Calais' and 'immigration' in the French press (Europresse 2022) shows a constant and growing dynamic since 2001. A slight peak occurred in 2002 when the Sangatte centre was created. Two other, more significant peaks emerged in 2009, when the national authorities destroyed several illegal camps, and then in 2014, when the Jules-Ferry centre was created. The peak in 2015–2016 corresponds to the forced distribution of foreigners outside Calais (October-November 2015) and the destruction of the jungle (2016). Many migrants evacuated from Calais then settled in Paris, leading to the evacuation of around 2,000 foreigners from the Porte de la Chapelle in 2017. At the same time, other foreigners resettled in Calais, leading to the emergence of a 'New Jungle', still in the spotlight today. The Eurotunnel event is thus the prelude to a strong governmental intervention and comes at the height of the 'migration crisis' of the 2010s.

GRAPH 6. Eurotunnel: press articles crossing the occurrences of 'Calais' and 'immigration' in France (Europresse)



WHERE: How do these successful narratives circulate from one medium to another?

Two parameters allow us to quantify the mutual citations between media:

1. A search of occurrences carried out by NVivo and including the list of the main French, English and American media (media present in the press and on television) (Appendix 17);
2. The list of URLs shared by each tweet (media present in Twitter).

The results in NVivo are then selected according to the context of the hits. When a tweet concerns the Twitter account of a media outlet (press, television, or radio), it is counted as this media and not as 'Twitter'. The 'press' also includes the online press. The result of this quantitative analysis is given below.

TABLE 5. Eurotunnel: mutual references between media

	PRESS IN...	TELEVISION IN...	RADIO IN...	TWITTER IN...
PRESS	9	3	0	0
TELEVISION	1	1	0	0
TWITTER	55	12	6	1

For Twitter, the associated elements are mainly articles (64 tweets) and images (63 tweets). 73 out of 74 URL links correspond to a media (11 from *Le Figaro*, 5 from BFM-TV, 5 from *20 Minutes*, 4 from *Valeurs Actuelles* and 4 from *Nouvel Obs*).

Again, the press is the most shared media and television is present in a significant proportion in Twitter. The press and, to a lesser extent, television are thus able to spread a narrative more easily than radio or Twitter.

WHO: Who carries these successful narratives?

The people most cited by the press, television and Twitter are mainly male politicians (especially the press) and male migrants (especially television). To a lesser extent, companies (notably Eurotunnel) and community activists are also very present in the three media.

The political parties of the politicians are relatively balanced between the left and the right. However, French politicians are slightly more left-wing and their British counterparts more right-wing because of the political parties in power in each country. Only the far left is not represented on either side of the Channel.

Twitter users are mainly journalists and media. Men dominate again, but the far right is more effaced than for the Nice attack.

Do the cases studied have a local, national, or international dimension?

The local or national dimension is measured using three variables: the format of the press (number of words and emotions), the 'Settings' and the place given to politicians (the greater the place of politicians, the more the event can be placed at national level).

Concerning the format, first, the number of words indicates that the local press (*La Voix du Nord*) uses a larger number of words than the national press (*Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*). Similarly, the local press uses a much more varied repertoire of emotions than the national press.

As regards 'Settings', the word 'Calais' is the first occurrence of the words searched. 'France' is very rarely mentioned.

Finally, regarding politicians, the average representation of politicians in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* is 54.6% for the Nice attack and 46.15% for the Eurotunnel. It is also 72.2% and 28.6% on Twitter for these two events respectively. This gap is less clear for television (20.8% and 18.9%).

For these three reasons, the Eurotunnel event may be considered as a local event.

Lastly, the international dimension is measured by two variables: the frames and the presence of foreign politicians. The first variable refers mainly to the 'press in the UK' frame which highlights the foreign press reaction to the event. The second variable shows that, in comparison with the Nice attack, the Eurotunnel event quote foreign politicians to a large extent (7.2% of foreign politicians among all politicians for the Nice attack, versus 50% for the Eurotunnel). The Eurotunnel thus has the particularity of being both a local and an international event.

2.3 The burkini controversy starting around 16 August 2016

The burkini controversy started slowly in the spring and summer of 2016 on social networks for various reasons: marketing of a burkini model by a major brand, a day organised in a water park where the two-piece swimming costume was banned, etc. Villeneuve-Loubet and Cannes were the first towns to issue an anti-burkini order – on 5 and 11 August 2016 respectively. *Libération* subsequently decided to cover the brawl of 13 August 2016 in Sisco, Corsica. During the brawl, villagers attacked a Muslim family who had allegedly privatised a Corsican beach. The presence of a burkini in this family is said to have partially escalated the conflict. As a result, the mayor of Sisco issued an 'anti-burkini' order on 16 August 2016. On 26 August 2016, the Council of State annulled the Villeneuve-Loubet order. As its decision was to apply to other municipal orders in France, this administrative body thus relaunched the controversy.

This debate should be seen in the context of four other disputes about the Islamic veil in France: the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools, universities and companies, and the wearing of the full veil in the public space. Regarding schools, firstly, a controversy started in 1989 when the principal of a secondary school excluded three young girls because of their headscarf. Several schools took similar initiatives, but some were overturned by the courts. In 2004, a law (see references) finally banned the veil – and other 'ostentatious' signs – in public schools. Since 2005–2006, another controversy, still

ongoing, concerns the wearing of the Islamic headscarf during extracurricular activities and parents' meetings. This debate usually concerns accompanying mothers.

Secondly, at the same time, there was also a debate about the full veil in public spaces and while driving. A law was finally adopted in 2010 (see references), creating a double offence: the requirement by a third party that a woman wear the full veil and the concealment of the face in public space. France is thus the first country in Europe to ban the full veil.

Thirdly, concerning the private sector, the Baby-Loup kindergarten case (2010–2014) was highly publicised. This event pitted the employee of a crèche against her employer – the Baby-Loup crèche. The employee was dismissed because she wore a full veil during working hours. In 2013, the Court of Cassation ruled in favour of the employee. But despite this decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed the dismissal. A new appeal to the Court of Cassation was finally rejected and the Court of Cassation finally validated the dismissal. In 2013, the then Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls (Socialist Party), also awarded the medal of merit to the director of the Baby Loup crèche to show his support. The position of this minister contributed to a strong split in his own left-wing party.

Finally, a last controversy concerns the veil at university. This controversy began in the early 2000s and was revived in 2013 following proposals for reforms to ban it. The controversy was revived following the 2015 attacks but was not followed up by policy measures. The veil is therefore still allowed at university in France. In 2016, Manuel Valls declared himself once again opposed to the veil at university and to the burkini – further dividing the Socialist Party. The burkini controversy is thus part of a series of controversies that began in the late 1980s on the veil.

The literature on the burkini in France does not always cross-reference this topic with that of immigration. One exception is an article that analyses the political sphere's view of immigration based on the burkini debate (Hackett 2018). Among other articles, one of them analyses the link between antisemitism and Islamophobia in the political discourses around the burkini and the 2015 attacks (Katz 2018). Others question the rhetoric and arguments of judicial decisions on the legality of anti-burkini orders (Hervieu 2016; Van der Tol 2018; Nielson 2020). Some also study the English-language media treatment of the controversy (Sommier 2019) and its visual coverage by major news agencies (Bowe, Gosen, and Fahmy 2019) and by artists (Berg and Lundahl 2016). Others, finally, examine the polemic in the light of neocolonialism (Brayson 2019), neo-republicanism (Chabal 2017) and secularism (Baldi 2018). In this sense, no study seems to focus on the media treatment of the burkini in France.

a) Representation: Main, collateral, and counter-narratives in traditional and social media

Main genre

As the burkini is a controversy, there are no factual press articles of the 'Course of events' type, unlike what was observed for the first two events. The simple factual references concern the 'anti-burkini' municipal orders, the few fines that resulted from them and the Council of State order that relaunched the controversy on 26 August 2016. Each article is thus a summary of contrasting opinions and is usually of 'analysis' type. On the other hand, it is possible to make a distinction according to the attention paid to the burkini in each of the articles. The latter are thus classified according to whether or not they devote more than half of their text to this controversy. In total, 18 articles can be classified as 'Burkini in the majority' and 33 as 'Burkini in the minority'.

The burkini is thus an event that is evoked but not fully treated. It is a phenomenon on which the actors must position themselves for or against, but no story allows us to follow this event chronologically. Compared to the two previous events, where the majority of articles focused on the Nice attack or the Eurotunnel, the burkini contrasts in that it is only occasionally mentioned in the articles.

As for television, the burkini is always at the heart of the newscast. The category 'Burkini in the minority' cannot therefore be applied here. Nonetheless, the 'Course of events' category can be used for some sequences (2 for TF1 and 3 for France 2). The 'Course of events' sequences on TF1 only concern the Sisco brawl and do not openly declare themselves in favour or against the burkini. The France 2 sequences relate to the Council of State's decision: they specify, upstream, the questions that this supreme court will have to decide and, downstream, the consequences of this decision on the anti-burkini bans and the legal proceedings against towns that have maintained these bans. The other sequences, of the 'Analysis' type (9 on TF1 and 9 on France 2), always give the arguments in favour or against this garment. Within this category, two TF1 sequences stand out because they have no equivalent on France 2. The editorialist, Christophe Jakubyszyn, is thus invited twice on the TF1 set to summarise, in detail, the position of each camp. For example, he gives the following summary:

> [T]his debate which, as you say, divides French society, well, transcends the political divisions. There are two camps, two visions of French secularism. On the one hand, there are those who are convinced that the burkini, just like the full veil at the time, is a provocation, a proselytism. In this camp, we find Nicolas Sarkozy [right-wing] as well as Manuel Valls [left-wing] (…) And then in the other camp, there are those who, even if they too are often shocked by the instrumentalisation of women's bodies and the sexism conveyed by the burkini, they do not want a secularism that would hunt down Muslims, whether they are moderate or radical. Among them, Alain JUPPÉ [right-wing] (…)(,) Marisol Touraine [left-wing] or Najat Vallaud-Belkacem [left-wing] (…). (TF1, 2016b)

Finally, for Twitter, the main genre consists, as before, of the following three categories: 'Commentary' tweets, 'Event' tweets (media) and 'Reaction' tweets (public figure). A single tweet can have two to three different categories. The chronological distribution of tweets is given in Appendix 30. The controversy thus started on 16 and 17 August 2016 with a wide sharing of 'Events'. It then subsided and then started up again with the decision of the Council of State on 26 August 2016. This second peak is, this time, by comments and reactions. The first peak corresponds, more precisely, to the sharing of a single article in *Le Monde* indicating that the foreign media are making fun of the burkini controversy in France (*Le Monde* 2016a). The Sisco brawl is therefore not covered. The second peak reports strong criticism of the Council of State.

In total, 108 tweets are of the 'comment' type (compared to 40 'Events' and 17 'Reactions'). A polemic therefore exists on Twitter for the Nice attack and the burkini. Regarding the Eurotunnel, it is difficult to affirm that there is no controversy on this event in view of the methodological biases observed above on the search hits used to collect the data.

Settings

The 'settings' are objects and places. They are classified into five categories:

1. Clothing ('swimming costume', 'burqa', etc.);
2. Adjectives and expressions describing such clothing ('Islamic', 'Islamist', 'religious signs', etc.);
3. Legal terms ('State Council', 'decision', 'arrêté', etc.);
4. Places ('Corsica', 'beach', 'border', 'France', 'republic', etc.);
5. Other settings ('photos', 'knife', etc.).

The search for 'Settings' follows the methodology used for the first two events. The same search hits are therefore used for press and television. The result is given by the word clouds in Appendix 31 (press) and Appendix 32 (television).

Firstly, regarding the location, 'France' is the main focus of the press and, to a lesser extent, of television. The national dimension of the event is therefore not as important as for the Nice attack, but it exists all the same. Thus, for the press, and even for television, the burkini touches, a priori, on the definition of

the national body and on republican values – the 'republican' issue being presented above all in the press (as for the Nice attack).

Moreover, the Sisco brawl is favoured by the press but not by television. The press thus highlights the controversy through anecdotes and very diverse opinions, while television confines itself to the legal aspect.

Regarding clothing, the veil and the burqa are the two most cited by the press and television. On the one hand, the burkini reopens the debate on the wearing of the veil in the public space, especially in the press. On the other hand, it is generally recalled that the burkini is the contraction of the expressions 'burqa' and 'bikini'.

As well, the press uses a wide repertoire to describe, more generally, Islamic dresses ('hidjab', 'niqab', 'jilbeb', 'chams', 'gandoura', etc.). This vocabulary gives the impression of a colonisation of French by the Arabic language. The negative view of this dress in the press is also demonstrated by the greater use of the adjective 'Islamist' compared to television.

Lastly, unlike television, the Council of State's decision is not the priority of the press. The legal dimension of these newscasts is also supported by the importance given to municipal orders in this medium. This focus on the Council of State's decision in the newscasts confirms the editorial line of TF1 and France 2, which considers that the Council of State's decision puts an end to this 'legal' controversy. This view is not shared by the press and Twitter which extended the debate beyond the Council of State's decision. In this sense, television abruptly stops its coverage on 29 August – before the press and Twitter.

Characters

The people listed here are the same as the previous categories with some modifications:

1. The 'Activist' category is heterogeneous and includes trade unionists, Islamic terrorists, and Corsican nationalists.
2. Most legal texts concern court decisions (several administrative courts and the supreme administrative court which is the Council of State).
3. The NGOs are mainly Muslim associations (Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France, Conseil français du culte musulman, Fédération des musulmans du sud, Union des mosquées de France, etc.).

Four other categories are also created:

1. 'Artists' can be actors, comedians, architects, etc. Writers are labelled as such if they do not speak out on the burkini;
2. 'Journalists' refers to journalists interviewed independently of their professional media (Caroline Fourest, Saïd Djaffar, Mathieu Gallet, a manager of the Best Image agency, etc.);
3. 'Lawyers' do not speak on behalf of an organisation that is otherwise named (in which case they are attached to the category of that organisation);
4. Finally, the 'sportsmen' are not always professional and are involved in a wide variety of sports (football, chess and boxing).

The breakdown of this classification by gender is given in Appendix 33. The data correspond to the number of people mentioned in a single article, TV sequence or tweet. The table reveals several elements:

1. For all three events, politicians are by far the most cited category for the national press. However, the proportions vary from one event to another: whereas the Nice attack mobilised this category in a consistent manner, with about 50% for *Le Monde* and 60% for *Le Figaro*, the picture is more mixed for

the Eurotunnel crossings (34% and 58% respectively) and the burkini (36% and 32%). The national dimension of the attack is thus confirmed once again by the word given to these politicians.

2. Experts are visibly valued. *Le Figaro* stands out here by the attention it gives them. On the other hand, for the three journals, these experts are often very far from the subject ('La Boétie', 'Louis Aragon', 'Montesquieu', 'Spinoza', 'Étienne Klein', 'abbé Sieyès', 'Saint-Just', etc.). Thus, those expressing themselves in the press do not seek to understand the burkini phenomenon: they position themselves directly and justify their position with the help of 'non-expert' experts.
3. Artists are also very present in *Le Monde*, but this is more of a bias caused by a single article that has little interest in the burkini but mentions them on a festival (the third edition of the '*Monde* Festival') (Cojean and Baudet 2016).
4. For the three events, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* still have the particularity of not being interested in 'individuals' compared to the other newspapers (*La Croix, Nice-Matin, La Voix du Nord* and *Libération*).
5. Television favours 'individuals' for the Nice attack (58% and 45% respectively for TF1 and France 2) and the Eurotunnel (33% and 53% respectively). On the other hand, it prefers to interview politicians for the burkini to show, no doubt, the presence of a national controversy.
6. As with the Eurotunnel, TF1 greatly values the voice of NGOs compared to France 2.
7. Regarding the gender, of the three events, the 'individual' category is the only one that allows women to be visible by being placed on an equal footing with men. Only the Nice attack and the burkini slightly promote women (about 60%).
8. Politicians are still very male in all three events. The Nice attack is the one that mobilises the most male politicians by far.
9. In all other categories, women are largely 'overwhelmed' by the male presence. A journalist from *Le Monde* (interviewed on the burkini) also believes that women are often absent from the people quoted – especially when they are not interviewed as 'individuals'. But she also insists on the difficulty women have in feeling legitimate to give their point of view as an expert:

> We set up an editorial committee specifically for this because we noticed that there were more men quoted in the articles and more men in the columns. (…) women researchers… (…) the women, each time, tell me 'I am not competent to speak'. [FR_I_2]

This member from the Information Department of France 2 observes the same phenomenon among the 'knowers' ('*sachants*' in French):

> There are too many know-it-alls. In particular, too many white, male, over-50-year-old know-it-alls. [FR_I_6]

This male journalist from *Le Monde* (Eurotunnel) considers, for his part, that he is concerned about balancing the representation between women and men since the Me-Too movement:

> I interview many more men than women. That's a certainty, especially in economics. I'm now aware of this, I wasn't really aware of it for a long time (…).
> (When did you become aware of this?)
> Five or six years ago. The MeToo wave is how many years old? [FR_I_5]

Women account for about 70% of individuals interviewed on television – a much higher proportion than in the press (55%). They also represent 19% of the individuals quoted (excluding legal text). Unlike TF1, all the women quoted by France 2 are in favour of the burkini, in the name of 'freedom of choice'[13]: 'I

13. The expression is notably used by the Australian Aheda ZANETTI, creator of the burkini in 2004, during a newscast (TF1, 2016c).

don't go against my convictions and at the same time I don't go against my own pleasures (…) there are colours, it's flashy (…) it's rather coquettish, it's fashionable (…) I don't see it as radical but as modern (…) it's not at all a provocation' (France 2, 2016a), 'You shouldn't see it as a model that we're trying to import from I don't know which country in the Middle East. (…) The burkini should not be seen as a sign of provocation (…) It is really a personal act (…) Women fought for this country, for its freedoms (…) They also fought so that today women can choose their clothing' (France 2, 2016a), 'It's a shame to force a Muslim woman to undress in public' (France 2, 2016b)[14], 'It's supposed to be a free country, they should do what they want' (France 2, 2016b).

In comparison, the comments against the burkini by 'individuals' are rarer. They come exclusively from two women (first two excerpts) and one man (last excerpt): 'I think he [the mayor] wanted to do this [anti-burkini order] to avoid provocation or things on the beach that could be a pretext for violence' (TF1, 2016a), 'If we think about women's rights, it [the burkini] is a bit of a step backwards' (TF1, 2016a), 'Let's not be naïve about the symbol of this garment. There is no shame in condemning Islamist extremism and blocking its path by all legal means' (France 2, 2016a). These women are thus selected to mitigate the malicious discourse against Muslims. This moderate position of women on television contrasts with the view of *Le Monde* according to one of its journalists:

> we wouldn't write an editorial saying we were pro-burkini, for example. You see, we can write an editorial to say that we are pro-Charlie (…) [We are] rather suspicious of religions, which are nevertheless an instrument of oppression. [FR_I_2]

The last table in Appendix 34 highlights the partisan distribution of politicians cited in the three media. Unlike previous events where the differences in partisan representation between media were small, the differences are more marked here. Compared to TF1, France 2 accentuates here the important place that the channel already gave to the right and the far right during the Nice attack. However, the channel has the particularity of also highlighting the left – which was not the case for the two previous events.

As for the Eurotunnel, the left is also listened to because of the political colour of the government (Socialist Party). *Libération* prioritises the voice of the left and the extreme left, which is in line with its leftist position. Over the three events, the political difference does not exist for *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde,* although these two newspapers are traditionally presented as being on different sides (right and centre-left).

The left and right abroad are relatively equally represented. However, the foreign far left is never listened to. As with the Nice attack, Twitter once again favours the word of the far right.

Finally, the tweets were classified according to the category of Twitter users. This category was determined as before. This classification highlights 86 individuals, 32 journalists (and media) and 30 politicians (including 6 former MEPs, 1 parliamentary assistant, 1 political adviser to the European Parliament, 1 director of cabinet and 1 former elected representative) – as well as 1 company, 1 NGO, 1 think tank and 3 accounts that no longer exist. It would appear that there are 77 men and 23 women (30 'unclear' and 24 'not applicable'). Many accounts support a former far-right presidential candidate: Éric Zemmour. The most diffused accounts are those of Jean-Yves Le Gallou (6 tweets, far-right politician), one journalist (3), Elisabeth Lévy (3, editorial director of Causeur, far-right news website), one individual supporting Emmanuel Macron (3) and one far-right activist advocating for remigration (3).

14. This extract refers to a woman who was forced to undress in Nice by four police officers. Photographs show her taking off her top and putting on a tank top. The information was picked up overnight by the international press and the hashtag #WTF-France (What the fuck France) was created.

Emotional tone

The emotions are distributed for press and television in Appendix 35. Compared to the two previous events, the absence of emotions ('neutral') is rare for the burkini controversy. The range of emotions used is also wider and this time includes a new kind of emotion: irony ('amused', 'critical', 'ironic' and 'mocking'). This new category of emotions is also present in Twitter, which counts the following emotions: 'Anger' (51), 'Critical' (35), 'Little anger' (26), 'Neutral' (12), 'Ironic' (11), 'Cynical' (10), 'Amused' (5), 'Worried' (3) and 'Little sadness' (1).

As for the two previous events, *Le Figaro* is again focused on anger and combativeness ('Anger', 'Bellicose', 'Confrontation', 'Critical', 'Disappointment', 'Mocking'). This type of emotion is distilled more in the other two dailies.

For all three events, too, the absence of emotions ('neutral') is rare on television. Newscasts once again emphasise anger, fear and compassion, but to a lesser degree here. In contrast to the Nice attack, television emotions are varied for the Eurotunnel and the burkini. The shock of the attack is undoubtedly at the origin of more 'raw' emotions on the part of the individuals interviewed by the television channels.

Formats

The format of the press is specified in Appendix 36. The formats used for this controversy are less varied than for the two previous events (no editorials, no 'zoom/in brief'). They also are evenly distributed by newspaper and chronologically. This tends to confirm its status: this controversy is mentioned, but not treated. It is notably mentioned in the op-ed and interviews, without being at the heart of the text ('Burkini in the minority'). Thus, compared to the two previous events, the number of interviews and op-eds is substantial compared to other 'national news' type articles. Journalists (op-ed) and respondents (interviews) are therefore implicitly asked to take a position on the burkini (or take a position by themselves). The 'national news' articles, which are few in number, also take a certain distance from this controversy ('Burkini in the minority') by limiting themselves to the position of the politicians Similarly, as with the two previous events, anger ('Anger' and 'Bellicose') and exhortations are the emotions that mark the op-ed more, especially at *Le Figaro*.

Finally, as for the Nice attack, *Le Figaro* devoted the most words to the subject (21,154 words, compared to 16,649 for *Libération* and 14,958 for *Le Monde*). These figures are close to those of the Nice attack but are less than those of the Eurotunnel: the latter event is therefore relatively neglected.

The newscasts format is now given in the Appendix 37. The four variables are the same as before: 'studio' (onset interview), 'with footage' (anchorperson's words illustrated), 'live' (live interview) and 'edited' (report with voice-over). While reports ('edited') are favoured before the Council of State decision, interviews with journalists ('live' and 'studio') are much more dominant in the commentary surrounding this administrative decision. This may help to explain why anger dominates the early stages of the controversy ('edited'), while the absence of emotions ('neutral') is more prevalent closer to the Council of State decision ('live' and 'studio').

On 26 August 2016 – the day of the Council of State decision – seven sequences were broadcast on average at 8:02 p.m. This result is slightly higher than the Eurotunnel peak (five sequences at 8:01 p.m.) but well below that of the Nice attack (twenty-two sequences at 8:11 p.m. and two special editions at 6 p.m.). The priority given by television to this subject is therefore low and is comparable to that of the Eurotunnel.

Main frames

As before, the frames define themes, as defined by Robert Entman (1993), and are determined in two stages (double reading and then search for occurrences). They are defined below.

TABLE 6. Burkini: description of frames

FRAME	DESCRIPTION	HITS
AGAINST MIGRANTS	The burkini is a false problem: the real problem is immigration	migr* OR étranger* OR clandestin*
ARREST IN NICE	A woman was summoned to remove part of her clothing under threat of being fined on a beach in Nice	'se déshabiller' OR 'plage de Nice' OR 'photo' OR 'image' OR 'policiers municipaux' OR arrestation* OR Carras
ASSIMILATION	Assimilation (or integration) is opposed to communitarianism (or multiculturalism)	'identité nationale' OR républicain* OR intégration OR assimilation OR 'l'assimilation' OR 'd'assimilation' OR cohésion OR séparatisme
AUTHORISE BURKINI	The burkini must be allowed	autoris* OR interdi* OR inutile
BAN BURKINI	The burkini must be banned	autoris* OR interdi* OR inutile
BAN BURQA IN PUBLIC SPACE	The full veil is banned in public spaces	burqa OR 'voile intégral'
BAN VEIL IN PUBLIC SERVICE	The veil is banned in the civil service	'fonction publique' OR 'service public'
COMMU-NITARIANISM	Communitarianism (or multiculturalism) is opposed to assimilation (or integration)	multiculturel* OR métissage OR métissé* OR 'vivre-ensemble' OR sécession OR communautarisme OR multiculturalisme
FOR MIGRANTS	Immigrants must be protected, immigration must be encouraged	migr* OR étranger* OR clandestin*
GREAT REPLACEMENT	French civilisation is disappearing	remplac* OR substitution OR démographi* OR défrancisation OR homogénéi*
INTERNATIONAL BACKLASH	Foreign media are surprised by this controversy	ambassade OR hashtag OR fuck OR Allemagne OR 'Royaume-Uni' OR 'Grande-Bretagne' OR Italie OR tabloid* OR tabloïd* OR presse OR télévision OR 'New York' OR BBC OR journal OR journaux OR quotidien OR quotidiens
JIHAD	The burkini is the manifestation of a conquering Islam	prosélyt* OR guerrier OR djihad OR jihad OR offensi* OR djihadist* OR colonisat* OR drapeau OR conquérant*
ORIGIN	Birth and diffusion of the burkini and its introduction in France	invent* OR Australie OR Zanetti
POLITICAL DIVISIONS	There is a strong national controversy	polémique OR contredit OR 'se déchire' OR cacophonie OR désaveu OR désaccord OR désaccords OR fracture OR divergence OR divergences OR divis* OR clivage OR clivages
RADICALISATION	The radicalisation of Muslims must be avoided	'islam radical' OR 'islam politique' OR fondamentalisme OR fondamentaliste OR fondamentalistes OR islamiste OR islamistes OR radicalisme OR radicalisation OR charia OR salafisme OR salafistes

SECULARISM	Is the burkini compatible with secularism?	laïci*
SISCO	Evocation of the brawl in Sisco	rixe OR Corse OR sisco
STATE COUNCIL RIGHT	The Council of State's decision is just or legitimate	'Conseil d'Etat' OR 'Conseil d'Etat' OR 'Conseil d'État' OR 'Conseil d'État'
STATE COUNCIL WRONG	The Council of State's decision is incomprehensible or illegitimate	'Conseil d'Etat' OR 'Conseil d'Etat' OR 'Conseil d'État' OR 'Conseil d'État'
TERRORISM	The debate on the burkini is part of the debate on terrorism	terrori* OR attentat*
VEIL AT SCHOOL	The veil is banned in schools	'l'école' OR élève* OR 'l'école' OR écoles OR fillettes
WOMEN FREE	Women are free to wear, or not, the burkini	'liberté individuelle' OR libres OR pudeur OR 'choix individuels'
WOMEN OPPRESSED	Women are forced to wear the burkini	'd'oppression' OR 'l'oppression' OR oppression* OR opprimée* OR asservie* OR 'l'asservissement*' OR 'd'asservissement*' OR asservissement* OR sexis* OR régression OR archaïque OR patriarcat OR machis* OR rétrograde OR soumis* OR tutelle OR aliénation

These frames are now divided by newspaper in Appendix 38. The table reveals several elements:

1. One of the most visible results is undoubtedly the parallel drawn between the burkini and terrorism. This link is only found in the interview of three national press journalists (*Le Monde, Libération* and *Le Figaro,* all on the burkini):

   > (Why was there this controversy at the time?)
   > Well, it's directly linked to the attacks because it happens… it happens in particular after the Nice attack [of 2016]. [FR_I_2]
   > the Nice attack [of 2016] was a big trauma that came after the 2015 attacks, after Charlie Hebdo. So it's a kind of… it comes on the tail of a comet (…) Society's nerves were on edge on these issues. [FR_I_3]
   > (How would you explain that it was a media peak at that time?)
   > Well, that's what I'm telling you, it's because there was both the context of the Nice and Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray attacks. [FR_I_8]

2. Another clear result is the difference between 'pro' and 'anti' migrants. *Le Monde* and, to a lesser extent, *Libération*, present pro-migrant views. Conversely, *Le Figaro* highlights anti-migrant views and does not present any pro-migrant articles.
3. *Le Figaro* has the highest number of articles that want to legally ban the burkini, but the gap with the other two dailies is smaller than for migrants. *Libération,* on the other hand, gives considerable prominence to opinions that do not wish to legally ban the burkini, without showing any enthusiasm for the garment.
4. Communitarianism is generally described by *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* as a model to be fought, unlike *Libération*, which questions the usefulness of assimilationism in France but does not openly oppose it.
5. *Le Monde* usually just insists on the existence of a controversy but does not really enter into it. The newspaper's frames are thus less numerous compared to the other two.
6. *Le Figaro* refers more systematically to the existing law: the burqa is banned in the public space and the veil is illegal in the public service and in schools. The articles generally welcome these bans.

7. The Sisco brawl was not a major event for the press, but it is still very present in *Libération*, which covered it even before the burkini controversy began.
8. *Le Figaro* focuses more on articles opposed to the Council of State's decision, notably because of the presence of the State Councillor, Thierry Thuot, who is accused of being an 'immigrationist' in favour of communitarianism. The same newspaper promotes the conspiracy theory of the 'great replacement'.
9. The international criticism of this controversy is relatively denied in all three newspapers.
10. Finally, for all three newspapers, women are generally considered to be subservient to their communities and not free to choose.

The harshest comments about migrants are once again found in *Le Figaro* and on Twitter. Some articles in *Le Figaro* take offence at the visibility that Islam is allegedly offering itself: 'Islamists who are always demanding more visibility and accommodation' (Rioufol 2016c); 'a fierce desire on the part of Muslims to impose their presence, their visibility' (Levet 2016). These articles thus conceive this garment as the mark of a 'political' Islam[15] (Levet 2016; Lombard-Latune 2016), that is, according to them, conquering: 'those who pretend to behave like a conquered land' (Rioufol 2016c); 'Islam dominating and conquering' (Rioufol 2016b); 'progressively nibbling away at the territory' (Finkielkraut 2016); 'Islamic and warrior uniform' (Rioufol 2016a); 'political aggressions of the burkini or burqa type' (Ferry 2016).

The conquering character of Islam is sometimes expressed in metaphors that generally evoke Nazism and Fascism – thus allowing these journalists to reverse the attacks on them. Islam would thus be a 'Foul Beast' (*bête immonde*) (Rioufol 2016c)—a metaphor generally used to designate the far right. Ivan Rioufol thus mentions an 'Islamic totalitarianism', a 'totalitarian and conquering ideology' (Rioufol 2016c) as well as a 'totalitarian hold' of Islam (Rioufol 2016b). Another, more subtle metaphor is also used by Alain Finkielkraut who contrasts the individualism of the bikini with the holism of the burqa and the burkini: 'The bikini is the emblem of societies that value the individual human being above all else. The burqa, on the other hand, manifests the primacy of society as a whole over each of its members taken in isolation. When we talk about the burkini, we pretend that this opposition between holism and individualism does not exist' (Finkielkraut 2016). Finkielkraut's holism can be understood as a form of attenuated totalitarianism affecting the privacy of individuals.

The visibility of Islam would thus contribute to 'disfiguring the national landscape'. (Levet 2016): 'Islam is attacking France' (Rioufol 2016c). Using the words of Jean-Pierre Chevènement (Alimi 2016), these same articles invite Muslims to show 'discretion', even if it means having to 'bend over backwards, in pain' (Rioufol 2016c). Muslims are thus asked to keep a 'low profile' (Lombard-Latune 2016). 'Paying allegiance' (Rioufol 2016c) to the nation would thus mean suppressing any 'sign of community belonging' contrary to 'our customs' and 'morals', such as the veil (Levet 2016). An opposition is thus constructed between, on the one hand, this Muslim population, showered with 'generous (…) public subsidies' and, on the other, the 'native French' ('*Français de souche*') (Jaigu 2016). The notion of 'native French' is a controversial expression, favoured by the extreme right, and designating people with no foreign origin or whose foreign origins are distant.

The French are thus asked to show 'ethnocentrism' (Jaigu 2016). In this sense, there is no point in denouncing 'Islamophobic acts' by placing oneself 'at the service of the conqueror' (Rioufol 2016c). It is also useless 'to denounce the "stigmatisation" of which Muslims in France are allegedly victims' (Lombard-Latune 2016). Again, there are no 'supposed faults of France' (Jaigu 2016) nor 'alleged Islamophobia' (Lombard-Latune 2016). 'Conflation' has thus become a 'buzzword' (Jaigu 2016) for

15. Political Islam is generally a term used by the far right to refer to a colonising movement. On the other hand, it is also used by non-jihadist movements with the aim of building a Muslim community (ummah) of solidarity and peace (see, e.g., Burgat [2016]).

'humanists' and other 'anti-racists' (Rioufol 2016c) – representatives of a 'progressivism' fascinated by the 'new, necessarily exotic, man' (Rioufol 2016b). This so-called 'fascination for minorities' (Rioufol 2016c) also affects feminists, who are allegedly focused on the domination of the 'white male' alone (Rioufol 2016b), i.e., 'White European Males' (in English in the text) (Finkielkraut 2016).

It would be therefore necessary to stop 'the invasion programmed in the name of human rights'. (Rioufol 2016b). Ivan Rioufol thus makes the 'double observation of a population substitution and a de-franchising' (*défrancisation*). He thus defines Renaud Camus's 'great replacement' as a 'demographic and religious phenomenon in progress' (Rioufol 2016a). This conspiracy theory asserts that a political, media and intellectual elite would voluntarily organise, for ideological or economic reasons, the replacement of the French population by a non-European population. Another journalist also asks: 'Do we still love our customs enough to defend them against all attempts to replace them?' (Levet 2016). Alain Finkielkraut also regrets, without saying so openly, the Arabisation of the French language: 'we have now learned all about ummah, Sharia, fitna, jahiliya, Salafism, Wahhabism, hijab, niqab, abaya and, of course, jihad. Burkini is the latest of these disturbing terms that have become familiar' (Finkielkraut 2016).

Le Figaro op-eds thus offer a coherent but sometimes very simplifying, even infantilising, account, as shown, for example, by this extract from Ivan RIOUFOL: 'Smoke and mirrors and disinformation have reached such a level that it remains difficult to make the most permeable to false thinking understand that they are facing a new totalitarianism, protected by countless useful idiots who see the most conquering as victims to be helped' (Rioufol 2016a). This narrative contributes to the imaginary construction of two opposing peoples: the first would be a victim to be protected ('native French'), the second an evil aggressor (the Muslims). The heroes would thus correspond to people who slow down or wish to slow down immigration.

A journalist from *Libération* considers, for example, that the opinion articles in *Le Figaro* have contributed to a radical change in the newspaper's editorial line:

> Figaro Vox has completely transformed Le Figaro.
> (And even on paper?)
> Yes, in fact, Le Figaro, the newspaper, became 'Figaro Voxer'. (…) It has somewhat phagocyted the rest of the newspaper. (…) Our 'idea' pages are very often written by researchers. (…) So they are really less inflammatory than those of Le Figaro. [FR_I_3]

This journalist from *Le Monde* (Eurotunnel) also agrees:

> All I can tell you without the slightest doubt that there are a certain number of articles published in the opinion pages of Le Figaro that would never be published in Le Monde. (…) My friends at Le Figaro are not very comfortable with this. (…). There is an ideological drift at Le Figaro, full stop. It's unfortunate because there are plenty of good journalists. [FR_I_5]

Indeed, this journalist from *Le Figaro* says she is not comfortable with some of the newspaper's opinion articles, which are, according to her, 'very ideologised'.

> in recent years there's a whole generation of young journalists at Le Figaro who have been recruited and who clearly have an opinion. (…) Who in fact don't even go through the reporting stage (…) Yes, young people. And then some of them are very ideologised. (…) Very harsh, yes, about migrants, yes, I know. (…) [I]t's a complete caricature. [FR_I_8]

This unease is also shared internally, at *Le Figaro*, according to the same journalist. She also mentions the internal unease within the editorial staff when Éric Zemmour – then a journalist at *Le Figaro* – ran for the presidential election.

> there were plenty of anonymous testimonies and journalists [from Le Figaro] who said that this turn to the right was not necessarily well received. Or maybe there were also a lot of internal debates and exchanges between the unions, the SDJ [Society of Journalists – an association of journalists formed within an editorial staff] and the editorial management with the candidacy of Zemmour.
> (And who said what internally?)
> Well, they said that his status should already be clear because at the beginning he was still a journalist at Le Figaro. [FR_I_8]

The same journalist also mentions the case of a press article, of the 'reportage' type, which was refused by *Le Figaro*. According to this journalist, this article, probably about the Roma, was too left-wing oriented regarding the editorial line of the newspaper.

> People know the editorial policy and they stick to it. Afterwards, it's funny because one summer a freelancer came and did something about the Roma or whatever and it was really a paper… Well, a paper, as we say, which was not 'Figaro', which would have been more 'Libé'. He was surprised because in the end it didn't get through.
> (Was it an opinion piece, or rather a reportage?)
> Not at all. It was a reportage. [FR_I_8]

According to this journalist from *Le Monde* (Nice attack), *Le Figaro* would even go so far as to propagate extreme right-wing ideas, even royalist ones:

> It is under the impulse of Alexis Brézet and especially of Vincent Trémolet de Villers who is his right-hand man. Figaro Vox is really the baby of Vincent Trémolet de Villers, who is the son of Jacques Trémolet de Villers, a former close friend of Jean-Marie Le Pen [far right]. Vincent Trémolet (…) has his own school of thought which, in my opinion, is close to the Maurrasian right [Charles Maurras, founder of Action Française – a far-right nationalist and royalist political movement]. (…) This is the line they want to carry, so they see Le Figaro as the flagship of this mission they have set themselves. [FR_I_7]

Moreover, the journalist from *Le Figaro*, who felt that the newspaper's 'ideologised' younger generation, does not hesitate to talk about the attacks 'from the Islamo-leftist movement' to which she is subjected. This term of Islamo-leftism, which is highly contested, implies a proximity between the political and associative left and Islamic or even Islamist circles. The term has been used mainly by the far right. Thus, the excerpt from this *Figaro* journalist, below, shows two things: on the one hand, the ability of the far right to disseminate its own vocabulary in the public space and, on the other, the embarrassment of this journalist in using this expression that she considers to be both convenient and illegitimate.

> When I am attacked, it is rather on these subjects. I know we can't use the word, but attacks that come from the Islamo-leftist movement. You see what I mean without wanting to use the term. [FR_I_8]

A little later in the interview, the same journalist from *Le Figaro* uses another highly contested expression from the extreme right: that of 'native French' ('*Français de souche*'):

> In the testimonies, there is no desire to say 'I'm going to interview a native Frenchman and a person of immigrant background equally' what. [FR_I_8]

The unease of some of *Le Figaro*'s journalists with regard to the ideological shift of the newspaper, mentioned above, can also be seen in three press articles (Dassonville 2021, Cassini and Dassonville 2021, Franque 2021).

For all three events, the authors of the press articles were relatively evenly divided between men and women (approximately 100 men and 80 women). This relative parity can be explained, according to the

press journalists, by chance. The division of labour between journalists is based on the following logic: whoever is present at the time of the event must cover it. Many journalists interviewed mentioned this division of labour and said more or less the following: 'I was at my post when the event happened, so I went there'.

In contrast, editorial and op-ed writers and interviewees are predominantly male (49 men and only 10 women) for the three events. Five figures stand out: Alain Finkielkraut (2 interviews), Christian Estrosi (3 interviews), Éric Ciotti (2 interviews), Ivan Rioufol (5 op-eds) and Vincent Trémolet De Villers (1 editorial and 1 op-ed).

This gender imbalance would be considered in the organisational chart of *Le Monde* according to one of its journalists (burkini):

> We have a very proactive policy. So today, not only are we 50/50 in terms of staff, but in the hierarchies… (…) [W]e have almost as many female heads as male heads. (…) there is still a salary gap every year. All the increases are essentially made by women to catch up. So today the gap is (…) I think it's 7%. (…) It's not the 20% in France. [FR_I_2]

This is confirmed by another journalist from *Le Monde* who also mentions the emails received internally inviting journalists to better balance the representation of men and women when quoting people. This journalist is not as high up in the hierarchy as the previous one.

> A reflection a little higher up in the strata of the newspaper. I'm not in the best position to talk about it, but on the idea of being careful, particularly when we give the floor to 'experts', to ensure that women's voices are heard, yes.
> (Were you asked to do this? [...] Is it at the reflection stage or have there been emails?)
> No no, there have been emails. Yes, yes. [FR_I_10]

However, a journalist from the Information Department of France 2 mentions the existence of a glass ceiling for women on his channel:

> women are in the majority at France Télévisions among press cards, slightly in the majority. (…) They have equal pay for equal work, but they are not equally represented in the wage bill because they are less represented in the hierarchy. [FR_I_6]

This glass ceiling would be even 'thicker' than that of male journalists with a non-European immigrant background according to the same journalist:

> Because people with an immigrant background are not victims of self-deprecation. But women do (…) I have really experienced it (…) That is, people who refuse to join the management while a red carpet is rolled out telling me 'No, I am not legitimate'. The impostor syndrome is mainly a female phenomenon (…) I don't have this with [men] of immigrant background. [FR_I_6]

Over the three events, the harshest comments about Muslims and migrants are written in *Le Figaro* (and Twitter) and mostly come from Alain Finkielkraut and Ivan Rioufol.

Ivan Rioufol has been in *Le Figaro* between 1985 and 2022 – date on which he left the newspaper. He was an editorial writer, member of the editorial board and holder of the bloc notes. He has written numerous essays since 2000. He is also present on the set of 'CNews' (far right) three times a week, according to his blog (Rioufol 2022), and was a columnist on the radio station 'RTL'. Ivan Rioufol's reactionary discourse has already made a name for itself in the social sciences, in the context of homosexual marriage (Cervulle 2013) and 'anti-white racism' (Merazka 2020) in particular.

Alain Finkielkraut has also written numerous books since the 1970s and has received many awards for them. He is an officer of the Legion of Honour, professor emeritus at the École Polytechnique, member of the Académie Française and presenter and producer of the weekly programme 'Répliques' on the radio station 'France Culture'. He is the author of several scientific articles and has also been linked by social science researchers to the notions of 'anti-white racism' (Laurent and Leclère 2013) and 'great replacement' (Héran 2017; Bancel, Blanchard, and Boubeker 2015).

Ivan Rioufol and Alain Finkielkraut thus benefit from a relative social notoriety and valuable institutional positions to legitimise their statements and maintain themselves in the media.

Moreover, compared to interviews, editorials, and news articles ('National news' and 'Local news'), *Le Figaro*'s op-eds are, by far, the ones that propagate hate speech against immigrants and Muslims in quantity. Such hostility is absent from other newspapers and television. Other op-ed writers at *Le Figaro* can also be singled out for the radicalism of their comments. Charles Jaigu, for example, previously worked at the right-wing newspaper *Le Point* and joined *Le Figaro* in 2005. He temporarily participated in a column on France inter in 2014–2015. Similarly, Bérénice Levet is a member of the think tank 'Institut Thomas-More' (right-wing) and has published several books since 2006. Her reactionary statements have been little contested in the social sciences (Raison du Cleuziou 2017; Habib 2020). Finally, Marie-Amélie Lombard-Latune was a journalist at *Le Figaro* between 1989 and 2019. She left the daily newspaper in the latter year to join the newspaper *L'Opinion.* Overall, Charles Jaigu and Marie-Amélie Lombard-Latune are of little interest to researchers. The op-ed thus offers these journalists, who are less protected institutionally, a space for expression.

The table in Appendix 39 shows the distribution of frames for television. The differences between the two TV channels are again very small:

1. France 2 places more emphasis on the 'pro' and 'anti' burkini testimonies, whereas TF1 is more interested in highlighting the existence of a controversy without allowing these testimonies to be expressed.
2. France 2 puts more emphasis on the confrontation between assimilationist and communitarian models.
3. Where TF1 has moderate views on the degree of subjugation of women, France 2 is more likely to see them as submissive to their community.
4. Compared to the press, terrorism is virtually absent from television – offering the image of a more measured, even less dramatic polemic.
5. The highly theoretical opposition between communitarianism and assimilationism is also much less present on television, no doubt because of its complexity.
6. The link with immigration is also more distant in the newscasts.
7. Finally, the theory of the 'great replacement' is absent and the parallel drawn between the burkini and the jihad is very limited.

This member from the Information Department of France 2 may explain, in part, this difference with the press concerning the absence of a link between the burkini, on the one hand, and terrorism, the great replacement and jihad, on the other: television, to keep its audience rating, is trying to reduce the anxiety-provoking nature of its information.

> Immigration often gives rise to images that are anxiety-provoking. But contrary to what many people think, we are not looking for anxiety. If we did, we would get lower ratings. [FR_I_6]

The distribution of frames is now given in Appendix 40 for Twitter. New frames are also created:

1. 'Against halal' opposes the marketing and practice of halal meat;
2. 'Against mosques' opposes the existence and construction of new mosques;

3. 'Against veil' opposes the wearing of the veil in public spaces;
4. 'Economy' usually downplays the burkini debate by saying that the economy and unemployment should be the priority;
5. 'Unclear' struggles to distinguish a relevant frame. This category shows a difficulty in understanding the meaning of the tweet. It does not correspond to an off-topic tweet, as the latter visibly, but confusingly, takes a position on the burkini controversy.

Several observations can be made:

1. Twitter once again confirms its 'anti-migrant' position in all three categories ('Commentary', 'Event' and 'Reaction'). Given the political positions that this social network favours (right and far right), it is also not surprising that the desire to legally ban the burkini is also affirmed.
2. Unlike the press and television, international criticism is widely shared, notably through an article in *Le Monde* (2016a).
3. As with the press, many tweets criticised the Council of State for its decision. The Councillor of State, Thierry Thuot, is once again singled out.
4. The parallel with terrorism is halfway between the press (which values this frame) and television (which neglects it).
5. Finally, the tweets that are generally favourable to migrants ('For migrants', 'Authorise burkini' and 'State Council right') are more present than in the two previous events. This mitigates, in part, the very right-wing position of the tweets.

For all tweets, 42 have anti-migrant comments and 23 have pro-migrant comments (22 have comments that do not take a position, 76 have no comments and 3 tweets cannot be found). Pro-migrant tweets thus represent, respectively, 15%, 42.5% and 55% of anti-migrant tweets for the Nice attack, the Eurotunnel and the burkini. Therefore, the burkini mobilises a pro-migrant 'response' that is more consistent than for the two previous events.

23 tweets can be considered as 'anti-Muslim'. This position is accentuated by some of the comments in these tweets that are particularly violent: parallels between a woman in a burkini and a rubbish dump, parallels between burqas and oil spill pollution, parallels between women in burqas and penguins, humour about the death of migrants, calls for the murder of migrants, etc. As with the Nice attack, the calls for murder among comments remain below ten – which is not many compared to the Eurotunnel. Here is an example: 'If the country of re-accommodation refuses them, we'll throw them in the water and see if they are welcomed like we are =D' (anonymous).

These calls for murder are not specifically contained on certain extreme right-wing accounts, such as those of 'Français de souche' or 'Damien Rieu' mentioned above. They are disseminated on sites that are very diverse politically and are often within comments of the tweets of mainstream media (*20 Minutes*, BFM-TV, *Le Parisien*, *Le Monde*, *Le Soir*, etc.). This explains, perhaps, the large number of calls to murder for the Eurotunnel – the tweets from the latter event being of the 'Event' type (media sharing). Attacks on migrants thus seem to take place primarily in the comments of the mainstream media.

Here is another example of a striking tweet (and not a comment this time): 'The #LR elected officials who deplore the #Burkini are like prostitutes complaining about their fungus. #Immigration #Clientelism' (anonymous). Immigration is thus compared to a disease that needs to be got rid of.

Hate towards migrants and Muslims is thus widely disseminated on this social network. The strength of this discourse does not therefore lie in the institutional position of some or the space given to the words of new journalists. It seems to result above all from the ease with which violent and unmoderated statements can be communicated on the social network.

Visual documentation

The image analysis deals, in order, with the press, television and Twitter. The press photographs cannot be reproduced here due to copyright.

First, regarding the press, it is not always easy to know the migratory origin of the people photographed. But a priori, no migrants are openly represented in the press.

Photographs in the press mainly concern politicians – in particular, Nicolas Sarkozy, campaigning for the right-wing primaries, and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, whose name has been put forward to head the Foundation of Islam of France. The other images are both very rare and very varied: veiled women on a beach (one of whom is stopped by police officers), representatives of the Muslim faith, the Sisco brawl (people stopped and a demonstration held in Bastia), experts (Alain Finkielkraut and Tahar Ben Jelloun), numerous images from the 'Monde Festival', Syrian refugees, etc.

Women in burkini are therefore not shown in the press. The only image of a burkini comes from a drawing by Serguei, published in *Le Monde* (2016b), taking a stand in favour of it. His drawing, entitled 'No swimming allowed', denounces the violence with which the defenders of secularism attack this garment. It shows a woman in a burkini, smiling and obviously happy to be about to go swimming on a sunny day. She is walking towards the water where one of her feet is resting. She does not see a shark, ready to devour her, with its sharp teeth protruding. It says "secular" on this shark. The violence of the defenders of secularism is akin to a death wish, symbolised by the voracity of a shark.

The images in the press may therefore reflect some frames ('Secularism') but not others ('Terrorism', 'Ban burkini', etc.).

Second, regarding the television, the analysis of the second-by-second coding of television images is divided into two categories:

1. images specific to the event (women in burkini or veiled women) and;
2. other images, aimed at understanding the event (maps, written quotes, interviews, photographs of politicians and various shots). These other images do not include the anchorperson.

Concerning the images specific to the event, TF1 devotes about a minute more to women in burkini or veils (282 seconds for TF1 and 232 seconds for France 2). As well, the proportion of veiled women and women in burkini is not the same: TF1 shows more women in burkini than France 2 (180 seconds against 54 seconds). But the private channel has difficulty finding images of burkini: the same 15-second shot dated 4 August 2016 is thus reused nine times – either as a video extract (seven sequences), or as a background image when the anchorperson introduces a report (one sequence), or, finally, as an image used by the foreign press (one sequence). This observation tends to confirm what a journalist from *Le Monde* (burkini) said: this controversy concerns a garment that practically does not exist.

> The burkini has nothing to do with the veil. It was very much in the minority. (…) I never saw a burkini in Marseille (…)
> (Have you looked for women in burkini?)
> Well, we didn't find any. We found one, which we photographed. [FR_I_2]

The other images of burkini correspond essentially to a demonstration, present on both channels, in front of the French embassy in London, where women in burkini protest, on an artificial beach (sand, games, towels, parasols and buoys), against the French municipal orders. On TF1, the burkini is also shown through an interview with its designer, Aheda Zanetti, in her shop in Sydney, Australia. On France 2, the burkini is mainly shown through online sales sites and a short interview with a woman wearing a

burkini who is asked about the decision of the Council of State. The parallel made by television between the burkini and the veil thus appears to be a tool to compensate for the difficulty of filming women in burkini in France.

Finally, the overall images aimed at understanding the event are often similar between the two channels: a map of France locating the towns that have issued anti-burkini bans; written quotations from judicial texts (municipal bans, administrative courts, Council of State), from politicians, from social networks (mainly tweets) or from the national or international press; various interviews; various shots (beaches, bans posted on these beaches and demonstrations in France and abroad, in particular); and photographs of politicians to illustrate a point.

However, there are some differences in this second category of images. TF1 makes greater use of images of the Council of State: the channel conducts numerous interviews inside or in front of it and often uses parts of the building to illustrate a voice-over (courtroom, hall and outside building). The private channel also makes extensive use of photographs of politicians to comment on them in voice-over or to clarify the remarks of a journalist interviewed in the studio. These two uses (Council of State and photographs of politicians) are rare at France 2.

On the opposite, the public channel (France 2) insists on the existence of a political controversy by showing the headquarters of the different parties (French Communist Party, Socialist Party, Les Républicains and Rassemblement National) and politicians (entering the Elysée or Matignon, surrounded by journalists in the street or at a press conference, in a radio studio [Europe 1, RMC and France Inter], in front of a political headquarters, on a stage, on the campaign trail, or even in the midst of a mob [Nicolas Sarkozy]). France 2 also highlights the foreign press by showing online newspapers, laid out on a table, stacked in their boxes in the UK ('newspaper boxes'), or even read by individuals in the street. Both these uses (political dimension and foreign press) are rare in TF1.

The parallel made by television between the burkini and the veil thus appears to be a tool to compensate for the difficulty of filming women in burkini in France.

These observations are in line with the people quoted by the two channels: TF1 values lawyers (3 for TF1 and 1 for France 2), legal texts (3 and 2) and experts (3 and 1) while France 2 favours politicians (6 and 19). The political colour of France 2's interviewees is also very varied compared to TF1. However, the 'Political divisions' frame relating to the existence of a controversy goes in the opposite direction to these observations (14% and 11.7%). The same applies to the 'International backlash' frame relating to foreign media (3.5% and 1.7%). The oral discourse of television channels is therefore not always correlated with images: television images can thus construct a narrative that is slightly different from the verbal discourse.

Third, as regards Twitter, the images on the social network focus in part on politicians (Florian Philippot [far right], Alain Juppé [candidate of the right-wing primaries] and Laurent Wauquiez [right-wing]). The social network also has the particularity of showing many women in burkini – in greater proportion than the press and television. A parallel is even drawn between a woman bathing in a burkini and an activist of the 'Manif pour tous' – a movement opposed to gay marriage in France – being stopped by a police officer. The tweet used the hashtag 'double standards' to denounce the non-interpellation of the woman in burkini.

The other images are very diverse: veiled women or women in burqas, the Sisco brawl, beach and parasol, collages for Marine Le Pen (far right), etc. As well, three other tweets use a map given in a book and showing the residences of state councillors in the Île-de-France. The source of the book is never given. Two tweets are identical. The two comments are: 'The Council of State, immigrationists who live in neighbourhoods without immigrants' (Jean-Yves Le Gallou); 'At the Council of State, we are

immigrationists but we avoid living in the 93!'[16] (Jean-Yves Le Gallou and anonymous). These maps show a high density of state councillors in the wealthy department of Hauts-de-Seine, close to Paris, and in the richest arrondissements of Paris.

Four other tweets are also striking because of their content. They cannot be shown here in order to preserve the anonymity of users. The first is worded as follows: 'Global warming is causing penguins to migrate, save the planet' (anonymous). This first tweet thus compares women wearing a veil to migrating penguins: immigration would thus bring animals ready to lay eggs in France (or come directly with their offspring from the South). The two other tweets read: 'Burkini, terrorism, migrants, same fight. To be retweeted' (two anonymous accounts). It shows migrants potentially assaulting a truck driver. The conflation between illegal immigration and terrorism is thus affirmed. Finally, the last tweet is written as follows: 'Verbalisation is obviously no longer enough to stop the provocation… Let's deport them!' (anonymous). The image, featuring a fake slogan inspired by a former US President Barack Obama ('Remigration, Yes You Can!'), suggests deporting Muslims over several generations.

The 'anti-immigrant' and 'anti-Muslim' message conveyed by these images is thus symbolically very violent and legitimises the calls for murder in the comments.

b) Narrative making and success

WHAT: What are the successful narratives?

The 'what' consists of the 'verbal' narrative (written and oral) and the 'visual' narrative (image or video). Regarding the **verbal narrative**, firstly, the three media have their own discourse. The press is essentially concerned with the possible link between the burkini and terrorism. In this sense, it prioritises speeches in favour of banning the burkini and dismisses, to a large extent, those who are opposed to this ban. Secularism is generally presented as being in contradiction with this garment. Communitarianism (or multiculturalism) would therefore be a model to be fought, as secularism implies a model of assimilation, favouring the integration of Muslims. Finally, as this swimming costume is the manifestation of a conquering Islam, the priority would be to fight against the radicalisation of this population.

Regarding the television, the distribution between those in favour and those against the burkini ban is slightly more balanced than that of the press, even if, in both cases, the 'favourable' discourse takes precedence. Television essentially insists on the existence of a strong polemic, either within the left or between the left and the right. Secularism can also be quickly mentioned. Finally, newscasts regularly remind us that this controversy is part of the continuity of the ban on the full veil (burqa) in the public space.

Twitter primarily favours anti-immigration discourse and those in favour of the burkini ban. The tweets thus consider the Council of State's decision to be incomprehensible in substance and illegitimate in form. This illegitimacy would be explained by the insufficient number of State Councillors who made the decision (only three) and by the presence of a pro-immigration councillor (Thierry Thuot) among them. Finally, this social network often shares the international media's irony about the existence of such a controversy in France.

Secondly, concerning the **visual narrative**, the press and Twitter mainly focus on images of politicians. Women in burkini are very present on Twitter but are rare in the press and television. The latter two media favour images of veiled women. The other images of the three media are very heterogeneous.

16. The '93' refers to the department of Seine-Saint-Denis where a large immigrant population lives.

Television favours a pedagogical reading: maps, quotes and commentaries on legal texts, quotes from politicians, photographs of politicians, quotes from the international press, etc. TF1 puts more emphasis on images of the Council of State, while France 2 puts more emphasis on images of politicians and political headquarters.

Some of the images on Twitter can also be very harsh towards Muslim women and immigrants.

WHEN: In what context do these successful narratives take place?

A cross-reference of the occurrences of 'veil' and 'immigration' (Europresse 2022) in the French press reveals a linear and growing treatment, but of a lesser extent than for terrorism or Calais. The controversy that began in 1989 at school did not, in the end, concern immigration. It was not until 2003–2004, when the headscarf was banned in schools, that the issue came to the fore. The subject was then revived in 2010 when the full veil was banned in the public space and the Baby-Loup crèche dispute received media coverage. A new peak occurred in 2013 with the veil at university and in 2015 at the time of the attacks in Île-de-France. The burkini reignited the debate in 2016. In 2019, the strongly contested Blanquer law included an amendment, which was rejected, banning the veil for those accompanying school outings. The controversy was finally revived in 2022 with the municipal authorisation of the burkini in Grenoble during the legislative campaign. As well, a dispute arouses the same year on the civic disobedience of an association from Grenoble ('Association citoyenne') lobbying in favour of the burkini. The burkini is thus the heir to a controversy that has been gradually taking hold in France since the early 2000s.

GRAPH 7. Burkini: press articles crossing the occurrences of 'veil' and 'immigration' in France (Europresse)



If the terrorist context is often evoked by the press to explain the existence of this controversy, this journalist from the Information Department of France 2 believes that it exists because of the journalistic 'vacuum' which is typical of each summer:

> It's the fact that it's August. So this controversy comes in an informational desert because in August, institutions are a bit dormant, companies work in slow motion. (…) in August, the news moves a lot towards the south, the holidays, the sun. [FR_I_6]

This summer context is also seen as an explanatory variable for this *Figaro* journalist:

> It was the end of August and [that] there was no other news. So I think that it was probably disproportionate. (…) A village in Sisco in Corsica, you know, it wouldn't have made so many headlines. [FR_I_8]

The same applies for one journalist from *Le Monde*:

> It's a summer controversy. [...] Nothing happens, it's summer. All of a sudden, something comes up and it becomes an event. [FR_I_10]

WHERE: How do these successful narratives circulate from one medium to another?

Two parameters allow us to quantify the mutual citations between media:

1. A search of occurrences carried out by NVivo and including the list of the main French, English and American media (media present in the press and on television) (Appendix 17);

2. The list of URLs shared by each tweet (media present in Twitter).

The results in NVivo are then sorted according to the context of the hits. When a tweet concerns the Twitter account of a media outlet (press, television or radio), it is counted as this media and not as 'Twitter'. The 'press' also includes the online press. As well, four 'television', shared in Twitter, come from Youtube (*) and 6 links, not visible here, are from different blogs. The result of this quantitative analysis is given below.

TABLE 7. Burkini: mutual references between media

	PRESS IN...	TELEVISION IN...	RADIO IN...	TWITTER IN...
PRESS	15	6	7	3
TELEVISION	4	1	1	1
TWITTER	56	10*	0	4

The links shared on Twitter come mainly from *Le Monde* (20 tweets), and more specifically from this article that was mentioned several times above on foreign media' (*Le Monde* 2016a). The other two main sources are *Causeur* (7 tweets, far-right media) and 'La gauche m'a tuer' (6 tweets, far-right media, since banned).

The press thus carries a story that is widely disseminated. The three events also show that television is relatively shared on Twitter. The three events thus show that the press, and even television, can disseminate a story widely.

WHO: Who carries these successful narratives?

The people most cited by the press, television and Twitter are mainly male politicians. Male experts are also highlighted, especially in *Le Figaro*. On the other hand, for the three media, they are often very far from the subject ('La Boétie', 'Louis Aragon', 'Montesquieu', 'Spinoza', 'Étienne Klein', 'abbé Sieyès', 'Saint-Just', etc).

The 'individual' category is the only one that allows women to be visible by being placed on an equal footing with men.

The political leanings of these politicians are varied. *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, TF1 and France 2 are balanced between the right and the left. *Libération*, on the other hand, leans left and Twitter right.

Twitter users are predominantly male individuals from the far right.

Do the cases studied have a local, national or international dimension?

The local or national dimension is measured using three variables: the format of the press, the 'Settings' and the place given to politicians.

Regarding format, it is not possible to compare the number of words and emotions between the national and local press because the local press is not studied here.

The 'Settings' show that the word 'France' is a priority in the press. This term is also very present on television. The national dimension thus exists, but to a lesser degree than for the Nice attack where this word was in first position in both media.

The third variable is the place given to 'politicians' in the three media: the greater the place of politicians, the more the event can be placed at national level. The average representation of politicians in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* is 54.6% for the Nice attack, 46.15% for the Eurotunnel and 34.1% for the burkini. It is also 72.2%, 28.6% and 50% on Twitter for these three events respectively, and 20.8%, 18.9% and 42.35% on television. These data thus confirm the observation made for the 'Settings': the burkini has a lesser national dimension than the Nice attack.

The Nice attack is thus the event that can be placed at national level in comparison to the other two. Conversely, the Eurotunnel is clearly a local event. The burkini, on the other hand, straddles the line between these two classifications.

Finally, the international scope of the burkini is measured using two variables: the 'International backlash' frame – highlighting the foreign press reaction to the event – and the share of foreign politicians quoted in the three media. Here again, it is possible to place the burkini event halfway between the Nice attack (not international) and the Eurotunnel (international). On the one hand, unlike the burkini and the Eurotunnel, there is no specific foreign press frame for the Nice attack, as the latter is almost never mentioned. On the other hand, the share of foreign politicians quoted out of all politicians in the three media is comparable between the Nice attack and the burkini (7.2% and 10.7% respectively). The Eurotunnel, however, is above these two proportions (50%). The international dimension of the burkini therefore exists, but in a limited proportion.

The vocabulary of migration

A final comparative analysis of the three events provides a better understanding of how foreigners and people of immigrant background are described. During the coding of the media, the terms relating to these people were systematically identified. The terms from the three events were then merged into a single list and transformed into search hits. Approximately 500 hits were searched in the documents. The result is given in the Appendix 41. It shows the first 10 to 20 occurrences of the different media (*Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, TF1, France 2 and Twitter) according to each event. The total of each media and each event is also visible.

The ten journalists interviewed unanimously stated that no meeting had been held within their newspaper or their channel to reflect on the vocabulary used to talk about migrants. None of them also received specific training on immigration, apart from their own professional experience, after obtaining their press cards. Only one journalist said that she had attended a one-week training course on immigration policy, organised by an association defending migrants.

Several observations emerge from these results:

1. The term 'migrant' largely dominates the sample. This semantic shift, underway since 2010–2015, is observed by other researchers (see, e.g., Cantat and Thiollet 2020). It shows a lasting disappearance

of other expressions, such as 'exile', 'worker', 'labour force', 'undocumented', 'chibani' (older people of North African origin) or 'boat people'. This rapid change is a marker of the liveliness of the debates on immigration. *Le Figaro* generally refers to the 'flood', 'flow' and 'influx' of migrants. These three expressions are present in smaller proportions in the other media.

2. Other, older expressions, however, remain topical, such as 'foreigner', 'Muslim' (Nice attack and burkini) and 'clandestine' (Eurotunnel). The terms 'clandestine', which have a negative connotation, and 'foreigner' are favoured by anti-immigration media (*Le Figaro* and Twitter).
3. The young age of migrants is a specification that is very regularly given. This is less true, however, for anti-immigration media (*Le Figaro* and Twitter).
4. The press again confirms the link between the terrorist 'threat' and the burkini. This link is also, but weakly, put forward by Twitter.
5. The term 'immigration' is essentially favoured by *Le Figaro* and Twitter to initiate, no doubt, a more general debate on the migration phenomenon. Expressions such as 'anarchic immigration', 'uncontrolled immigration' and 'mass immigration' are frequent in *Le Figaro*.
6. The burkini refers above all to the following generations of immigrants by using the following expressions: 'children of immigration', 'children of immigrants', 'young people born of immigration', people of foreign 'origin', 'communities', 'minorities', etc.
7. The migration 'crisis' is primarily evoked for the Channel Tunnel. It thus shows that the 'crisis' is linked to the phenomenon of irregular immigration. The media mainly refer to the 'migrant crisis' and the 'migration crisis'.
8. The Eurotunnel event evokes migrants in a numerical way. The number of migrants attempting a crossing in a 'group' is often given. The figures also list the number of people who died in the process.
9. Twitter is the only medium that hardly ever refers to migrants as 'people', 'men' or 'women'.

3. Conclusion

3.1 WHAT: What are the successful narratives?

Regarding the Nice attack, the press and Twitter are dominated by the terrorist's background and profile, as well as by the need to reinforce border controls, expel foreigners and better monitor the application of the right to asylum – even if it means restricting it. The press also insists on the shortcomings of the intelligence services and questions the compatibility between Islam and France. Conversely, Twitter emphasises the responsibility of NGOs and the need to stop or even reverse immigration ('remigration'). These 'frames' thus contribute to a double conflation: between immigration and terrorism, on the one hand, and between Muslims and terrorism, on the other. Conversely, the television places a greater emphasis on remembrance, security and the profile of the victims.

For the Eurotunnel crossings, the press and television have a similar discourse. Their attention is focused on the security measures and the economic impact of these crossings. To a lesser extent, the deaths of migrants are also mentioned, but generally in an accounting manner. These figures are in competition with other quantitative data, such as lost growth points, hours of waiting on the roads, requests for financial compensation, costs incurred to secure the site, etc. These deaths are thus treated with few emotions ('neutral'). Twitter differs greatly from the other two media in the pressure it puts on the government.

Finally, regarding the burkini, the three media construct their own discourse. The link between the burkini and terrorism is essentially put forward by the press. Television insists on the existence of a controversy by presenting the arguments 'for' and 'against'. Twitter reaffirms its 'anti-migrant' position and often insists on the criticism of foreign media.

For all three events, it is common for Twitter's comments to call for murder with ironic emoticons aimed either at minimising the seriousness of the content or at establishing an ambiguity between seriousness and humour.

Overall, the analogy between verbal and visual narratives is good, although some differences exist – especially in the press – maybe because press journalists do not choose the photographs of their articles.

For all three events, hatred towards immigrants and Muslims is mainly spread through *Le Figaro* and Twitter. Some highly contested terms are used by both media: 'great replacement' (*Figaro*), 'remigration' (Twitter), 'native French' (*Français de souche*) and 'Islamo-leftism' (*Figaro* journalist in interview). The difference between hatred of Muslims and migrants is, however, not always clear in the report and would benefit from further exploration. Three factors explain the success of these discourses:

1. The institutional position of some of the people speaking to *Le Figaro* newspaper. (Ivan Rioufol and Alain Finkielkraut),
2. The space given to journalists with less institutional support in *Le Figaro* (Charles Jaigu, Bérénice Levet and Marie-Amélie Lombard-Latune),
3. The ease of communicating violent and unmoderated speech on Twitter.

Six press journalists and one editorial writer affirm, in the interviews, that journalists have a great deal of freedom in writing their articles, even though they may occasionally be forced to make tiny changes by their editors. This freedom of tone is illustrated by this journalist from *Libération*:

> (What kind of changes?)
> Very little. (…) I'm very control freak (…) I'm very obsessed with not having a comma changed. I'm very annoying (…) I rarely have the content of my papers changed. It's very rare. (…) It's rare. (…) It happened to me this year (…) I did a portrait that I found hard but fair and they found it too mean and asked me to change things. And I wasn't happy. (…) I think that in my entire career at Libé, that's the moment when I was most upset. (…) There were 3–4 adjectives that were a bit, a bit stiff that were removed, there was a catchphrase that was a bit nasty that was removed (…) that really, really annoyed me. [FR_I_3]

The freedom of newspaper journalists thus explains the differences in writing between each newspaper. This freedom of tone contrasts with television. A France 2 journalist, who covered the burkini, testifies in this sense:

> Editors and chiefs have more impact and power than journalists. (…) When there was the burkini controversy, I was asked to find and convince women who wear the burkini to testify on television. (…) I was asked to do hidden cameras of women wearing the burkini. [FR_I_1]

More precisely, two departments are involved in writing the newscast at France 2: the thematic department (the 'chiefs' mentioned in the previous interview) and the editorial department (the 'editors'). The thematic department is responsible for feeding back suggestions from reporters in the field. This thematic department thus proposes reports and angles to the editorial department. The editorial department has always the final word. In this sense, a double barrier exists between the field reporter and the final newscast: the representative mandate assigned to the thematic department and the superiority given to the editorial department. This journalist from the Information Department of France 2 explains this hierarchy:

> from the reporter's point of view, this means that it's a discussion which, most of the time, takes place outside his presence. (…) So this is what sometimes gives the reporter the impression that he is not necessarily listened to (…)

(Who decides? The editorial department?)
It's the edition who has the last word. We are very clear on this, it is very contested. There are lots of people who don't agree, but we take responsibility. It's the edition who decides. [FR_I_6]

The absence of hate speech in the press (other than *Le Figaro*) and television thus appears to be uncorrelated with the level of control exercised by management. In other words, hate speech is not related to the existence of 'free' or 'coerced' writing.

Lastly, according to this same journalist, the proximity between the two television channels may be explained by TF1's desire to continue to look like a public service after its privatisation:

they realise something that a competitor in special operations told me verbatim (…)
(So, someone from TF1?)
Yes, yes, it's my counterpart (…) 'we love to pretend to be a public service'. (…) What is the interest of the Publicis Studio subsidiary in Trooping the Colours, which was broadcast yesterday? The Queen's Jubilee with Trooping the Colours, which was put into images (…) TF1 buys this thing for several million. The CSA [Higher Audiovisual Council] considers that it is an information programme, so they don't have the right to interrupt it with advertising. (…) I can give you [also] the example every year of 14 July, when from 7 am to 1 pm TF1 is on the air without any advertising. (…) They do it, and it's unique in Europe, there's no other example, they do it because they feel that they absolutely want to be the number one institution in people's minds. [FR_I_6]

The public or private dimension therefore does not seem to influence the content of the 8 p.m. newscast on both channels.

3.2 WHEN: In what context do these successful narratives take place?

Regarding the Nice attack, the link between immigration and terrorism in the French press has been important since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York. Press articles undergo an exponential increase due to the 2015 attacks in France. This link between immigration and terrorism then falls back. The Nice attack in 2020 tends to slow down the fall of this curve without preventing it.

Concerning the Channel Tunnel and the cross-referencing of the hits 'Calais' and 'immigration', we see a constant and growing dynamic since 2001. The huge peak in 2015–2016 corresponds to the forced distribution of foreigners outside Calais and then the destruction of the jungle. The Eurotunnel event is thus the prelude to a strong governmental intervention.

Finally, a cross-reference of the hits 'veil' and 'immigration' reveals a linear and growing treatment, but of a lesser extent than for terrorism or Calais. Several issues concerned the full veil and the headscarf at school, at university or for employees from the private sector. The burkini is in line with these controversies that have been gradually taking hold in France since the early 2000s.

3.3 WHERE: How do these successful narratives circulate from one medium to another?

The three events show that the press carries a story that is widely disseminated in the press itself (in other journals) and on Twitter as well. The television is also well shared on Twitter. France 2 is aware of this impact on social networks and has a department dedicated to its study.

In comparison, the radio and Twitter have few repercussions. Nonetheless, France 2 does have a non-binding charter inviting journalists to control their comments on Twitter. It includes the following sentence for all France Télévisions employees: 'It is recommended that you do not tweet about what you would not said on air' (Guide 2011). Of all the press journalists interviewed, none reported the existence of a comparable charter in their newspaper.

But four limitations can be pointed out on these results:

- First, the search hits are necessarily limited.
- Second, the second-by-second coding of television indicates that many politicians are shown and quoted during their radio appearance. This data has not been used here. It is therefore likely that the place of radio on television is slightly greater.
- Third, this same second-by-second coding also indicates that the presence of the tweets, shown on the screen, has not been considered in this report. It is therefore possible that Twitter is more cited in the newscasts.
- Lastly, these tweets may also concern tweets from other media (press, radio, etc.). The consideration of tweets on television can thus upset the overall results at the margin.

3.4 WHO: Who carries these successful narratives?

For all three events, the people most cited by the press and Twitter are male politicians. Television focuses more on individuals – the latter being the only category where women can be represented equally with men. They are otherwise overwhelmed by the male presence in all three media. However, relegating women to the rank of a simple citizen ('individuals') does not necessarily contribute to valuing them.

The political tendencies of politicians are unevenly distributed: right-wing and extreme right-wing discourses are privileged. Within the press, and for all three events, 83 people are on the left and extreme left, 84 on the centre and 156 on the right and extreme right.[17] For the centre, people are more likely to be centre-right rather than centre-left, which increases this imbalance. Similarly, the presence of the far right (34 people) is incomparable to that of the far left (14 people). The traditional attack by the far right to classify French journalists as left-wing is thus weakened by these figures (see, e.g., Breizh-Info 2021; Madouas 2012; Desrimais 2021; Observatoire du journalisme 2021).

Le Monde and France 2 value the right and the extreme right slightly more than *Le Figaro* and TF1.[18] This goes against the political orientation of these four media: *Le Monde* and France 2 are centre-left and left-wing, while *Le Figaro* and TF1 are right-wing.

The narratives of the right and the far right are thus more easily disseminated than those of the left. The far left is almost absent from the media. There are several reasons for the presence of the far right in these media. According to this journalist from *Le Monde* (Nice attack), the Rassemblement National (far right) should be treated like the other political parties:

> as we often say, the [Rassemblement] National is a party which is not like the others, but it must be treated like the others. [FR_I_7]

17. More precisely, 14 French politicians are far left, 61 left, 73 centre, 101 right and 27 far right. Concerning foreign politicians, 8 are left-wing, 11 centre, 21 right-wing and 7 far right.
18. *Le Monde* has 51 people from the right and the far right against 21 people from the left and the far left. This same distribution falls to 47 and 22 for *Le Figaro*, 8 and 6 for TF1 and 20 and 12 for France 2.

This same journalist, in agreement with another journalist from *Le Figaro* (second extract) also believes that the electoral results of Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, far right) legitimise the importance given to this political party.

> There is a form of logic insofar as they have electoral results as a result. (…) So necessarily, we're not going to pretend that they don't exist (…) The heart of the [Rassemblement] National's doctrine is based on this question of immigration. When we talk about immigration issues, obviously, these are subjects on which they speak loudly, on which they have things to say. [FR_I_7]
> the extreme right has nevertheless risen in recent years. (…) I think that's maybe why I think that even indifferently, we talk about them more than the extreme left. [FR_I_8]

This journalist from *Le Monde* also considers this phenomenon statistically. According to her, since the right and the far right have more to say about immigration, it is logical that they are heard more:

> It's logical insofar as these are events on which more right-wing politicians have surfed, i.e. the burkini, it was right-wing town halls that issued the orders. The Nice attack, the link between immigration and terrorism, well it was more right-wing politicians who established this link. It's a theme that the right-wing is more likely to take up. You only have to look at the presidential programmes. [...] The right-wing programmes were much more prolific than those of the left on immigration. It was out of all proportion. So it seems logical to me in fact. The right has a greater say on these issues than the left. [FR_I_10]

For all three events, Twitter users are mainly men. The presence of the far right is very strong for the Nice attack and the burkini. The attack mobilises, in equal amounts, individuals, journalists (and the media) and politicians. On the other hand, the Eurotunnel mainly mobilises journalists and the media, whereas the burkini mobilises individuals.

3.5 Do the cases studied have a local, national, or international dimension?

The Nice attack has a strong national dimension in comparison with the other two events. Conversely, the Eurotunnel is both a local and an international event. The burkini may be placed halfway: slightly national and slightly international at the same time.

Regarding the international dimension, this report has one limitation: all foreign-language speakers, whether shown (visual narrative) or quoted (verbal narrative), have not been considered here, although they could have been used as a variable to measure the international dimension of an event.

3.6 Key reflections on hate speech against migrants and Muslims

Two reflections may be proposed on hate speech against migrants and Muslims: the place of ethnic minorities among journalists, on the one hand, and cyberbullying of journalists, on the other.

Regarding ethnic minorities, on the one hand, press journalists stated in interviews that they were almost absent among their colleagues. According to the interviews, this seems to be less true for television. The *Libération* journalist thus remembered a photograph of part of his editorial staff, in 2015, before the newspaper moved within Paris. This photograph was circulated on social networks and the editors were accused of being too white, mainly by the right and the far right.

This image, from Marc Chaumeil, shows part of the editorial staff of *Libération* on the terrace of 11 rue Béranger in Paris, on 17 November 2015. It shows about 200 people raising their left fists in the air

(symbol of the left) and looking at the lens, which probably comes from a drone. With the exception of one or two people, the entire editorial staff appears to be white.

This same *Libération* journalist believes that this photograph helped to initiate some changes within the newspaper:

> we had someone like Johan Hufnagel who really tried to make Libé's newspaper less white, to sum up. (…) he appointed Rachid Laïreche. (…) Hufnagel said to him: 'No more football and the suburbs, you're going to do politics and you're going to do the congress of the ecologist party'. [FR_I_3]

The photographs available online also seem to show that editorial boards are more mixed on television than in the press. A more mixed editorial staff could help to reduce the level of hatred towards immigrants and Muslims as well as these three amalgams: immigration/terrorism, Muslims/terrorism and NGOs/terrorism.

Regarding cyberbullying, on the other hand, most journalists in interviews report pressure from people who propagate far right and far left ideas. They also report harassment from people close to President Emmanuel Macron. The following extract comes from a *Le Monde* journalist interviewed about the Nice attack:

> the Macronists, it's more insidious, but there are networks of trolls on Twitter that are quite well organised, that denigrate, that attack and the Elysée is not fooled by what's going on and I think there's certainly some kind of link between the two. [FR_I_7]

This journalist from the Information Department of France 2 confirms this phenomenon:

> LREM [Emmanuel Macron's political party] is a willingly harassing entity. And really, it's a party that was built on the digital, that is very powerful on the digital, more powerful than on the ground. And frankly, they are virulent. It's incredible. [FR_I_6]

Cyberbullying has thus become a common practice against journalists. Regulating it could help make the profession more attractive. Similarly, some interviews mention physical threats accompanying this harassment. The physical danger seems to come mainly from the far right and not from the far left or from the presidential party. Controlling the potentially more intimidating far-right harassment could also help to spread benevolent discourses towards migrants and Muslims more widely.

Finally, five last tips may be given to mitigate such hate speech.

- First, hate speech being banned in France, certain articles from *Le Figaro* should be read by lawyers to check their legality.

- Second, Twitter should improve its algorithm for detecting hate speech, especially in the comments of tweets.

- Third, as hate speech is mainly carried by men in *Le Figaro* and on Twitter, women should express themselves in these two media by writing op-eds, accepting interviews and taking over Twitter. By extension, women should be more quoted in the press.

- Fourth, as all three media favour right-wing and far-right politicians, it would be better to balance this representation by encouraging the presence of left-wing and far-left (female) politicians.

- Lastly, the voice of first-, second- and third-generation migrants is rarely heard in the media as a whole and should be encouraged.

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of journalists interviewed

The profile of the person is given by the gender the person declared during the interview and their media. The interview is described according to the case study, the number of press articles or TV sequences in our sample related to this person, the date and the duration of the interview. A *Figaro* journalist has no articles in our sample, but she wrote several articles on the burkini over the period studied. The same applies to the journalist from *Le Monde* who wrote several articles on the burkini, but none of these articles appear in our sample. The last journalist at France 2 belongs to the information department: he gave his opinion on the three events.

PROFILE			INTERVIEW				
GENDER	NAME OF MEDIA	TYPE OF MEDIA	CASE STUDY	ARTICLE OR TV SEQUENCE IN OUR SAMPLE	DATE IN 2022	DURATION	CODE
Woman	Nice-Matin	Press	Nice attack	9	9 March	1 h 05	FR_I_4
Man	Le Monde	Press	Nice attack	2	10 June	1 h 02	FR_I_7
Woman	Le Monde	Press	Nice attack, Eurotunnel and Burkini	2 (Nice attack), 3 (Eurotunnel)	5 October	1 h 13	FR_I_10
Man	Le Monde	Press	Eurotunnel	3	30 May	1 h 29	FR_I_5
Man	Le Monde	Press	Eurotunnel	2	20 June	1 h 06	FR_I_9
Woman	France 2	Television	Burkini	2	22 February	2 h 05	FR_I_1
Woman	Le Monde	Press	Burkini	1	23 February	1 h 02	FR_I_2
Man	Libération	Press	Burkini	3	2 March	2 h 10	FR_I_3
Woman	Le Figaro	Press	Burkini	0	10 June	1 h 00	FR_I_8
Man	France 2	Television	Nice attack, Eurotunnel and Burkini	N/A	3 June	3 h 02	FR_I_6

Appendix 2. Search occurrences used to collect data

	NICE ATTACK	ILLEGAL EUROTUNNEL CROSSINGS	BURKINI CONTROVERSY
PRESS ARTICLES (IN THE TEXT)	**Europresse and Factiva**: (migrant* OR étrangers OR immigré* OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration* OR migration* OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin* OR tunisien OR Lampedusa) **AND** (terrori* OR attentat*) **AND** (Nice) **Factiva** [Duplicates: 'similar']	**Europresse**: (migrant* OR étrangers OR immigré* OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration* OR migration* OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin*) **AND** ('royaume-uni' OR 'royaume uni' OR manche OR angleterre OR 'grande bretagne' OR 'grande-bretagne' OR Londres) **AND** (tunnel OR eurotunnel)	**Europresse** (migrant* OR étrangers OR immigré* OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration* OR migration* OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin*) **AND** (burkini OR burqini OR burquini)
TELEVISION (*DESCRIPTEUR*)	attentat OR terroriste OR terrorisme OR nice OR attentats OR terroristes	tunnel OR eurotunnel	burkini OR burqini OR burquini
TWITTER (LANGUAGE: FRENCH)	(migrant OR migrants OR migrante OR migrantes OR étrangers OR immigré OR immigrée OR immigrées OR immigrés OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR réfugiée OR réfugiées OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration OR migration OR migrations OR migratoire OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin OR clandestins OR tunisien OR Lampedusa) **AND** (terrorisme OR terroriste OR terroristes OR attentat OR attentats) **AND** (nice)	(migrant OR migrants OR migrante OR migrantes OR étrangers OR immigré OR immigrée OR immigrées OR immigrés OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR réfugiée OR réfugiées OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration OR migration OR migrations OR migratoire OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin OR clandestins) **AND** (tunnel OR eurotunnel)	(migrant OR migrants OR migrante OR migrantes OR immigré OR immigrée OR immigrées OR immigrés OR réfugié OR réfugiés OR réfugiée OR réfugiées OR 'sans-papiers' OR 'sans papiers' OR asile OR immigration OR migration OR migrations OR migratoire OR 'situation irrégulière' OR clandestin OR clandestins) **AND** (burkini OR burqini OR burquini)

Appendix 3. Nice attack: main genre for the press and television

	PRESS				TELEVISION	
	La Croix	Le Figaro	Le Monde	Nice-Matin	TF1	France 2
COURSE OF EVENTS	3	10	7	19	19	20
ANALYSIS	3	23	10	12	7	4
COURSE OF EVENTS/ANALYSIS	0	0	0	1	2	2

Appendix 4. Nice attack: chronological distribution of tweets



Appendix 5. Nice attack: press settings (NVivo)

Appendix 6. Nice attack: television settings (NVivo)

Appendix 7. Nice attack: gender of the quoted persons

		LA CROIX	*LE FIGARO*	*LE MONDE*	*NICE-MATIN*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
INDIVIDUAL	Men	6	2	9	6	20	9	
	Women	8	4	9	6	25	24	
	Unclear		2	1	5			
	Various							
	N/A							
GROUP	Men							
	Women							
	Unclear			1				
	Various	1		1				
	N/A							
COLLECTIVITY	Men							
	Women							
	Unclear							
	Various				1			
	N/A							
PUBLIC OFFICIAL	Men	1	12	5	2	7	5	
	Women	1		1			1	
	Unclear		1	2	1			
	Various							
	N/A		1	1	2			
POLITICIAN	Men	9	46	47	7	11	15	7
	Women	3	7	10		3	2	4
	Unclear			3				
	Various							
	N/A		3	1	1			2
NGO	Men			1	3	2	5	
	Women				1	1		
	Unclear							
	Various							
	N/A							
ACTIVIST	Men		1	5	4	2	2	
	Women							
	Unclear							
	Various							
	N/A			3				
EXPERT	Men	4	6	14	4	1	2	2
	Women	1	3	1		1		
	Unclear		2					
	Various							
	N/A			1				
CLERGY	Men	4	3	5	2	5	7	
	Women							
	Unclear							
	Various							
	N/A							
LEGAL TEXT	N/A			1				
UNCLEAR/ OTHER	Men							2
	Women							
	Unclear		1	1				
	Various							
	N/A							1
TOTAL		**38**	**94**	**123**	**45**	**78**	**72**	**18**

Appendix 8. Nice attack: partisan distribution of politicians

The 'N/A' category includes personalities with no party affiliation at the time of the attack (Éric Dupond-Moretti, Jacques Chirac, Xavier Bertrand and Marion Maréchal), public institutions (l'Élysée, the Quai-d'Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and the Ministry of the Interior) and some unidentified individuals (a member of the executive, an official at Beauvau [Ministry of the Interior], another deputy, a minister and a government source).

	LA CROIX	*LE FIGARO*	*LE MONDE*	*NICE-MATIN*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
Rassemblement National (far right)	1	5	4		1	2	4
Les Républicains (right)	3	14	26	5	2	6	3
Other right (RPF, DLF, LDP)		1	2				
La République en Marche (centre)	4	15	15	2	6	6	3
Other centre (Agir, EELV, TdP, Libres!, Les Centristes)	2	4	2		1		2
Parti Socialiste (left)		4	1		1	1	
La France Insoumise (far left)		1	1		1	1	
Other far left (PCF)			1				
France and **Foreign**: N/A	1	7	6	1	2		
Foreign – Centre	1	4	3			1	1
Foreign – Far Right		1					
TOTAL	**12**	**56**	**61**	**8**	**14**	**17**	**13**

ACRONYMS: PCF: French Communist Party; DLF: Debout la France; EELV: Europe Ecologie Les Verts; LDP: La Droite populaire; RPF: Rassemblement pour la France; TdP: Territoires de progrès.

Appendix 9. Nice attack: press and television emotion

The data correspond to the number of press articles or television sequences. Several emotions may belong to one press article or TV sequence.

	LA CROIX	*LE FIGARO*	*LE MONDE*	*NICE-MATIN*	TF1	FRANCE 2
ANGER	1		1	3	5	7
BELLICOSE		5				
COMPASSION				1	5	4
EXHORTATION		8			1	
FEAR			1	1	14	11
FRUSTRATION		1				
IMPATIENCE		2				
INCOMPREHENSION			1			
NEUTRAL (ABSENCE OF EMOTIONS)	5	16	13	23	4	4
IRRITATION		2				
LUCID			1	1		
MOURNING	1					
OFFENDED		1				
OPTIMISM	1					
REMEMBRANCE			1	2		
SADNESS			2	3	14	7
SCANDALISED		1				
SCEPTICAL			1			
SOLIDARITY	1					

Appendix 10. Nice attack: press format

Items without a number in brackets are considered 'one'. (Example: 'only one editorial is written by *Nice-Matin*'). The emotion of the interviews is that of the interviewee and not the interviewer.

	JOURNAL	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE PAGE NUMBER (EXCLUDING *NICE-MATIN*)	EMOTIONS
EDITORIAL	*Le Figaro* (2) *Nice-Matin*	361	04/11/2020	1	Bellicose, Exhortation (2), Neutral
INTERVIEW	*Le Monde* *Le Figaro* (5) *Nice-Matin* (4)	1255.7	31/10/2020	10.8	Anger, Bellicose, Exhortation, Neutral (4), Lucid (2), Remembrance
LOCAL NEWS	*Nice-Matin* (27)	461	06/11/2020	?	Anger (2), Empathetic, Fear, Neutral (21), Remembrance, Sadness (3)
NATIONAL NEWS	*La Croix* (6) *Le Figaro* (20) *Le Monde* (15)	794	04/11/2020	9	Anger (2), Bellicose, Fear, Frustration, Impatience (2), Incomprehension, Neutral (30), Irritation (2), Mourning, Offended, Optimism, Remembrance, Sadness (2), Sceptical, Solidarity
OP-ED	*Le Figaro* (6) *Le Monde*	1124	03/11/2020	20.8	Bellicose (2), Exhortation (5), Neutral, Scandalised

Appendix 11. Nice attack: newscasts format

Items without a number in brackets are worth 'one'. (Example: 'only one "edited/live" format is performed by TF1').

	CHANNEL	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DURATION (SECONDS)	AVERAGE POSITION	AVERAGE START TIME	EMOTIONS
EDITED	FR 2 (15), TF1 (16)	30/10/2020	413	141	6	20:09:10	Anger (7), Compassion (6), Exhortation, Fear (16), Neutral, Sadness (16)
EDITED/ LIVE	TF1	29/10/2020	195	56	3	20:03:49	Anger, Sadness
EDITED/ WITH FOOTAGE	TF1	31/10/2020	473	177	4	20:04:22	Neutral
LIVE	FR 2 (6), TF1 (2)	29/10/2020	277	116	6	20:01:35	Anger (2), Compassion, Fear (2), Neutral (3), Sadness (2)
LIVE/ EDITED	FR 2	01/11/2020	456	143	4	20:04:58	Neutral
LIVE/ WITH FOOTAGE	FR 2	29/10/2020	662	208	6	20:07:40	Anger, Compassion, Fear
STUDIO	TF1 (5)	30/10/2020	398	184	8	20:17:40	Anger, Fear (2), Neutral (2)
WITH FOOTAGE/ EDITED	TF1 (2), FR 2 (3)	30/10/2020	480	119.5	6.5	20:11:33	Compassion, Fear (4), Sadness
WITH FOOTAGE/ LIVE	TF1	29/10/2020	392	142	1	17:58:28	Sadness

ACRONYMS: FR 2: France 2.

Appendix 12. Nice attack: press distribution by frame

The data which are not percentages correspond to the number of press articles.

FRAME	TOTAL	*LA CROIX*	%	*LE FIGARO*	%	*LE MONDE*	%	*NICE-MATIN*	%
PATHWAYS	**32**	3	**11.5**	11	**7.0**	8	**10.4**	10	**8.1**
IMMIGRATION (BORDER CONTROL)	**31**	4	**15.4**	18	**11.4**	4	**5.2**	5	**4.1**
INTELLIGENCE	**31**	2	**7.7**	12	**7.6**	10	**13.0**	7	**5.7**
IMMIGRATION (DEPORTATION)	**27**	2	**7.7**	15	**9.5**	4	**5.2**	6	**4.9**
POLICE INVESTIGATION	**25**	2	**7.7**	5	**3.2**	2	**2.6**	16	**13.0**
IMMIGRATION (ASYLUM)	**24**	1	**3.8**	12	**7.6**	3	**3.9**	8	**6.5**
PROFILE	**24**	1	**3.8**	6	**3.8**	4	**5.2**	13	**10.6**
CIVILISATION	**22**	0	**0.0**	13	**8.2**	4	**5.2**	5	**4.1**
CARICATURES	**18**	0	**0.0**	8	**5.1**	6	**7.8**	4	**3.3**
STATE OF EMERGENCY	**18**	1	**3.8**	4	**2.5**	5	**6.5**	8	**6.5**
IMMIGRATION (DETENTION)	**16**	1	**3.8**	9	**5.7**	1	**1.3**	5	**4.1**
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE	**16**	1	**3.8**	3	**1.9**	4	**5.2**	8	**6.5**
INTERNET	**14**	1	**3.8**	5	**3.2**	5	**6.5**	3	**2.4**
SECURITY	**14**	1	**3.8**	6	**3.8**	3	**3.9**	4	**3.3**
IMMIGRATION (STOP)	**13**	1	**3.8**	7	**4.4**	2	**2.6**	3	**2.4**
TURKEY	**13**	1	**3.8**	10	**6.3**	1	**1.3**	1	**0.8**
REMEMBRANCE	**10**	1	**3.8**	1	**0.6**	3	**3.9**	5	**4.1**
EX-PRISONERS	**9**	1	**3.8**	4	**2.5**	1	**1.3**	3	**2.4**
VICTIM	**9**	0	**0.0**	1	**0.6**	2	**2.6**	6	**4.9**
CLOSURE OF PLACES OF WORSHIP	**7**	1	**3.8**	3	**1.9**	2	**2.6**	1	**0.8**
IMMIGRATION (NATIONALITY)	**5**	1	**3.8**	2	**1.3**	1	**1.3**	1	**0.8**
VEIL	**4**	0	**0.0**	3	**1.9**	1	**1.3**	0	**0.0**
IMMIGRATION (SOCIAL RIGHTS)	**2**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**	1	**1.3**	1	**0.8**
TOTAL		**26**	**100**	**158**	**100**	**77**	**100**	**123**	**100**

Appendix 13. Nice attack: newscasts distribution by frame

The data which are not percentages correspond to the number of television sequences.

FRAME	TOTAL	TF1	%	FRANCE 2	%
Remembrance	**29**	15	**15.5**	14	**20.0**
Police investigation	**18**	10	**10.3**	8	**11.4**
Security	**17**	15	**15.5**	2	**2.9**
Victim	**17**	7	**7.2**	10	**14.3**
Intelligence	**12**	9	**9.3**	3	**4.3**
Pathways	**10**	6	**6.2**	4	**5.7**
Immigration (deportation)	**10**	8	**8.2**	2	**2.9**
Profile	**10**	4	**4.1**	6	**8.6**
Civilisation	**10**	6	**6.2**	4	**5.7**
Caricatures	**7**	3	**3.1**	4	**5.7**
State of emergency	**6**	4	**4.1**	2	**2.9**
Video surveillance	**6**	1	**1.0**	5	**7.1**
Immigration (border control)	**3**	1	**1.0**	2	**2.9**
Immigration (asylum)	**3**	2	**2.1**	1	**1.4**
Immigration (detention)	**3**	2	**2.1**	1	**1.4**
Ex-prisoners	**3**	2	**2.1**	1	**1.4**
Internet	**1**	1	**1.0**	0	**0.0**
Immigration (stop)	**1**	0	**0.0**	1	**1.4**
Closure of places of worship	**1**	1	**1.0**	0	**0.0**
TOTAL	**167**	**97**	**100**	**70**	**100**

Appendix 14. Nice attack: tweet distribution by frame

FRAMES	TOTAL	COMMENTARY	EVENT	REACTION
Immigration (stop)	**36**	19	8	9
Pathways	**34**	24	9	1
Immigration (deportation)	**19**	10	4	5
Responsibility of NGOs	**18**	8	9	1
Immigration (border control)	**14**	12	1	1
Profile	**10**	6	4	
Immigration (asylum)	**9**	5	3	1
Italy's responsibility	**8**	5	1	2
Intelligence	**8**	3	3	2
Remembrance	**4**	3	1	
Civilisation	**3**	2		1
Closure of places of worship	**2**	2		
Security	**2**	1	1	
Police investigation	**2**		2	
Caricatures	**1**	1		
Immigration (detention)	**1**	1		
Immigration (nationality)	**1**	1		
Immigration (social rights)	**1**	1		
State of emergency	**1**	1		
Ex-prisoners	**1**			1
Unclear	**1**			1

Appendix 15. Nice attack: chronological distribution of attacks cited by the press

The curve represents the year of the events cited per article. For example, 33 press articles mention at least one event that took place in 2015.



Appendix 16. Nice attack: chronological distribution of attacks cited by the newscasts

For example, 15 TV sequences mention at least one event that took place in 2016.



Appendix 17. Nice attack. Search terms used for media crossover

TWITTER IN TELEVISION AND PRESS	'tweet' OR 'tweets' OR 'twitter'
PRESS IN PRESS AND TELEVISION	'presse' OR 'dans Le Figaro' OR 'Les echos' OR 'les échos' OR 'Libération' OR 'La Croix' OR 'L'Humanité' OR 'L'Humanité' OR 'New York Times' OR 'Le Parisien' OR 'La Voix du Nord' OR 'Nice-Matin' OR 'Nice Matin' OR '20 minutes' OR 'Le Point' OR 'L'Obs' OR 'L'Obs' OR 'CNews' OR 'Marianne' OR 'Boston Globe' OR 'daily Mail' OR 'Daily Mirror' OR 'Daily Star' OR 'Financial times' OR 'Guardian' OR 'Corriere della Sera' OR 'Fatto quotidiano' OR 'Sole 24 ore' OR 'Independent' OR 'International Herald Tribune' OR 'La Repubblica' OR 'La Stampa' OR 'L'Espresso' OR 'L'Espresso' OR 'Los Angeles Times' OR 'Mail on Sunday' OR 'New Republic' OR 'New York Times' OR 'Newsweek' OR 'San Francisco Chronicle' OR 'Scotsman' OR 'Sun' OR 'Sunday' OR 'Telegraph' OR 'Time' OR 'Times' OR 'Usa Today' OR 'Wall Street Journal' OR 'Washington Post'
TELEVISION IN TELEVISION AND PRESS	'télévision' OR 'télévisions' OR 'télé' OR 'émission' OR 'émissions' OR 'BFM' OR 'M6' OR 'Arte' OR 'France 3' OR 'CNews' OR 'France 24' OR 'CNN' OR 'Fox News' OR 'BBC' OR 'MSNBC' OR 'ITV' OR 'S4C' OR 'channel'
RADIO IN PRESS AND TELEVISION	'radio' OR 'radios' OR 'France info' OR 'France inter' OR 'France culture' OR 'Europe 1' OR 'RFI' OR 'radio france' OR 'RTL' OR 'France Bleu' OR 'RMC'

Appendix 18. Eurotunnel: main genre for the press and television

	PRESS			**TELEVISION**	
	Le Figaro	**Le Monde**	**La Voix du Nord**	**TF1**	**France 2**
COURSE OF EVENTS	4	0	9	0	1
ANALYSIS	7	9	18	7	4
COURSE OF EVENTS/ANALYSIS	4	4	7	1	1

Appendix 19. Eurotunnel: chronological distribution of tweets



Appendix 20. Eurotunnel: press settings (NVivo)



Appendix 21. Eurotunnel: television settings (NVivo)



Appendix 22. Eurotunnel: gender of the quoted persons

		LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LA VOIX DU NORD*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
INDIVIDUAL	Men		4	4	9	8	
	Women			2			
	Unclear	1	1	4			
	Various						
	N/A						
GROUP	Men						
	Women						
	Unclear			1			
	Various				1		
	N/A						
COLLECTIVITY	Men						
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
PUBLIC OFFICIAL	Men	2	2	4	1		
	Women			2			
	Unclear	4		2			1
	Various						
	N/A						
POLITICIAN	Men	12	13	6	3	4	1
	Women	6	2	3			
	Unclear	1					
	Various	1	2	2			1
	N/A	1					
NGO	Men	2	5		3		1
	Women		6		3	1	
	Unclear		1				
	Various						
	N/A						
ACTIVIST	Men	2		4	3	1	
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A			1			
EXPERT	Men		2				
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
CLERGY	Men		1				
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
LEGAL TEXT	N/A		7				
COMPANY	Men	4		5	3	1	1
	Women			1			
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A		4	5	1		2
TOTAL		**36**	**50**	**46**	**27**	**15**	**7**

Appendix 23. Eurotunnel: partisan distribution of politicians

The total is not equal to that in Appendix 25 as two people may speak together ('Bernard Cazeneuve and Theresa May', 'Bernard Cazeneuve and Manuel Valls', 'Emily Arnold and Chris Precious').

	LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LA VOIX DU NORD*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
FRANCE (RIGHT): LES RÉPUBLICAINS	7	2		1	1	
FRANCE (LEFT): PARTI SOCIALISTE	5	7	3	1	1	2
UNITED KINGDOM (RIGHT): CONSERVATIVE PARTY	6	7	2		1	1
UNITED KINGDOM (LEFT):LABOUR PARTY	1	2				
UNITED KINGDOM (FAR RIGHT): UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP) OR BRITAIN FIRST	1	1		1	1	
FRANCE: N/A	2					
UNITED KINGDOM: N/A			8			
TOTAL	**22**	**19**	**13**	**3**	**4**	**3**

Appendix 24. Eurotunnel: press and television emotion

The emotion of the journalists conducting the interviews is not given. The data correspond to the number of press articles or television sequences.

	LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LA VOIX DU NORD*	TF1	FRANCE 2
ANGER				4	6
ANTICIPATION				1	
COMPASSION		3		3	2
DESPAIR OF MIGRANTS			1	2	
DETERMINATION				1	
DISCOMFORT				2	
EXHORTATION	2		1		
FEAR			1	4	1
HAPPINESS				1	2
HOPE		1			
NEUTRAL (ABSENCE OF EMOTIONS)	13	10	30	4	5
OUTRAGED		1			
QUESTIONING			1		
REMEMBRANCE		1	1		
SADNESS		2	2		2
SCANDALISED	1				
SURPRISED			2		

Appendix 25. Eurotunnel: press format

Items without a number are considered 'one'. (Example: 'Only one editorial is written by *Le Figaro*'). The emotion of the interviews is that of the interviewee, not the interviewer.

	JOURNAL	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE PAGE NUMBER	EMOTIONS
EDITORIAL	*Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *La Voix du Nord* (2)	297	02/08/2015	2.75	Exhortation, Neutral (3), Sadness, Surprised
INTERVIEW	*Le Monde*	1034	06/08/2015	7	Neutral
LOCAL NEWS	*La Voix du Nord* (28)	340	02/08/2015	9.9	Despair of migrants, Fear, Neutral (25), Questioning, Remembrance, Sadness (2), Surprised
NATIONAL NEWS	*Le Figaro* (12), *Le Monde* (8)	633	31/07/2015	5.1	Compassion (2), Neutral (19), Remembrance, Sadness, Scandalised
ZOOM/EN BREF	*Le Figaro* (2)	103	02/08/2015	6	Neutral (2)
OP-ED	*Le Figaro*, *Le Monde* (2), *La Voix du Nord* (4)	589	04/08/2015	23.1	Compassion, Exhortation (2), Hope, Neutral (3), Outraged

Appendix 26. Eurotunnel: newscasts format

	CHANNEL	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DURATION (SECONDS)	AVERAGE POSITION	AVERAGE START TIME	EMOTIONS
EDITED	TF1 (6), FR 2 (2)	29/07/2015	426	140	5	20:05:07	Anger (5), Anticipation, Compassion (2), Determination, Discomfort (2), Distress, Fear (4), Neutral (5), Sadness
LIVE	FR 2	29/07/2015	234	78	2	20:02:01	Neutral (2)
LIVE/ EDITED	FR 2 (2)	02/08/2015	483	178	8	20:13:27	Anger (2), Compassion (2), Happiness (2), Neutral
WITH FOOTAGE/ EDITED	TF1 (1), FR 2	04/08/2015	390	139	7	20:09:20	Anger (3), Compassion, Despair, Fear, Happiness, Neutral, Sadness

ACRONYMS: FR 2: France 2.

Appendix 27. Eurotunnel: press distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	*LE FIGARO*	%	*LE MONDE*	%	*LA VOIX DU NORD*	%
Securing	**48**	12	**18.2**	12	**16.2**	24	**20.0**
Casualty	**32**	9	**13.6**	7	**9.5**	16	**13.3**
Delays	**23**	4	**6.1**	5	**6.8**	14	**11.7**
Demonstration	**20**	5	**7.6**	2	**2.7**	13	**10.8**
Economy	**20**	7	**10.6**	4	**5.4**	9	**7.5**
Voter exasperation	**16**	4	**6.1**	3	**4.1**	9	**7.5**
Compensation	**14**	4	**6.1**	5	**6.8**	5	**4.2**
Asylum	**12**	3	**4.5**	6	**8.1**	3	**2.5**
Press in the UK	**12**	2	**3.0**	6	**8.1**	4	**3.3**
Humanitarian	**11**	2	**3.0**	7	**9.5**	2	**1.7**
Illegal work in the UK	**9**	4	**6.1**	2	**2.7**	3	**2.5**
Smuggler	**9**	1	**1.5**	3	**4.1**	5	**4.2**
European coordination	**8**	4	**6.1**	2	**2.7**	2	**1.7**
Operation Stack	**5**	2	**3.0**	1	**1.4**	2	**1.7**
Social rights in the UK	**5**	0	**0.0**	3	**4.1**	2	**1.7**
Development	**4**	0	**0.0**	2	**2.7**	2	**1.7**
Freedom of movement	**4**	1	**1.5**	1	**1.4**	2	**1.7**
Information	**4**	1	**1.5**	1	**1.4**	2	**1.7**
Tenants	**4**	1	**1.5**	2	**2.7**	1	**0.8**
TOTAL		**66**	**100**	**74**	**100**	**120**	**100**

Appendix 28. Eurotunnel: newscasts distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	TF1	%	FRANCE 2	%
Casualty	**10**	7	**20.6**	3	**14.3**
Securing	**9**	5	**14.7**	4	**19.0**
Voter exasperation	**6**	5	**14.7**	1	**4.8**
Delays	**5**	3	**8.8**	2	**9.5**
Demonstration	**5**	4	**11.8**	1	**4.8**
Humanitarian	**5**	3	**8.8**	2	**9.5**
Economy	**3**	1	**2.9**	2	**9.5**
Press in the UK	**3**	2	**5.9**	1	**4.8**
Asylum	**2**	1	**2.9**	1	**4.8**
Illegal work in the UK	**2**	0	**0.0**	2	**9.5**
Tenants	**2**	1	**2.9**	1	**4.8**
European coordination	**1**	1	**2.9**	0	**0.0**
Smuggler	**1**	1	**2.9**	0	**0.0**
Social rights in the UK	**1**	0	**0.0**	1	**4.8**
TOTAL		**34**	**100**	**21**	**100**

Appendix 29. Eurotunnel: tweet distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	COMMENTARY	EVENT	REACTION
Crossing	**68**	16	49	3
Not Eurotunnel	**30**	20	9	1
Securing	**29**	9	19	1
Government	**25**	23	1	1
Casualty	**19**	6	12	1
Unclear	**9**	5	4	
Delays	**7**	2	5	
Demonstration	**6**	2	4	
Compensation	**3**	2	1	
Eurotunnel	**3**		2	1
Asylum	**2**	2		
Social Rights In France	**2**	2		
Press In The Uk	**1**	1		
Voter Exasperation	**1**		1	

Appendix 30. Burkini: chronological distribution of tweets



Appendix 31. Burkini: press settings (NVivo)

Appendix 32. Burkini: television settings (NVivo)

Appendix 33. Burkini: gender of the quoted persons

		LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LIBÉRATION*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
ACTIVIST	Men	1	1	4			
	Women						
	Unclear			1			
	Various						
	N/A			1			
ARTIST	Men	1	11	3			
	Women	1	4	1			
	Unclear		1				
	Various						
	N/A						
CLERGY	Men	2					
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
COMPANY	Men	1	1				
	Women						
	Unclear	1					
	Various						
	N/A						
EXPERT	Men	19	4	4	3		3
	Women	1	2	3		1	
	Unclear			1			
	Various						
	N/A						
GROUP	Men						
	Women		1	1			
	Unclear	1	1	6			
	Various						
	N/A						
INDIVIDUAL	Men	1	3	9	3	1	
	Women	7	1	8	5	5	
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
JOURNALIST	Men	3					
	Women	1		2			
	Unclear		1				
	Various						
	N/A						
LAWYER	Men		1	1	3	1	
	Women			1			
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
LEGAL TEXT	N/A	1		1	3	2	
NGO	Men	2	2	3	1	1	
	Women	1		1	2		
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A	2					
POLITICIAN	Men	19	14	23	6	13	8
	Women	6	8	4		6	1
	Unclear	1		1			
	Various						
	N/A	1		1			
PUBLIC OFFICIAL	Men	7	2	6	1		6
	Women				1		
	Unclear	1		2			
	Various						
	N/A			1			
SPORTSMAN	Men		2	1			
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A						
OTHER	Men						
	Women						
	Unclear						
	Various						
	N/A	3	1	1			
TOTAL		**84**	**61**	**91**	**28**	**30**	**18**

Appendix 34. Burkini: partisan distribution of politicians

	LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LIBÉRATION*	TF1	FRANCE 2	TWITTER
Rassemblement National (far right)		1			2	2
Other far right (Comités Jeanne, Debout la France)		1			1	3
Les Républicains (right)	10	4	3	3	6	2
La République en Marche (centre)	1		2			
Other centre (Modem, Walwari, EELV)	2		5		1	
Parti Socialiste (left)	9	5	10	3	7	1
La France Insoumise (far left)		1	2			
Other far left (PCF, NPA)		1	4		1	
Foreign – Left (Democratic Party [USA], Democratic Party [Italy], Labour Party [UK])	2	2			1	
Foreign – Centre (Parti québécois [Canada])						1
Foreign – Right (CDU [Germany], Republican Party [USA])	2	1	1			
Foreign – Far Right (UKIP [UK])		2				
Unclear/Other (Les Monarchiens)	1	4	2			
TOTAL	**27**	**22**	**29**	**6**	**19**	**9**

ACRONYMS: CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands; EELV: Europe Écologie les Verts; NPA: Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste; PCF: French Communist Party; UK: United Kingdom; UKIP: UK Independence Party; USA: the United States of America.

Appendix 35. Burkini: press and television emotion

The data correspond to the number of press articles or television sequences.

	LE FIGARO	*LE MONDE*	*LIBÉRATION*	TF1	FRANCE 2
ADMIRING		1			
AMUSED	1				
ANGER	2			5	8
BEGGING		1			
BELLICOSE	3	1			
CALMNESS				1	
COMBATIVE		1			
COMPASSION TOWARDS WOMEN					1
CONFRONTATION	2				
CRITICAL	1				
DISAPPOINTMENT	1				
DOUBTFUL	1				
ENTHUSIASM				1	
EXHORTATION			2		
FEAR		1		3	
FRUSTRATION				1	
HAPPINESS				1	2
HOPE			1		
HORROR		1			
INCOMPREHENSION			1		
NEUTRAL (ABSENCE OF EMOTIONS)	8	6	10	1	4
INSECURITY				1	
IRONIC				1	
MOCKING	2		3		
RESENTMENT				1	
SURPRISED	1	1			
UNDERSTANDING				1	
WELCOMING		1			
WORRIED	1				

Appendix 36. Burkini: press format

Items without a number are worth 'one'. (Example: 'Only one interview is written by *Libération*'). The emotion of the interviews is that of the interviewee, not the interviewer.

	JOURNAL	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE PAGE NUMBER	EMOTIONS	BURKINI IN THE MAJORITY	BURKINI IN THE MINORITY
INTERVIEW	*Le Figaro* (4), *Le Monde* (2), *Libération*	1654	05/09/2016	14.5	Exhortation (2), Neutral (5)	2	5
NATIONAL NEWS	*Le Figaro* (8), *Le Monde* (7), *Libération* (10)	992	06/09/2016	8.8	Admiring, Amused, Begging, Combative, Confrontation (2), Critical, Incomprehension, Neutral (17), Mocking (3), Surprised (2), Welcoming, Worried	8	17
OP-ED	*Le Figaro* (9), *Le Monde* (4), *Libération* (6)	863	07/09/2016	19.1	Anger (2), Bellicose (4), Disappointment, Doubtful, Exhortation (2), Fear, Hope, Horror, Neutral (8), Mocking (2)	8	11

Appendix 37. Burkini: newscasts format

	CHANNEL	AVERAGE DATE	AVERAGE LENGTH (NUMBER OF WORDS)	AVERAGE DURATION (SECONDS)	AVERAGE POSITION	AVERAGE START TIME	EMOTIONS
EDITED	TF1 (8), FR 2 (7)	21/08/2016	418	133.8	4.8	20:06:04	Anger (12), Compassion towards women, Happiness, Calmness, Enthusiasm, Fear (2), Frustration, Happiness (2), Resentment, Understanding
LIVE	FR 2 (2)	25/08/2016	174	60.5	2	20:01:50	Neutral (2)
STUDIO	FR 2	27/08/2016	393	123	9	20:15:40	Anger
WITH FOOTAGE	FR 2	29/08/2016	39	17	10	20:15:02	Neutral
WITH FOOTAGE/ EDITED	TF1	25/08/2016	343	123	9	20:11:53	Fear, Insecurity
WITH FOOTAGE/ STUDIO	TF1 (2), FR 2	25/08/2016	274	87.3	5.7	20:07:33	Neutral (2), Ironic

ACRONYMS: FR 2: France 2.

Appendix 38. Burkini: press distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	*LE FIGARO*	%	*LE MONDE*	%	*LIBÉRATION*	%
Terrorism	**28**	15	**9.7**	7	**11.5**	6	**8.3**
Ban burkini	**26**	16	**10.3**	4	**6.6**	6	**8.3**
Secularism	**25**	14	**9.0**	5	**8.2**	6	**8.3**
Radicalisation	**24**	13	**8.4**	4	**6.6**	7	**9.7**
Communitarianism	**22**	13	**8.4**	6	**9.8**	3	**4.2**
Assimilation	**21**	10	**6.5**	4	**6.6**	7	**9.7**
Authorise burkini	**19**	7	**4.5**	3	**4.9**	9	**12.5**
Jihad	**18**	10	**6.5**	4	**6.6**	4	**5.6**
Political divisions	**18**	6	**3.9**	7	**11.5**	5	**6.9**
Against migrants	**15**	11	**7.1**	2	**3.3**	2	**2.8**
For migrants	**15**	0	**0.0**	9	**14.8**	6	**8.3**
Ban burqa in public space	**8**	6	**3.9**	1	**1.6**	1	**1.4**
Sisco	**8**	3	**1.9**	1	**1.6**	4	**5.6**
State council wrong	**7**	6	**3.9**	1	**1.6**	0	**0.0**
Women oppressed	**7**	4	**2.6**	1	**1.6**	2	**2.8**
Ban veil in public service	**6**	6	**3.9**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**
Great replacement	**6**	5	**3.2**	0	**0.0**	1	**1.4**
State council right	**4**	2	**1.3**	1	**1.6**	1	**1.4**
Veil at school	**4**	3	**1.9**	1	**1.6**	0	**0.0**
International backlash	**3**	3	**1.9**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**
Women free	**3**	1	**0.6**	0	**0.0**	2	**2.8**
Arrest in Nice	**1**	1	**0.6**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**
Origin	**0**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**	0	**0.0**
TOTAL	**288**	**155**	**100**	**61**	**100**	**72**	**100**

Appendix 39. Burkini: newscasts distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	TF1	%	FRANCE 2	%
Ban burkini	**15**	7	**12.3**	8	**13.3**
Political divisions	**15**	8	**14.0**	7	**11.7**
Authorise burkini	**12**	5	**8.8**	7	**11.7**
Secularism	**11**	5	**8.8**	6	**10.0**
Ban burqa in public space	**8**	5	**8.8**	3	**5.0**
Women oppressed	**7**	3	**5.3**	4	**6.7**
Communitarianism	**5**	2	**3.5**	3	**5.0**
Radicalisation	**5**	2	**3.5**	3	**5.0**
Sisco	**5**	3	**5.3**	2	**3.3**
Women free	**5**	3	**5.3**	2	**3.3**
Arrest in Nice	**4**	2	**3.5**	2	**3.3**
Assimilation	**4**	1	**1.8**	3	**5.0**
Veil at school	**4**	2	**3.5**	2	**3.3**
International backlash	**3**	2	**3.5**	1	**1.7**
State council right	**3**	1	**1.8**	2	**3.3**
State council wrong	**3**	1	**1.8**	2	**3.3**
Against migrants	**2**	1	**1.8**	1	**1.7**
Jihad	**2**	2	**3.5**	0	**0.0**
Origin	**2**	1	**1.8**	1	**1.7**
Terrorism	**2**	1	**1.8**	1	**1.7**
TOTAL	**117**	**57**	**100**	**60**	**100**

Appendix 40. Burkini: tweet distribution by frame

FRAME	TOTAL	COMMENTARY	EVENT	REACTION
Against migrants	**94**	65	16	13
Ban burkini	**50**	44	4	2
International backlash	**32**	14	18	
State council wrong	**21**	9	6	6
For migrants	**13**	10	1	2
Authorise burkini	**12**	7	1	4
Terrorism	**10**	9		1
Economy	**10**	7	1	2
State council right	**6**	4	2	
Unclear	**6**	4	2	
Against veil	**5**	5		
Communitarianism	**4**	4		
Against mosques	**3**	3		
Against halal	**2**	2		
Secularism	**2**	2		
Great replacement	**2**	2		
Sisco	**1**	1		

Appendix 41. Vocabulary of migration

	NICE	EUROTUNNEL	BURKINI	TOTAL
LE FIGARO	Terroriste (46), terrorisme (38), ans (33), l'immigration (30), menace (26), musulmans (26), personnes (26), étrangers (22), islamistes (20), tunisien (20)	migrants (64), clandestins (14), crise (11), nombre (11), plusieurs (10), groupe (8), migratoire (7), l'immigration (6), milliers (6), réfugiés (6)	femmes (36), musulmans (33), terrorisme (19), femme (13), l'immigration (11), plusieurs (11), menace (10), musulman (10), personne (10), migrants (9)	migrants (88), musulmans (59), terrorisme (57), terroriste (49), l'immigration (47), ans (43), femmes (38), menace (37), personnes (34), plusieurs (33)
LE MONDE	Terrorisme (54), ans (49), personnes (25), terroriste (24), tunisien (20), homme (17), terroristes (16), jeune (15), l'immigration (15), musulmans (15), plusieurs (15)	migrants (85), ans (21), crise (18), nombre (15), personnes (14), mort (12), soudanais (10), clandestins (9), migratoire (9), morts (8), plusieurs (8)	musulmans (24), femmes (18), daech (14), gens (12), femme (11), ans (10), plusieurs (9), syrie (9), noir (8), corps (7), jeunes (7), menace (7)	migrants (93), ans (80), terrorisme (59), personnes (45), musulmans (40), plusieurs (32), nombre (29), terroriste (28), crise (26), femmes (25)
TF1	Femme (40), homme (34), terroriste (34), ans (29), victimes (27), personnes (21), terrorisme (21), fidèles (17), vingt (17), assaillant (16)	migrants (39), cents (13), vingt (11), migrant (10), mille (10), crise (7), personnes (7), morts (6), dangereux (5), gens (5)	femme (14), femmes (11), corps (8), maghrébine (7), d'origine (6), personnes (6), homme (5), musulmans (5), arabes (4), musulman (4), radicaux (4)	femme (54), migrants (49), homme (43), ans (34), personnes (34), terroriste (34), vingt (30), victimes (28), mille (27), terrorisme (21)
FRANCE 2	Ans (26), femme (26), terroriste (23), victimes (23), mille (22), assaillant (21), homme (20), vingt (18), brahim (13), famille (12), personnes (12)	migrants (27), cents (6), mille (6), ans (5), lakhi (5), tahar (5), dix (4), d'origine (4), pakistanaise (4), vingt (4)	femmes (10), femme (9), ans (6), musulmans (5), personnes (5), corps (4), personne (4), radical (4), crise (2), européens (2), islamiste (2), musulman (2), plusieurs (2), trentaine (2), vingt (2)	ans (37), femme (35), migrants (34), mille (28), vingt (24), terroriste (23), victimes (23), homme (22), assaillant (21), personnes (17)
TWITTER	Migrants (26), tunisien (21), terroriste (20), migrant (15), ans (11), l'immigration (11), terroristes (9), migratoire (8), fichés (6), terrorisme (6), étrangers (6)	migrants (79), migrant (20), clandestins (9), mort (7), l'immigration (6), migratoire (3), clandestin (2), crise (2), immigration (2)	étrangers (44), migrants (26), l'immigration (12), immigration (10), immigrés (9), l'immigration (6), ans (5), femmes (5), migratoire (4), musulmans (4), réfugiés (4), terrorisme (4)	migrants (131), étrangers (50), migrant (35), l'immigration (29), tunisien (21), terroriste (20), ans (16), migratoire (15), clandestins (14), immigration (14)
TOTAL	Ans (232), terroriste (212), terrorisme (167), personnes (125), tunisien (99), homme (94), femme (83), victimes (82), brahim (80), menace (75), migrants (74), terroristes (66), musulmans (65), plusieurs (57), étrangers (57), l'immigration (55), fidèles (51), islamiste (46), jeune (46), gens (45)	migrants (401), migrant (56), ans (50), crise (47), clandestins (44), nombre (35), plusieurs (34), migratoire (33), mort (31), morts (29), groupe (28), personnes (28), soudanais (27), gens (25), cents (24), dix (23), décès (23), mille (22), vingt (22), nombreux (19)	femmes (107), musulmans (89), femme (63), ans (57), étrangers (56), migrants (44), enfants (32), gens (32), terrorisme (31), personnes (30), plusieurs (29), communauté (28), corps (28), l'immigration (28), personne (27), famille (26), jeunes (26), musulman (26), hommes (23), daech (22)	N/A

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BRIDGES

Assessing the production and impact of migration narratives

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